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Chapter
1
Introduction
This thesis is the result of my research on questions concerning theory change
and certain aspects of rationality that underlies it. As the primary focus of
my investigations emerged two issues: ﬁrst, rationality governing the context
of theory pursuit and second, formal models that can account for this type of
rationality. In what follows I will clarify and motivate these two problem ﬁelds
of my research.
1.1 Epistemic Justification and the Context of Pursuit1
1.1.1 Epistemic Justification of Scientific Theories
Science has many goals. Beside the practical ones, such as improving the life
standards of citizens, or providing predictive control of our environment, there
are also epistemic goals. Science should provide us with knowledge about the
world. It should increase our understanding by providing explanations and
accurate descriptions of natural or social phenomena.2
Epistemic justiﬁcation is concerned with the latter type of goals. It is
traditionally conceived of as providing standards for the acceptability of certain
beliefs in the knowledge base or the cognitive system of an intelligent agent.
Applied to a scientiﬁc theory, it provides criteria for its inclusion and acceptance
into the grand corpus of our scientiﬁc knowledge. It concerns the question as to
whether we have good reasons to consider it as being (approximately) truthful,
empirically adequate, etc. Hence, epistemic justiﬁcation is tightly connected
to what Larry Laudan calls the context of acceptance, i.e. the context in which
1This section includes parts of my paper written together with Christian Straßer: (Sˇesˇelja
and Straßer 201x), which is further presented in Chapter 3.
2Of course, these goals are interwoven. For instance, predictive power is also an epistemic
goal.
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scientists choose to accept a theory and thus treat it as if it were true (Laudan
1977, p. 108).
However, while it is a worthwhile epistemic goal to satisfy the criteria of
theory acceptance, it is not the only one. A quick glance at the history of
science reveals that scientiﬁc knowledge is highly dynamic and we shouldn’t be
all too assured with the theories we have accepted. Not just is it the case that
theories often have to be altered and adjusted, but sometimes they have to be
entirely replaced. Under suﬃcient pressure of anomalies we may be justiﬁed
in no longer maintaining the belief that these theories are suﬃciently good to
be considered acceptable. These times of crisis we do not want to face empty-
handed.
Therefore, another important epistemic goal of our scientiﬁc knowledge is
achieving robustness with respect to these perturbations and conditions of un-
certainty. If robustness is the ability to maintain performance in the face of
perturbations and uncertainty (Stelling et al. 2004), then we can say that the
scientiﬁc knowledge in a given domain is robust if it is able to maintain its key
functions of explaining and helping us to understand the world, by means of
avoiding and, if necessary, by overcoming scientiﬁc crisis. Clearly, the more ro-
bust our theories (in a certain domain) are with respect to these perturbations
the more robust our scientiﬁc knowledge base as a whole (in this domain) is.3
Although robust theories support this aim, since we cannot be sure that even
the best theories withstand a possible future crisis we need more in order to
ensure the robustness of the scientiﬁc knowledge as a whole. Recall that, as
Otto Neurath famously remarked (Neurath 1932/1933 (1983, p. 92), scientists
are “like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever
being able to dismantle it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best com-
ponents”. Given the case that the old ship is about to sink and we cannot ﬁx
it anymore, we need to have (an)other “backup”-ship(s) available. Similarly,
given the fact that even our best theories may fall in crisis, it is supportative
of the aim of robustness to have alternative “backup”-theories around. These
theories don’t come from nowhere, but have to be thoroughly investigated and
pursued.
This opens two perspectives on the composition and structure of scientiﬁc
knowledge as a whole or in a give domain: (i) the ﬂat perspective under which
scientiﬁc knowledge is composed of accepted theories and (ii) the entrenched
perspective under which scientiﬁc knowledge is composed and structured by
layers of more and more entrenched theories. The degree of entrenchment may
be measured by any standard of epistemic justiﬁcation (such as for example
the degree of coherence). At the most entrenched level we have the accepted
theories. At the following levels we have alternative theories that may in times
of crisis oﬀer good backups for the accepted theories, or that may under fur-
ther development eventually surpass the currently accepted theories. Although
3For an account of the robustness of theories (and/or their constitutive parts) see for
instance (Wimsatt 2007, Calcott 2011) or (Chang 2004, p. 51-52). See also Footnote 5 in
Chapter 3.
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they do not (yet) suﬃce the criteria of actual epistemic justiﬁcation for being
accepted (e.g. they are not coherent enough) they are epistemically justiﬁed in
a diﬀerent sense since they, on the one hand, support the robustness of scien-
tiﬁc knowledge, while, on the other hand, they are promising of developing into
candidates for acceptance and in so far they serve the goal of adequacy and
accuracy of scientiﬁc knowledge. We will thus say that a theory is potentially
epistemically justified to the extent that it is promising of contributing to the
epistemic goal of robustness and of developing into a candidate for acceptance.4
In the following subsection we will suggest that a theory is epistemically worthy
of further pursuit to the extent it is potentially epistemically justiﬁed.
1.1.2 The Context of Pursuit
According to Laudan, in addition to acceptance and rejection, pursuit and
non-pursuit are the other two major cognitive stances that scientists can le-
gitimately take towards research traditions (and their constituent theories)
(Laudan 1977, p. 119). The notion of the context of pursuit resulted from the
discussion on the traditional distinction between the context of discovery and
the context of justiﬁcation (proposed by Hans Reichenbach in the 30s’ (Re-
ichenbach 1938)) which, in view of many philosophers, needed to be reﬁned
by introducing an intermediate step. For example, Richard Tursman speaks of
“the logic of pursuit and/or of preliminary evaluation of hypotheses”, linking
it to Charles S. Peirce’s account of abduction as a logic of pursuit, according
to which, there is a prima facie ground for pursuing a hypothesis which is
capable of explaining certain surprising facts, which have been observed (Turs-
man 1987, p. 13-14). Imre Lakatos characterizes his “methodology of scientiﬁc
research programmes” as consisting of “a negative heuristic”, which tells us
what paths of pursuit to avoid, and “a positive heuristic”, which tells what
paths to pursue (Lakatos 1978, p. 47). Ernan McMullin speaks of a “heuristic
appraisal”, which regards the research-potential of a theory (McMullin 1976).
Thomas Nickles also discusses “heuristic appraisal” (Nickles 2006), as well as a
“preliminary evaluation”, “plausibility assessment” or “pursuit” as the context
which ”requires the comparative evaluation of problem-solving eﬃciency and
promise, not simply the evaluation of completed research”, in contrast to the
traditional theories of conﬁrmation (Nickles 1980, p. 21). Martin V. Curd ar-
gues that “not only is the logic of pursuit of more immediate practical relevance
to scientiﬁc inquiry than the logic of probability but also that it is the only
workable notion of a logic of discovery in the sense of a logic of prior assessment
that one can formulate” (Curd 1980, p. 204). Finally, Laudan describes this
intermediate step as “the context of pursuit” (Laudan 1977, 1980), and Laurie
Anne Whitt as “theory promise” or “theory pursuit” (Whitt 1990, 1992).
Nevertheless, the question of pursuit has often been left out of the accounts
of epistemic justiﬁcation. Even though some of the above mentioned authors
4Also Sven Ove Hansson (2003) makes –in reference to David Makinson– the distinction
between actual and potential justification of beliefs.
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discuss the nature of the context of pursuit or the possible logic of pursuit, and
even though it has often been pointed out that such a prior assessment already
embraces elements of justiﬁcation (Schickore and Steinle 2006a, p. viii), there
has been little to no consideration of this question in the concrete accounts
of epistemic justiﬁcation.5 In contrary, pursuit worthiness has been mainly
discussed in view of an interwoven set of epistemic and non-epistemic values,
the latter referring to social, ethical, or political values or personal interests
of scientists (e.g. (Nickles 2006), (Kitcher 2001, Chapter 9), (Douglas 2009,
Chapter 5)).
As we have suggested in the previous subsection, pursuit worthiness is a
valid subject of epistemic justiﬁcation that needs to be addressed in a diﬀerent
way than theory acceptance. Scientiﬁc theories clearly do not suddenly come
into existence complete and fully equipped with an explanatory apparatus that
would satisfy the standards of theory acceptance. Their origin lies in ideas and
hypotheses that have been thoroughly investigated, reformulated, corrected.
But at the same time, young theories can be promising of developing into
good backups for the currently established theories, and eventually even into
acceptable ones. Hence, from an epistemic perspective, what we are concerned
with in the context of pursuit is not the question as to whether a theory is
acceptable, but as to whether there are good epistemic reasons for its further
pursuit. We will say that a theory is epistemically worthy of pursuit to the
extent that it can be shown to have a promising potential for contributing to
those epistemic goals that determine theory acceptance, as well as to the value
of robustness. In other words, a theory is epistemically worthy of pursuit to
the same degree that it is potentially epistemically justiﬁed.
To be sure, the evaluation in the context of pursuit, as a part of the scien-
tiﬁc practice, is certainly not exclusively epistemic. Many other non-epistemic
factors play a role in deciding which problems to tackle, which methodology
is ethically acceptable, etc. But this does not imply that epistemic values do
not have a place in such an evaluation. In contrary, debates among scientists
about the further pursuit of emerging scientiﬁc theories are often focused on
novel explanations and predictions that the given theory oﬀers, its consistency
and compatibility with theories from other scientiﬁc domains, etc. Having
good epistemic reasons for the further investigation of a theory is an important
criterion for deciding about its pursuit, though it is not the only one that is
practically relevant.
It is also important to notice that the question of epistemic pursuit worthi-
ness is diﬀerent from the question: Which theory should an individual scientist
actually pursue? Showing that a theory is epistemically worthy of pursuit does
not imply that each scientist should engage in its actual pursuit, since more
5The closest to an epistemic treatment of pursuit worthiness came Laurie Anne Whitt
who, in response to McMullin’s approach, remarked that “There seems to be no reason
to accept the stipulation that epistemic appraisals are limited to contexts of acceptance.”
(Whitt 1992, p. 616). In addition, Chang’s coherentist epistemic iteration (Chang 2004)
addresses some aspects of the context of pursuit even though he does not explicitly discuss
the notion of pursuit or pursuit worthiness.
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than one theory can simultaneously be epistemically worthy of pursuit. The
fact that some of them are epistemically worthy of pursuit should not be con-
fused with speciﬁc preferences individual scientists may have when choosing
which of these theories to work on. A rational division of labor in a given
scientiﬁc discipline depends on the epistemic status of all available theoretical
candidates, as well as on some non-epistemic factors, such as the number of
scientists working in the ﬁeld, the ﬁnancial resources, personal interests and
expertise of the scientists etc. Therefore, an account of the epistemic pur-
suit worthiness provides tools that (together with some other elements) play
a central role in determining the rational division of labor in a given scientiﬁc
community.
In the ﬁrst part of this thesis I discuss some of the central questions raised by
the neglect of the context of pursuit in philosophy of science and epistemology.
First of all, in Chapter 2 I disambiguate between diﬀerent notions of pursuit
and pursuit worthiness. Epistemic pursuit worthiness will be explicated as one
of the notions that plays a key role in the evaluation of scientiﬁc theories. In
Chapter 3 I present a coherentist account of epistemic justiﬁcation suitable for
the context of pursuit, that I have developed together with Christian Straßer.
In Chapter 4 I apply this framework to the revolution in geology in order to
investigate the pursuit worthiness of Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental
drift. This chapter has resulted from a joint work with Erik Weber.
1.2 Formal Modeling – Argumentation Frameworks and
Adaptive Logics
1.2.1 Epistemic Evaluation from an Argumentative Point of
View
In the last couple of decades discussions in the ﬁeld of philosophy of science
and scientiﬁc methodology have witnessed a growing conviction that a rule-
based algorithmic approach to theory appraisal is problematic (e.g. (McMullin
1982, p. 17), (McMullin 1984, p. 56), (Kuhn 1996, p. 198-199), (Kuhn 2000,
p. 200)). One possible attempt to preserve the normative idea of rational-
ity in spite of abandoning the idea of a static, universally applicable scientiﬁc
method can be found in more rhetorically minded approaches to scientiﬁc rea-
soning, such as Marcello Pera’s (1994) or Marcelo Dascal’s (2000). Instead of
an algorithmic assessment of scientiﬁc theories, Pera and Dascal emphasize the
evaluation in view of the argumentative context underlying the given episode
in the history of science. While formal approaches to scientiﬁc reasoning have
been mainly focused on the logical form of arguments (that is, the nature of the
inference relation), both Pera and Dascal show that scientiﬁc debates (Dascal’s
controversies) are typically not resolved by derivational reasoning that is char-
acteristic for logic but rather by scientists exchanging arguments and trying to
convince each other by giving reasons that substantiate their points.
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In view of this argumentative shift in methodology, an account of epistemic
justiﬁcation, suitable for either the context of pursuit or the context of ac-
ceptance, has to allow for its constitutive criteria to be determined in view of
scientiﬁc debates relevant for the given historical context. That means that the
nature of the criteria, or their speciﬁc preference order cannot be pre-deﬁned,
but it is dependent on the speciﬁc historical context. The speciﬁcities of his-
torical contexts can be found by a close analysis of scientiﬁc debates in the
given domain at the time.
Chapter 5 starts from these insights and reexamines the previously pre-
sented account of epistemic justiﬁcation from such an argumentative perspec-
tive. We will take a closer look at Kuhn’s views towards theory evaluation in
the context of pursuit, as well as at his notion of persuasion. The latter notion
will point to the argumentative approach to scientiﬁc methodology, which will
be presented in view of McMullin’s and Pera’s views.
Let us also mention that a discussion on the relation between Kuhn’s
views and coherentist epistemology is presented in the Appendix of this the-
sis. Even though related to the above points, this discussion is written as a
reply to (Kuukkanen 2007) and hence, stands on its own. One of the points we
make in this paper regards Kuhn’s stance on the rationality underlying inter-
paradigmatic changes and its relation to coherentist epistemology. The paper
is a result of a joint work with Christian Straßer.
1.2.2 Explanatory Argumentation Frameworks
The argumentative approach to methodology motivates an argumentative ap-
proach to formal modeling of theory assessment as well. Formal theories of
argumentation have been extensively researched within the ﬁelds of artiﬁcial
intelligence, philosophy, logic and computer science. One of the most inﬂuential
formal accounts of argumentation is Phan Minh Dung’s abstract argumenta-
tion framework (Dung 1993, 1995). The signiﬁcance of Dung’s approach derives
from the fact that it abstracts away from the nature of arguments and argu-
mentation rules, which allows us to focus on the interplay of arguments rather
than on their speciﬁc structure. The fruitfulness of this framework stems also
from the fact that it is easily enhanceable with additional properties and the
fact that it is useful in diﬀerent application contexts. However, the abstract
argumentation framework has so far not been applied to the modeling of theory
choice and scientiﬁc debates. Moreover, the framework has not been enhanced
with explanatory capabilities, which play a signiﬁcant role in scientiﬁc rea-
soning. Chapter 6 presents this enhancement, which we call the Explanatory
Argumentation Framework, and its application to the modeling of scientiﬁc
debates. We will show that such a framework allows for a comparison of dif-
ferent sets of arguments in view of their explanatory virtues. Furthermore,
we will oﬀer a set of criteria which are useful for the demarcation of rivaling
scientiﬁc views in terms of arguments, as well as for an evaluation of such views
in terms of their argumentative and explanatory properties. We will show that
such a modeling is suitable for theory evaluation in both the context of pursuit
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and the context of acceptance. This chapter is a result of a joint work with
Christian Straßer.
1.2.3 Adaptive Logic Framework for Abstract
Argumentation
The ﬁeld of abstract argumentation opens the question how to represent the
reasoning underlying selection procedures of acceptable sets of arguments in
a formal logical way. According to Dung, “Logic-based knowledge bases can
be viewed as argumentation systems where the knowledge base is coded in the
structure of the arguments and the logic is used to determine the acceptability
of the arguments.” (Dung 1995, p. 856, italics added). By representing the
acceptability of arguments in a proof theoretic manner, an additional approach
to formalizing scientiﬁc reasoning can be oﬀered. Such an approach diﬀers from
logical formalizations of inferences made in scientiﬁc reasoning (such as induc-
tion, abduction, etc.) in view of the given propositions. As John L. Pollock
remarks: “Constructing arguments is one thing. Deciding which conclusions to
accept is another. . . . The conclusions that ought to be believed are those that
are undefeated.” (Pollock 1987, p. 7). Hence, in this type of logical systems,
the focus is not on the derivation of propositions in view of other individual
propositions, but on the derivation of arguments, and thus of the conclusions
made by them, that are considered acceptable in view of the whole set of ar-
guments constituting the given debate.
The adaptive logics have shown to be a fruitful system for this purpose. In
Chapter 7 I present an adaptive logic framework that provides a proof theory
for all the standard selection procedures of abstract argumentation frameworks.
This part has resulted from a joint work with Christian Straßer.

Chapter
2
Diambiguating the Notions
of Pursuit and Pursuit
Worthiness
. I wish to thank Christian Straßer and Erik Weber for valuable comments
on a former version of this chapter.
Summary In this chapter we will disambiguate between diﬀerent types of
pursuit which belong to the scientiﬁc practice, and between diﬀerent types
of pursuit worthiness, that is, diﬀerent ways in which a theory can be wor-
thy of pursuit. With respect to the notion of pursuit, we will distinguish
between, on the one hand, the pursuit of explanatory theories and, on the
other hand, the pursuit of scientiﬁcally relevant phenomena, entities, techno-
logical developments, etc. With respect to the notion of pursuit worthiness, we
will distinguish, ﬁrst, between the epistemic and non-epistemic kind of pursuit
worthiness, and second, between the pursuit worthiness regarding individual
rationality and the one regarding group rationality. Finally, in view of these
distinctions we will explicate the notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness that
will be of our primary interest in this thesis.
2.1 Introduction
To pursue a theory means to engage in its further investigation, aiming at its
development or a development of its variants. Whether a theory is worthy of
pursuit is usually assessed in terms of epistemic as well as non-epistemic con-
cerns. As we have announced, our primary interest in this thesis is the epistemic
pursuit worthiness of scientiﬁc theories. But before we present our framework
suitable for the evaluation of epistemic pursuit worthiness, we should clarify
the idea of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. More precisely, we should explicate
in which way pursuit of scientiﬁc theories diﬀers from other types of pursuit
that are of scientiﬁc interest, and in which way epistemic pursuit worthiness
diﬀers from the notion that involves both epistemic and non-epistemic criteria.
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Finally, the distinction between individual and group rationality underlying
the context of pursuit should be explicated as well.
Some of these aspects of pursuit are also characteristic of a pursuit con-
ducted by a detective who is investigating a criminal case. Thus, before we
turn to the scientiﬁc enterprise, let us take a look at how a detective’s pur-
suit is evaluated. This might help us in noticing that similar aspects can be
distinguished in the case of scientiﬁc pursuit as well.
First, if a detective is to investigate a new murder case, she will try to
build a hypothesis of how the murder occurred. There are diﬀerent ways in
which it can be evaluated whether her hypothesis is worthy of pursuit. On
the one hand, our detective may need to show (for example, when presenting
the case to her super-ordinate) why her hypothesis is epistemically worthy of
pursuit. This includes showing that there is evidence which indicates that
her hypothesis best explains the given case. Moreover, she is to show how
she plans on proceeding with her investigation. That includes showing that
her pursuit will be based on the heuristics that can allow for further evidence
to be collected and used to corroborate or falsify the initial hypothesis. For
example, in order to investigate the main suspect, the detective might propose
introducing wiretaps on the suspect’s phone line. However, in spite of being
epistemically interesting, such a pursuit might conﬂict with certain ethical or
political concerns. For example, her proposal to implement wiretaps might
aﬀect the privacy of people who are not directly involved in the given case. Or
her pursuit could lead to the evidence that certain politicians, who are directly
responsible for the funding of the police department, are involved in the case.
In the former case, the pursuit might be assessed as ethically problematic in
its current form. In the latter case, the pursuit might be assessed as politically
problematic and moreover, ﬁnancially unfeasible. In other words, in spite of
being epistemically worthy of pursuit, the investigation does not have to be
practically worthy of pursuit, where by practical pursuit worthiness we mean
the assessment of the given pursuit in view of both epistemic and non-epistemic
values that are determined by the given socio-political framework. Finally, her
case could be both epistemically and practically worthy of pursuit, but, for
instance, due to certain reductions in the budget of the police department, not
actually pursued.
Second, we can imagine that another detective, working on a diﬀerent case,
obtains through his own investigation some new evidence relevant for the above
mentioned murder as well. Moreover, he might develop a diﬀerent hypothesis
for who the main suspect in this murder is. We can imagine that even though
his hypothesis is supported by some evidence, it cannot account for all the
evidence provided by his colleague, while her hypothesis cannot account for
some of his evidence either. Hence, both hypotheses could turn out to be
epistemically worthy of pursuit, that is, in view of all the available evidence.
Note, however, that this does not mean that investigative plans for both of
them would necessarily be equally worthy of pursuit in other respects as well:
they could diﬀer in ethical, political or social aspects. But let us assume that
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they are in these respects unproblematic.1 In this case, it would be rational for
both detectives to further pursue their respective hypotheses, until they obtain
some more decisive evidence.
This example nicely shows diﬀerent aspects of pursuit in general, and dif-
ferent notions of pursuit worthiness. We have ﬁrst seen that the fact that a
hypothesis and an investigation based on it are epistemically worthy of pursuit
may not coincide with its practical pursuit worthiness. Second, more than one
hypotheses may simultaneously be practically worthy of pursuit. Hence, the
fact that one of them is assessed as such does not mean that each detective
working on the case should engage in its actual pursuit. Diﬀerent detectives
may simultaneously conduct diﬀerent investigations regarding the same case.
In the remainder of this chapter we will show that these distinctions apply in a
similar way to the notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness regarding scientiﬁc
theories.
2.2 The Pursuit Worthiness of Theories and the Pursuit
Worthiness of Other Types of Scientifically Relevant
Questions
Our detective case showed certain aspects of pursuit that are similar to the
pursuit of scientiﬁc theories. But before we take a look at diﬀerent types of
pursuit worthiness regarding scientiﬁc theories, we should ﬁrst distinguish the
pursuit of scientiﬁc theories from other types of pursuit, that may also be
scientiﬁcally relevant.
Depending on what kind of issue is being investigated, we can distinguish
between a pursuit of scientiﬁc theories and other types of pursuit, such as those
regarding scientiﬁcally relevant phenomena, entities or technological develop-
ments.2 These types of pursuit are often interwoven within the same research.
For instance, the pursuit of Wegener’s theory of the continental drift, which
was explanatory of diﬀerent geological explananda, implied the pursuit of the
phenomenon of drift itself. Therefore the pursuit worthiness of the theory of
continental drift implied that the phenomenon of drift was worthy of pursuit
as well.
However, the criteria used for the evaluation of the pursuit worthiness of
explanatory theories may not always be suitable for the evaluation of the for-
mer type of pursuit.3 A scientiﬁcally relevant phenomenon worthy of pursuit
1Of course, what counts as problematic here depends on the ethical and political stan-
dards one adopts. See also the discussion in Section 2.3.
2Martin Carrier makes a similar distinction between “epistemic research” as the search
for understanding, characterized by knowledge-guided mode of problem selection, and
“application-oriented research” as the search for utility (Carrier 2010). However, our dis-
tinction is different since a scientifically relevant phenomenon does not necessarily belong to
a search for utility (see the example of the continental drift bellow).
3Even though we are placing here very different types of pursuit (that of phenomena,
entities, technological inventions) in the same group, this is only due to the fact that in this
thesis we will be interested in pursuit and pursuit worthiness of explanatory theories. Hence
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may be, for example, a certain statistical correlation. For instance, pursuing
correlations such as those between smoking and lung cancer can be worthy in
view of certain epistemic and social reasons. However, once we have shown
that the correlation holds, we are also interested in a theory that explains it.
Whether such a theory is worthy of pursuit or not needs to be evaluated in
a diﬀerent way (for instance, by taking a look at how good explanations the
theory oﬀers, how well connected it is with other scientiﬁc theories, etc.).
Another example of the pursuit of scientiﬁcally relevant phenomena is the
investigation of the question as to whether there is extra-terrestrial life, as it
has been done by various SETI (the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence)
projects. For this investigation to be worthy of pursuit, we need to show that
there is a methodology that provides the heuristic of our investigation, that
there is a certain level of likelihood of the success in ﬁnding the extraterrestrial
intelligent life forms, as well as that the overall epistemic and non-epistemic
beneﬁts of such an investigation outweigh the possible dangers (see (Kukla
2001)). In contrast, a theory that aims at explaining the extraterrestrial life
can be worthy of pursuit only after the evidence of such life forms has been
found. Moreover, when evaluating the pursuit worthiness of such a theory, we
will not only be interested in how good its heuristic is, but also in how good its
current explanations are, and why the theory seems promising of developing
into a highly explanatory one. Even though some criteria of pursuit worthiness
may overlap, some others will be diﬀerent.
Yet another example of pursuit that should be distinguished from a pur-
suit of explanatory theories is the one regarding technological developments.
Pursuing the invention of an instrument, apparatus, machine, etc. could be a
part of a pursuit of a certain explanatory theory. For instance, a pursuit of
nuclear weapons can be seen as a part of the pursuit of theories within the
domain of nuclear physics, where the former was not only an application of the
latter, but it also served to produce additional evidence for it. Clearly, there
are good reasons why a pursuit of such a technology may be considered highly
ethically problematic and in so far unworthy of being conducted. But this does
not mean a pursuit of theories in the domain of nuclear physics is unworthy
as well, in case they oﬀer alternative ways of obtaining the evidence regarding
their hypotheses. When we evaluate whether a given technological development
is worthy of pursuit, we are interested in how useful such a technology could
be, how easy it would be to handle it, what the beneﬁts and dangers of such a
pursuit are, etc. In contrast to scientiﬁc theories, technological developments
do not need to aim at oﬀering scientiﬁc explanations (though they may indeed
make use of scientiﬁc explanations, that serve as guidelines in the construction
of the given technology).
To sum up: on the one hand, the pursuit of phenomena, entities, and tech-
nological developments, and on the other hand, the pursuit of explanatory
theories belong to diﬀerent types of pursuit, which may be tightly connected.
the aim of the above distinction is to delineate the latter type of pursuit, rather than to
properly define the former.
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Nevertheless, evaluating their respective pursuit worthiness may require diﬀer-
ent criteria of evaluation. In the following two sections we will take a closer
look at the latter type – pursuit of theories.
2.3 Epistemic and Non-epistemic viz. Practical Notions
of Pursuit Worthiness
Let us now get back to our example of a detective case. The ﬁrst type of
distinction that we have seen there is the one regarding the question: According
to which criteria is pursuit worthiness of a theory evaluated?
As we have already mentioned, it has been common in the philosophical
literature to relate the epistemic justiﬁcation primarily to the context of ac-
ceptance. In contrast, theory evaluation in the context of pursuit has usually
been related to a joint set of epistemic and non-epistemic criteria. For exam-
ple, Thomas Nickles makes a distinction between epistemic appraisal (EA) and
heuristic appraisal (HA):
EA attends to truth-conductive features of justiﬁcation and decision-
making, while HA attends to a variety of heuristic and pragmatic
considerations relating to economy of research. . . . HA evaluates
the promise or potential fertility and feasibility of further work on
a problem, research program, theory, hypothesis, model, or tech-
nique. (Nickles 2006, p. 159)
Nickles argues that HA cannot be reduced to EA, nor can it be described as
its derivative (p. 164). Moreover, according to him HA is primarily concerned
with pragmatic aspects of the scientiﬁc research, namely, its fertility and its
practical realizability (p. 165). It regards questions such as: “Where do we
go from here? What would be a good project to do next?”, “Is the project
feasible for anyone right now? For us?” (p. 167). Nickles thus regards HA as
an evaluation which is done in view of not only epistemic criteria, but also – and
essentially – in view of non-epistemic criteria. When performing HA, scientists
must take into account “external factors” such as those regarding the question
as to “whether their research is likely to be funded, whether the lab director
or department head will look favourably upon this project; whether enough
laboratory space, equipment, and expert technical assistance is available” etc.
(p. 169).
A similar approach to the notion of pursuit can be found in Philip Kitcher’s
2001.4 Kitcher proposes a detailed account of how a scientiﬁc inquiry should be
organized, where the notion of pursuit is understood in terms of both epistemic
and non-epistemic standards (Kitcher 2001, Chapter 9). However, he recognizes
a possible conﬂict between epistemic and non-epistemic pursuit worthiness.
Arguing that restrictions on a free inquiry are sometimes justiﬁed, he writes:
4Another example would be Heather Douglas’ discussion of epistemic and non-epistemic
values that jointly play a role in assessing pursuit worthiness of research processes (Douglas
2009, Chapter 5).
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Respecting rights comes at a price, and it’s important that the price
be distributed fairly. In situations where free inquiry would unfairly
increase the burden on those who are already disadvantaged, there
can be no right to free inquiry. (Ibid., p. 103)
Without going into a discussion on Kitcher’s view on free inquiry, there
is an important point about pursuit that Kitcher raises here. The conﬂicting
interests regarding pursuit can be presented in terms of diﬀerent prices that
need to be payed if the pursuit is conducted. For instance, if the research
involves a certain ethically problematic methodology, we may say that the
ethical price to pay is too high, and hence, the pursuit in this form should
be avoided. Similarly, we may ask whether the epistemic price to pay is too
high if a certain pursuit (that is, a scientiﬁc project involving it) is no longer
ﬁnanced. The epistemic price could, for instance, refer to the abandoning of
this research altogether, or to giving up on certain aspects of it, which would,
if realized, result in an epistemic beneﬁt. Those arguing for the rejection of a
further ﬁnancial support may say that the economic price to pay outweighs the
epistemic beneﬁt in case the theory is pursued (for example, due to the fact
that the theory is epistemically not very interesting, while its pursuit requires a
huge investment). Of course, how one weighs out diﬀerent “prices to be paid”
is also dependent on social and political interests that determine what means
that some factors outweigh the others.
Altogether, what this tells us is that a decision regarding the undertaking of
a given pursuit involves the weighting of diﬀerent epistemic and non-epistemic
factors, where we estimate which epistemic, ethical, economic, political, etc.
prices to be payed are right. Deciding whether a scientiﬁc theory is worthy of
pursuit in view of all these respects amounts to, what we shall call, practical
pursuit worthiness. Nevertheless, we can also speak of epistemic pursuit worthi-
ness alone. This notion concerns the question as to whether a theory is worthy
of pursuit in view of epistemic values, disregarding whether the non-epistemic
factors have been satisﬁed.
The following example should help us to clarify some more aspects of the
relation between the epistemic and the practical pursuit worthiness. Imagine
that a further investigation of a developing scientiﬁc theory is, in principle,
technically realizable but it conﬂicts with certain ideological views of the gov-
ernment and with the institutions responsible for funding of scientiﬁc research.
When evaluating such a research proposal according to the criteria compris-
ing of both epistemic and non-epistemic values, the scientists would have to
conclude that their project is simply not worthy of pursuit, since it is polit-
ically controversial, and is thus unlikely to be ﬁnanced. Nevertheless, from
an epistemic point of view, their project may be very well worthy of pursuit.
Moreover, it may be practically worthy of pursuit from a perspective rooted in
a diﬀerent social-political values.
There are two points that can be made in view of this example. First,
depending on the ethical and political framework we adopt, we can have dif-
ferent standards of the practical pursuit worthiness. On the one hand, we can
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root the notion of pursuit worthiness in a normative framework which is exter-
nal to the status quo, and which may thus diﬀer from it. Kitcher’s approach,
based on democratic values, is an example of this notion. According to his
account of (what we have called) practical pursuit worthiness, a theory would
not necessarily be practically unworthy of pursuit if it conﬂicted with some
ideological views of the given government. Moreover, in such a framework, if a
theory is practically worthy of pursuit, then it is also epistemically worthy of
pursuit (though not be the other way around). On the other hand, the notion
of pursuit worthiness can be built in view of the normative framework that is
internal to the status quo. In our example from above, the given theory is not
practically worthy of pursuit in this sense of the term.
Second, an assessment of epistemic pursuit worthiness may give a diﬀerent
result than an assessment of practical pursuit worthiness. The usual way to
deﬁne epistemic values5 is as those that are considered to be conducive of the
cognitive goals of science, such as truth, problem-solving eﬃciency, etc.6 Dif-
ferent scholars have oﬀered diﬀerent lists of values that fall in this category,
especially with regard to the problem of theory choice. Kuhn, for instance, lists
accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness as “the standard cri-
teria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory” (Kuhn 1977, p. 322). According
to McMullin, epistemic values include predictive accuracy, internal coherence,
external consistency, unifying power, fertility and simplicity (McMullin 1982,
p. 15-16). Indeed, diﬀerent approaches to the problem of theory choice (given
in view of diﬀerent methodological, epistemological, and other philosophical
views) give diﬀerent lists of epistemic criteria relevant for the evaluation of
scientiﬁc theories.
However, when it comes to the epistemic pursuit worthiness it is important
to mention that in addition to the usual epistemic standards7 it also includes
certain pragmatic elements. Recall that in our example of a developing scientiﬁc
theory we have assumed that its further investigation was, in principle, techni-
cally realizable. Technical realizability is a criterion that obviously introduces a
pragmatic element. This criterion concerns the feasibility of a research and its
methodological requirements in view of the current technological achievements,
and it is directly linked to the heuristics of the given research. It concerns the
question as to whether the heuristics of the theory allows for further evidence
5We shall use the terms “value”, “criterion”, and “standard” in this context interchange-
ably.
6Ernan McMullin, for example, characterizes them as values that are “presumed to pro-
mote the truth-like character of science, its character as the most secure knowledge available
to us of the world we seek to understand. An epistemic value is one we have reason to
believe will, if pursued, help toward the attainment of such knowledge.” (McMullin 1982,
p. 18). Similarly, Phyllis Rooney defines them as “those [values] that are usually taken as
constitutive of the knowledge and truth-seeking goals of the enterprise of science” (Rooney
1992, p. 15).
7Even though we speak here of the usual set of epistemic criteria, it is important to
mention that in order to be suitable for theory evaluation in the context of pursuit, they
need to be formulated in a different way than those suitable in the context of acceptance (see
Chapter 3).
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to be collected and used to support the given hypotheses or to confront them
with possible anomalies. Of course, in case the required technology itself ﬁrst
needs to be pursued, the epistemic pursuit worthiness of the given theory will
directly depend on the epistemic pursuit worthiness of the given technology.8
But why is making the distinction between epistemic and practical pursuit
worthiness important? In which way does it help us to understand the context
of pursuit in contrast to the above mentioned accounts of pursuit that already
include both epistemic and non-epistemic factors relevant for assessing pursuit
worthiness? The main signiﬁcance of the distinction is that it allows us to focus
only on epistemic properties of a theory. On the one hand, this is important for
the evaluation of certain episodes from the history of science and the rationality
underlying views of scientists with regard to the pursuit of certain theories. For
example, if a pursuit of a theory was rejected due to some epistemic reasons, we
will be interested in assessing whether such reasons were justiﬁed or whether
the theory was, in fact, epistemically worthy of pursuit. On the other hand, the
epistemic approach may help us in clarifying the reasons why a certain pursuit
is favored. For instance, it could be found out that a pursuit of a certain
theory is supported because of certain political reasons (and thus considered
as practically worthy of pursuit in the second sense that we have explicated)
in spite of being epistemically not very attractive.
As we have already pointed out, showing that a theory is epistemically
worthy of pursuit does not mean that it should actually be pursued, since it
may be problematic in some other respects that fall under practical pursuit
worthiness. But even if a theory is practically worthy of pursuit (in either of
the above two senses), that does not mean it should necessarily be actually
pursued. If certain conditions, independent of the theories themselves but
required for their pursuit, are not fulﬁlled, their pursuit might be diﬃcult to
realize. For instance, the budget from which scientiﬁc projects are ﬁnanced
may temporarily be too small to support all the candidates that are practically
worthy of pursuit. Or the number of scientists working in the given domain
may be too small to cover all the theories that are practically worthy of pursuit.
8Furthermore, how epistemic criteria are evaluated may depend on some non-epistemic
factors. For example, if we want to assess whether a theory has exhibited certain growth,
which would help us in judging whether it has remained worthy of pursuit, we will have to
take into account the number and the expertise of scientists working on the theory or the
appropriate funding that allows for the required resources (see Chapter 3). That does not
mean that the epistemic evaluation is not epistemic in character (we are still evaluating the
epistemic growth of the theory), it just means that our expectations regarding the epistemic
standards are in this sense context dependent. In other words, the non-epistemic factors
determine in which respects the conditions for fulfilling the epistemic standards have been
met, and what can thus be expected from the given theory.
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2.4 Pursuit Worthiness Regarding Group and
Individual Rationality
Similarly to our detective case where we have seen that more than one hy-
pothesis may be worthy of pursuit, when it comes to the scientiﬁc enterprise,
more than one scientiﬁc theory may be simultaneously worthy of pursuit as
well. This holds for both epistemic and practical notions of pursuit worthiness.
But when we say that more than one theory may be simultaneously worthy of
pursuit, what we mean is worthy of pursuit for the given scientific community,
that is, for the scientists working in the given scientiﬁc domain. Hence, such
a notion of pursuit worthiness regards rationality of a group, rather than ra-
tionality underlying decisions of an individual scientist. If a theory is worthy
of pursuit for the given scientiﬁc community, that does not mean that each
individual scientist working in the given domain is supposed to actually pursue
it (see also (Whitt 1990, p. 476-477)).
So far we have used the term “pursuit worthiness” only to refer to the
communal notion, which will also be our primary concern in this thesis. Nev-
ertheless, it is worth noticing that the individual pursuit worthiness is usually
used as the practical pursuit worthiness (that is, it can be considered as a
subtype of the practical pursuit worthiness). What is worthy of pursuit for an
individual scientist depends not only on epistemic criteria, but also on diﬀerent
non-epistemic factors, such as the expertize of the scientist in a particular do-
main, his or her personal interests and preferences, etc. (see also (Whitt 1990,
p. 479)).
Failing to recognize the distinction between the individual and the commu-
nal pursuit worthiness can lead to ambiguities in understanding the notion of
pursuit. For instance, when Nickles writes: “Deciding that a defective theory
or model is worthy of further pursuit amounts to launching or continuing a
research program” (Nickles 2006, p. 168) – we can agree with this statement
only if we link both phrases “worthy of pursuit” and “launching or continuing
a research program” either to a group or to an individual scientist. On the one
hand, if a theory is worthy of pursuit for the given scientiﬁc community, then
some scientists (and in that sense, the scientiﬁc community) working in this
ﬁeld should actually pursue it. On the other hand, if a theory is worthy of pur-
suit for a certain scientist, then she or he should pursue the theory. However,
the sentence would get a completely diﬀerent meaning (which would conﬂict
with our view from above) if we interpreted it as saying that if a theory is
worthy of pursuit for an individual scientist, then all other scientists should
engage in its pursuit, or as saying that if a theory is worthy of pursuit for the
community, every individual scientist should actually pursue it.
An important consequence of the fact that more than one theory may at
the community level be simultaneously worthy of pursuit9 is that we do not
9Of course, it could also be the case that more than one theory is at the same time
worthy of pursuit for an individual scientist, who then engages in the actual pursuit of the
given theories.
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necessarily need a dissensus among scientists regarding the pursuit worthiness
of theories in order to have a diversity in the context of pursuit. Scientists may
agree that diﬀerent theories are worthy of pursuit, and yet, each of them may
engage in a pursuit of only one of them.
Surprisingly, this quite obvious point has been overseen by a number of
authors who have discussed theory choice, especially with regard to scientiﬁc
controversies. In order to have the diversity of theories that are actively pur-
sued, they have often pointed out a disagreement among scientists as crucial
for this purpose. We will take a look at three such examples.
Our ﬁrst example is from (Hoyningen-Huene 2006). In his discussion of
Kuhn’s stance on theory choice Paul Hoyningen-Huene reminds the reader
that, according to Kuhn, even though a given scientiﬁc community may have
a set of shared values of theory choice, each individual member of the commu-
nity will specify these values with respect to their content and their mutual
weight (p. 127). In view of this he explains that the consensus can be reached
only if, in spite of these “individual value diﬀerences”, an agreement among
scientists about which theory should be accepted eventually emerges. In order
to show why such a decision procedure is justiﬁed, Hoyningen-Huene suggests
the following:
. . . it must be shown that also the individual value diﬀerences that
lead to disagreement in the phase of extraordinary science but dis-
appear from the result of communal theory choice, are rational
means towards the cognitive goals of science. The main idea here
is that these diﬀerences make a rational disagreement during the
phase of extraordinary science possible. This disagreement is vital
for the distribution of risk in a situation of epistemic uncertainty
as no one knows, which candidate for paradigmatic theory will be
successful. (p. 128, italics added)
Without going into discussion on Kuhn’s view on theory choice,10 let us
notice the following claim in the above quote: that the disagreement among
scientists is vital for the diversity of pursued theories. Nevertheless, while a
disagreement among scientists regarding the question, which theories are wor-
thy of pursuit, may be fruitful in this sense, it is not clear why it would be vital
for it. If scientists can evaluate more than one theory as worthy of pursuit in
the communal sense of the term, such an agreement would allow for the diver-
sity as well. The division of labor based on their individual preferences may
not include a disagreement either: a scientist may ﬁnd more than one theory
worthy of pursuit for herself, but decide to pursue only one, while agreeing that
her colleague should pursue the other.
Our second example is from (Rueger 1996), which shows a similar neglect of
this point. With regard to the pursuit of scientiﬁc theories, Alexander Rueger
writes:
10Indeed, the emphasis on rational disagreement is present in Kuhn’s work: see, for ex-
ample, (Kuhn 1977, p. 220), (Kuhn 1970b, p. 241), as well as Chapter 5 of this thesis.
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. . . suppose that we had a generally followed set of rules for rational
pursuit. Then all rational scientists, or at least almost all, would
make the same decision concerning the choice of a theory to work
on. This would destroy an essential condition for progress within
scientiﬁc community. . . . If each member of the community would
follow the rule for pursuit, there would just be one preferred theory
for the whole group to work on. Rational behavior of this sort
could not produce the diversity of research that seems important
to scientiﬁc progress. (Rueger 1996, p. 265)
There are two problematic assumptions present in Rueger’s argument. First,
he assumes that a set of rules for rational pursuit necessarily has to result in
only one theory being worthy of pursuit. Second, he assumes that if a theory
is assessed as worthy of pursuit, then the entire scientiﬁc community in the
given domain is to actually pursue it. A possible reason why he makes these
two assumptions is that he fails to distinguish between the rules for rational
pursuit that hold for a community, and those that hold for an individual scien-
tist. While an individual scientist is more likely to ﬁnd one theory as worthy of
pursuit for herself or himself, there is no reason why the same should follow for
the scientiﬁc community in the given domain. Moreover, while a theory may
be worthy of pursuit for the community, that does not imply that it is worthy
of pursuit for each member of this community.
Finally, the neglect of this distinction has lead some authors to argue that
non-epistemic factors are crucial for the diversity regarding the division of labor
among scientists. For instance, Kitcher (1990) suggests that
we sometimes want to maintain cognitive diversity even in instances
where it would be reasonable for all to agree that one of two theories
was inferior to its rival, and we may be grateful to the stubborn
minority who continue to advocate problematic ideas. (p. 7)
As an example, Kitcher mentions Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental
drift, and asks:
Was it equally reasonable to be a drifter or an anti-drifter in the
1920s and 1930s? Inspired by appreciation of the intricate shifts in
standards of appraisal that occur in the history of science, you might
say “yes”. But then you face a problem of maintaining cognitive
diversity . . . from the community’s point of view, it would have been
better if geologists had been more equally divided. (p. 7-8)
Furthermore, Kitcher maintains that the problem of the cognitive diversity
cannot be solved by introducing the stance of pursuit:
Once we have recognized the distinction [between belief in a theory
and pursuit of research designed to apply or extend that theory],
can we not accept a simple solution to my puzzle? Whereas it may
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be rational for each scientist to believe the theory that is better
supported by available evidence, it may not be rational for each of
them to pursue that theory, and what the community cares about is
the distribution of pursuit not the distribution of belief. . . . The idea
that it is rational for a person to believe the better-supported theory
seems, however, to be based on supposing that that person’s aim
is to achieve true beliefs (or some other desirable epistemic state,
the acceptance of empirically adequate theories, for example). In
that case, however, it appears that the person should also pursue
the better-supported theory, since pursuing a doctrine that is likely
to be false is likely to breed more falsehood (or less of the desired
epistemic state). Only if we situate the individual in a society
of other epistemic agents . . . does it begin to appear rational for
someone to assign herself to the working out of ideas that she (and
her colleagues) view as epistemically inferior. (p. 8)
Kitcher’s solution is to conceive of diversity of the pursuit in the given sci-
entiﬁc community by means of personal motives and diﬀerences that scientists
have in their assessments of epistemic merit.
The key problematic assumption endorsed here is that the assessment of
pursuit worthiness for the given community will necessarily give only one
“better-supported” theory. Hence, Kitcher oversees the fact that more than
one theory can be simultaneously worthy of pursuit for the given community.
More precisely, what he oversees is the fact that an individual scientist may
assess a theory as worthy of pursuit for the community, and yet, engage in a
pursuit of a diﬀerent theory, which is also worthy of pursuit for the given com-
munity (and probably for the scientist as well). To go back to the example of
Wegener’s theory, the pursuit worthiness of the theory of continental drift for
the geological community in the 1920s and 1930s could be perfectly justiﬁed by
means of evaluation that holds for the community (that is, without introducing
non-epistemic factors regarding individual scientists and their preferences), as
we will show in Chapter 4.11
In view of these three examples12 we can conclude that not only has a very
simple thought – that more than one theory can be worthy of pursuit at the
same time – been neglected, but the distinction between individual and group
rationality underlying the context of pursuit has been insuﬃciently clariﬁed.
11Kitcher’s point that non-epistemic reasons govern the diversity may very well be de-
scriptive of the actual scientific practice. However, our aim here was to point out that it
does not have a normative strength, since diversity could be maintained by evaluating the
communal pursuit worthiness as well.
12A similar point could also be made for Richard E. Grandy’s argument for diversity of
pursuit (see (Grandy 2000)), as well as for Kuhn (see Chapter 5).
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2.5 The Notions of Pursuit and Pursuit Worthiness
Employed in this Thesis
Having made the above distinctions between diﬀerent types of pursuit and
diﬀerent types of pursuit worthiness, let us clarify the notions that will be our
primary focus in the remainder of this thesis.
First, we will be primarily interested in the pursuit of scientiﬁc theories
(rather than the pursuit of phenomena, entities, technological developments,
etc.). Second, we are interested in investigating the notion of epistemic pursuit
worthiness (rather than what we have called the practical pursuit worthiness).
Finally, such a notion of epistemic pursuit worthiness will regard what is worthy
of pursuit for the given scientiﬁc community (rather than what is worthy of
pursuit for an individual scientist).

Chapter
3
Epistemic Justification in the
Context of Pursuit
A Coherentist Approach
. This chapter is based on a paper with the same title, which is accepted for
publication in a special issue of Synthese “Is Science Inconsistent?”, ed. by
P. Vickers and O. Bueno (Sˇesˇelja and Straßer 201x). The paper is a result
of a joint work with Christian Straßer. We are indebted to Erik Weber and
the anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on a former draft of this
paper.
Summary The aim of this chapter is to oﬀer an account of epistemic justi-
ﬁcation suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in
which new scientiﬁc ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established
theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account
paradigmatically on the basis of one of the inﬂuential systems of epistemic
justiﬁcation: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justiﬁcation. The idea
underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate that the
pursued system is promising of contributing to the epistemic goal of robustness
and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we
will (a) adjust the scope of Bonjour’s standards –consistency, inferential den-
sity, and explanatory power–, and (b) complement them by the requirement
of a programmatic character. In this way we allow for the evaluation of the
“potential coherence” of the given epistemic system.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a coherentist account of epistemic justiﬁcation suit-
able for the evaluation of the epistemic pursuit worthiness of scientiﬁc theories.
Among the accounts of epistemic justiﬁcation that have been applied to the
evaluation of scientiﬁc theories, coherentist approaches have been scoring fairly
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better than the foundationalist ones.1 Thagard’s explanatory coherentism has
been applied to a number of scientiﬁc revolutions (Thagard 1992), Chang has
applied his epistemic iteration to the case of the invention of the concept of
temperature (Chang 2004), while Bonjour’s coherentism (Bonjour 1985, 1989)
has been discussed with regard to the problem of theory choice in Kuhn’s phi-
losophy of science (Kuukkanen 2007). Nevertheless, none of these accounts is
fully suitable for theory evaluation in the context of pursuit. Thagard’s ex-
planatory coherence is primarily concerned with theory acceptance, even when
it is applied to the cases of early developments of theories (e.g. see his dis-
cussion of Wegener’s theory of the continental drift (Thagard 1992, p. 171)).
In contrast, in Chang’s epistemic iteration coherence is used “as a guide for
a dynamic process of concept formation and knowledge building, rather than
strict justiﬁcation” (Chang 2004, p. 156). Even though his approach could be
seen as addressing epistemic justiﬁcation in a broader sense of the term, it does
not oﬀer any criteria for an assessment of the initial pursuit worthiness of the-
ories, which, as we shall see, is an important part of the evaluation of pursuit
worthiness. Bonjour’s coherentism oﬀers criteria of epistemic justiﬁcation as it
has been traditionally conceived, that is, regarding the context of acceptance
(we will discuss this more in Section 3.2).
As we have mentioned in Chapter 1, a theory is epistemically worthy of
pursuit to the extent that it can be shown to have a promising potential for
contributing to the epistemic goals of the scientiﬁc enterprise. In a coheren-
tist framework, we can say that a theory is epistemically worthy of pursuit to
the extent that it can be shown to have a promising potential for contributing
to a greater coherence and greater robustness of scientiﬁc knowledge. Such a
character can be manifested in the theory being promising of increasing the co-
herence of an already existing research tradition (for example, by deepening its
explanatory mechanisms), and/or in the theory being promising of developing
into a system or a research tradition that is more coherent than the currently
established one in the given domain, and/or in the theory being promising of
developing into a good backup theory or a research tradition for the currently
dominant one.2 The latter feature is motivated by the epistemic virtue of
robustness of knowledge.
The signiﬁcance of robustness as an epistemic goal becomes even more
obvious once we have stepped on the coherentist ground. In order to explain
why, let us brieﬂy recall that the main virtue of a foundationalist approach to
epistemic justiﬁcation is the “ﬁrm foundation” of knowledge: it is supposed
to be not only the basis of epistemic justiﬁcation, but also to oﬀer robustness
to the knowledge, since even if our theories turn out to be wrong, there is
1For example, see the discussion in (Kleiner 2003, p. 513-514) and (Chang 2004, p. 223-
224).
2In the remainder of the chapter we will – for the sake of simplicity – use the terms
“cognitive system”, “(scientific) theory” or “scientific hypothesis” interchangeably. It is clear
though that especially in the early stages of their development, such cognitive structures have
neither all the properties of a theory nor all the links which would make them sufficiently
systematic, and yet, they can be more than just a hypothesis.
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always a ﬁrm ground to get back to and start building the knowledge all over
again. To use Neurath’s analogy mentioned in Chapter 1, a foundationalist
approach presupposes that there is always a dry-dock where the ship can be
reconstructed on the basis of its ﬁrm components all over again. Needless to
say, the idea of such an unquestionable basis of scientiﬁc knowledge has by
many been regarded untenable, and coherentism stepped in as an alternative.
Now, in order to compensate for the lack of a ﬁrm foundation, coherentism,
applied to scientiﬁc knowledge, needs to introduce robustness in a diﬀerent
way, namely, by allowing for developing theories to serve as backups of the
currently established ones. In other words, if there is no absolutely certain
foundation to which we can always turn to, then the best we can do in order
to achieve robustness of the scientiﬁc knowledge as a whole with respect to the
uncertainty of the future developments, is to allow for a pursuit of theories that
are alternative to (and possibly incompatible with) the currently established
ones.
In summary, our task is to oﬀer the standards on the basis of which it can be
judged to which degree a theory is epistemically worthy of pursuit, viz. to which
extent it is potentially epistemically justiﬁed viz. potentially coherent. We will
paradigmatically build our framework on the basis of Bonjour’s account. The
advantage of adjusting an already existing theory of justiﬁcation is that we
can obtain a single unifying (in this case, coherentist) framework of justiﬁca-
tion, covering both the context of pursuit and the context of acceptance. The
reason why we have chosen Bonjour’s criteria for this purpose is that, on the
one hand, they are concise and simple, which makes them especially suitable
for a demonstration of our approach. On the other hand, they are suﬃciently
similar to other approaches to theory evaluation (such as, for example, Lau-
dan’s problem-solving approach (Laudan 1977) or the approach of Kitcher’s
explanatory uniﬁcation (Kitcher 1989) or Thagard’s explanatory coherentism
(Thagard 1992)). This means that our account can be easily adjusted to ﬁt
diﬀerent methodological frameworks. The way we will modify Bonjour’s crite-
ria is by adjusting them in such a way that their focus is shifted towards those
aspects of theories which point to their epistemic pursuit worthiness.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we give a brief summery
of Bonjour’s system of coherence. In order to see which requirements should be
satisﬁed for an epistemic evaluation to be adequate for the context of pursuit,
we will in Section 3.3 present the main ideas of Laudan’s notion of the context
of pursuit. In view of Laudan’s ideas, we will in Sections 3.4 to 3.6 present the
criteria of potential coherence, applicable to the evaluation of scientiﬁc theories
in the context of pursuit. In Section 3.7 we will give a meta-justiﬁcation of our
framework. Finally, Section 3.8 brings some concluding remarks.
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3.2 Bonjour’s Concept of Coherence
Bonjour deﬁnes coherence by means of the following criteria (Bonjour 1985,
p. 95-99):3
1. Consistency:
a) Logical consistency: A system of beliefs is coherent only if it is logically
consistent.4
b) Probabilistic consistency: A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to
its degree of probabilistic consistency. Probabilistic inconsistency occurs
when a system of beliefs contains both the belief that P and also the
belief that it is extremely improbable that P. According to Bonjour,
probabilistic inconsistency diﬀers from the logical one in two respects: (i)
it is extremely doubtful that probabilistic inconsistency can be entirely
avoided; (ii) probabilistic consistency (unlike the logical one) is a matter
of degree, depending on how many such conﬂicts the system contains,
and the degree of improbability involved in each case.
2. Inferential density:
a) Presence of inferential connections: The coherence of a system of be-
liefs is increased by the presence of inferential connections between its
component beliefs and in proportion to the number and strength of such
connections.5
b) A lack of inferential connections: The coherence of the system of beliefs
is diminished to the extent to which it is divided into subsystems of beliefs
which are relatively unconnected to each other by inferential connections.
3. Explanatory power: The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in
proportion to the presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content
of the system. Bonjour deﬁnes an anomaly as a fact or event, especially one
involving some sort of recurring pattern, which is claimed to obtain by one
or more of the beliefs in the system of beliefs, but which is incapable of being
explained (or would have been incapable of being predicted) by appeal to
the other beliefs in the system.
3For the sake of transparency we will give each criterion (or group of criteria) an appro-
priate name.
4 Bonjour remarks that making the criterion for consistency absolutely necessary might
be an oversimplification. Moreover, recent research has shown that it is sensible to ask
how inconsistent a theory is and that logical inconsistency can be considered to come in
degrees as well. In order to measure such degrees syntactic approaches based on minimal
inconsistent sets (Hunter and Konieczny 2008) or maximal consistent sets (Knight 2002)
have been suggested, as well as semantic approaches employing paraconsistent models such
as (Hunter 2002, Hunter and Konieczny 2005, Grant 1978, Grant and Hunter 2006, 2008, Ma
et al. 2009).
5It is interesting to notice that William Wimsatt emphasizes the role of two more refined
notions in scientific theories that are based on the inferential density, namely the robustness
and the generative entrenchment of parts of cognitive systems. Given a directed graph of
inferential connections “a robust node has multiple inferential paths leading to it and resists
failure because of its multiple sources of support.” and the generative entrenchment of a
node is given proportional to the “number of nodes reachable from that node” (Wimsatt
2007, p. 142).
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Conceived in this way, Bonjour’s concept of coherence – to which we will
refer to as the actual coherence – can be used for an assessment of diﬀerent belief
systems, including scientiﬁc theories.6 Nevertheless, in order to be applicable
to the evaluation of scientiﬁc theories, a few adjustments should be made to
Bonjour’s criteria:
1. First, Bonjour’s unit of appraisal – “belief system” – should be replaced with
“cognitive system”. The reason for this is that, especially in the context of
pursuit, a scientist does not necessarily have to believe in the assumptions
constituting her model, but rather take them as provisional descriptions of
what is yet to be further investigated. For instance, she may not believe
that some concepts used in a certain pursued scientiﬁc model refer in a strict
sense or that some ad hoc hypotheses are true.
2. Once we have adjusted the unit of appraisal, it becomes clear that the
criterion of inferential density should be adjusted as well. In contrast to the
inferential density of the belief system of an individual, which also addresses
inferential connections between two theories belonging to it, the inferential
density of a scientiﬁc theory can be seen as consisting of two aspects: the
internal one – referring to the inferential connection within the theory itself,
and the external one – referring to the connections between the theory and
other scientiﬁc theories. The standard of inferential density, adapted for the
evaluation of scientiﬁc theories, is now formulated in the following way:
The coherence of the cognitive system is increased by the pres-
ence of both, the inferential connections within the system, as
well as the connections between the evaluated system and other
established scientiﬁc systems; and vice versa, the coherence is di-
minished by the absence of the connections within the system as
well as connections with other theories that are considered rele-
vant for it (for example, if they have an overlapping explanatory
scope, or if one theory is expected to deepen the other, etc.).
3. For the same reason, we can distinguish between the internal and the ex-
ternal aspects of the consistency criterion. Bonjour’s formulation of the
standard of consistency can be taken to refer to the internal consistency,7
while the standard of the external (logical and probabilistic) consistency is
now expressed in the following way:
A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to its logical and
probabilistic consistency with other, already established scientiﬁc
theories.
Even though rooted in a coherentist framework, Bonjour’s criteria are sim-
ilar to some other standard approaches to theory evaluation. For example,
6“By devising a new system of theoretical concepts the theoretician makes an explana-
tion available and thus enhances the coherence of the system. In this way the progress of
theoretical science may be plausibly viewed as a result of the search for greater coherence.”
(Bonjour 1985, p. 100).
7For the precise distinction between the internal and external consistency, see Section
3.5.3.
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Laudan’s view on the scientiﬁc development as a progress in problem-solving
employs similar criteria: explanatory power is expressed in terms of empirical
problem-solutions, inferential density in terms of compatibility between theo-
ries (the absence of which is a type of external conceptual problems) and a
preference for more unifying problem-solutions, while inconsistency falls under
internal and external conceptual problems (Laudan 1977). In a similar vain,
it could be argued for the similarity between Kuhn’s and Bonjour’s criteria.
For example, as already mentioned, (Kuukkanen 2007) suggests that Kuhn’s
philosophical standpoint could be incorporated into a coherentist epistemology.
Furthermore, according to Kitcher, “scientists in the thick of a controversy face
two types of predicaments: those of inconsistency and those of explanation.”
(Kitcher 2000, p. 31). If we add to that Kitcher’s view on the aim of inquiry
as “the provision of a maximally uniﬁed set of explanatory schemata that
will generate the largest possible set of true instantiations” (Ibid., p. 24), we
can see a clear similarity between Bonjour’s and Kitcher’s evaluation criteria.
Therefore, rooting our account in a coherentist epistemology and moreover,
in Bonjour’s notion of coherence, should not prevent it from being relevant
for other approaches to theory assessment as well. It should rather be seen
as a paradigmatic demonstration of adjusting existing accounts of epistemic
justiﬁcation to the context of pursuit.
3.3 Laudan on the Context of Pursuit
Laudan distinguishes two contexts in which cognitive appraisals of scientiﬁc
theories and research traditions are made:
1. The context of acceptance is a context in which scientists choose to accept
one of the competing theories (and research traditions), thus treating it
as if it were true (Laudan 1977, p. 108).
2. The context of pursuit is a context speciﬁc for the emergence of a new
research tradition, in which scientists begin to pursue and explore it long
before it is qualiﬁed to be accepted over its older rivals (ibid., p. 110).
By recognizing the context of pursuit, we can explain the historical fact
that scientists sometimes, particularly in the time of scientiﬁc revolutions, work
alternatively in two diﬀerent, even mutually inconsistent, research traditions:
I shall suggest that, within each of these contexts of inquiry, very
diﬀerent sorts of questions are raised about the cognitive creden-
tials of a theory, and that much scientiﬁc activity which appears
irrational – if we insist on a uni-contextual analysis – can be per-
ceived as highly rational if we allow for the divergent goals of the
following two contexts: [the context of acceptance and the context
of pursuit] (ibid., p. 108).
Thus, accepting one research tradition does not necessarily have to preclude
scientists from pursuing alternatives which are inconsistent with it. For exam-
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ple, Galileo’s physics was in its early stage much weaker than its primary rival,
Aristotelianism:
Aristotle’s research tradition could solve a great many more impor-
tant empirical problems than Galileo’s. Equally, for all the con-
ceptual diﬃculties of Aristotelianism, it really posed fewer crucial
conceptual problems than Galileo’s early brand of physical Coper-
nicanism ... Galileo was taken seriously by later scientists of the
seventeenth century, not because his system as a whole could ex-
plain more than its medieval and renaissance predecessors (for it
probably could not), but rather because it showed promise by be-
ing able, in a short span of time, to oﬀer solutions to problems
which constituted anomalies for the other research traditions in the
ﬁeld. (ibid., p. 112, italics in the original).
A similar case is Daltonian atomism. Dalton’s early atomic theory was con-
fronted by numerous serious anomalies, and was far from reaching the problem-
solving success of its dominant rival – elective aﬃnity chemistry. Still, his sys-
tem was taken to be promising since, in contrast to its rival, it was able to
predict what has later on come to be known as the laws of deﬁnite and multi-
ple proportions (namely, that chemical substances combine in certain deﬁnite
ratios and multiples thereof no matter how much of the various reagents was
present (ibid., p. 113)). Dalton’s theory was thus acknowledged as worthy of
further pursuit mainly because of its scientiﬁc promise, despite the fact that it
did not (yet) satisfy the standard of theory acceptance.
Taking these examples into account, it is obvious that Bonjour’s criteria of
coherence aren’t suitable for the context of pursuit. Both Galileo’s and Dalton’s
theories were in the early stages of their development less coherent than their
dominant rivals. Still, both of them were taken to be worthy of pursuit. An
account of epistemic justiﬁcation applicable to the context of pursuit should
be able to oﬀer the standards in view of which we can understand why their
pursuit was rational.
Before we present our account of coherence evaluation for the context of
pursuit, let us make a critical remark on Laudan’s approach. Laudan gives the
following criterion for when it is rational to pursue a research tradition: “it
is always rational to pursue any research tradition which has a higher rate of
progress than its rivals (even if the former has a lower problem-solving eﬀec-
tiveness)” (ibid., p. 111, italics in the original). Since only one tradition at the
time can have a higher rate of progress than its rivals, Laudan’s criterion can
evaluate pursuit worthiness of only one tradition in cases in which diﬀerent
rivaling traditions are simultaneously worthy of pursuit. Indeed, if a tradition
is worthy of pursuit, that does not imply rejecting its rivals as unworthy of
pursuit. There are situations in which it may be rational for a given scientiﬁc
community to pursue two or more research traditions at the same time. One
of these traditions may exhibit a higher rate of progress than its rivals at one
point, but soon it may turn out to be the other way around, or they may
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exhibit similar rates of progress.8
Our idea of pursuit worthiness is in this respect more similar to the one
developed by Laurie Anne Whitt (1990, 1992), whose indices of theory promise
also allow for more than one theory at the same time to be evaluated as being
promising of further investigation (Whitt 1992, p. 632).9
3.4 The Notion of Potential Coherence
In order to clarify the idea underlying our account of potential coherence, let
us make an analogy between a scientist pursuing a theory and a painter trying
to paint a particular landscape in a more realistic way than other painters have
done it so far. Just like the painter will start with a simple sketch, so does the
scientist begin with an abstract model. And just like the sketch is far from being
the ﬁnal form of the painting, ready to compete with other already ﬁnished
paintings, so is the pursued theory in its beginnings not able to compete with
its dominant rival with respect to its actual coherence. Nevertheless, the sketch
could already show certain strengths due to which we can say that it seems
promising of becoming as realistic a painting of the landscape as other works,
if not even more. For example, even though it is still lacking various nuances
of colors, a number of details, etc., we could imagine that the previous painters
did not have a technique for representing three-dimensional objects, whereas
the new painter develops such a technique and thus introduces a signiﬁcant
novelty allowing for a more realistic depicting of the landscape than it was
possible earlier. And so, when evaluating the promising character of this work,
rather than criticizing it for being a sketch with many shortcomings compared
to the ﬁnished paintings, we would focus on its strengths and particularly on
those elements which the other paintings have not managed to include. As
the painting develops we can evaluate whether it is still promising or whether
those initially interesting elements have ceased to be interesting (for example,
another painter could have in the meantime incorporated the novelty into an
already more realistic painting, while our painter did not manage to improve
any other elements of her work.) In a similar way, the criteria of the potential
coherence should enable us to judge whether a developing scientiﬁc theory is
suﬃciently promising in spite of its obvious shortcomings.
When we say potentially coherent, we are not after a degree of coherence
which a theory will certainly have in the future. It is clear that we cannot
8Alexander Rueger’s criticism of Laudan’s criterion (Rueger 1996, p. 267) along the
similar lines overlooks the fact that Laudan expresses his criterion only as a sufficient, but
not a necessary one. In contrast, according to (Whitt 1992, p. 616-617), Laudan’s criterion
is not even sufficient for the evaluation of pursuit worthiness.
9 Note that even though the criteria constituting our account are similar to those expli-
cated by Whitt, our approaches differ in several key respects. First, our account is formulated
in terms of a coherentist account of epistemic justification, while Whitt’s approach is rooted
in Laudan’s (Laudan 1977) and McMullin’s (McMullin 1976) methodological frameworks.
Second, our account introduces a unificatory aspect to the evaluation in the context of pur-
suit and the context of acceptance by allowing for both to be presented within the same
epistemic framework (namely, Bonjour’s coherentism).
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foresee that with certainty. What we are after are indications which tell us
that the theory might develop or is promising of developing into a powerful
scientiﬁc system. The fact that we speak here of a possibility, instead of a full
guarantee, means that the result of such an evaluation will always include a
certain level of chance and risk. We are thus interested in certain properties,
a theory can actually hold, on the basis of which experts in the given ﬁeld are
able to say whether taking such a risk is epistemically justiﬁed or not. In order
to account for this we take into account on the following two aspects:
1. In order to evaluate the potential coherence of T we need to focus on certain
positive features of the theory, which highlight that there are good reasons to
consider it to be an (epistemically) attractive candidate for further pursuit.
These are often properties which the dominant rival lacks. The idea is here
to restrict the focus of the criteria of the actual coherence (in our case,
Bonjour’s original criteria, see Section 3.2) to the particular strengths of the
theory, which should serve as indications of whether the theory is suﬃciently
promising. We will thus assess the potential explanatory power of the theory,
its potential inferential density and its potential consistency.
2. Since we cannot expect a theory to be fully developed right from the start we
should not be too critical of the various shortcomings that it faces. However,
we should also not turn a blind eye on them since we want to evaluate if
the theory in question is promising of overcoming these problems. What we
expect instead is that T oﬀers a programmatic character, i.e. methodological
and heuristic means to tackle these problems in its further development.
The diachronic character of pursuit points to two distinct questions concern-
ing the assessment of pursuit worthiness. First, we may ask whether a theory
is initially worthy of pursuit. The importance of this question can easily be
seen in the case of assessing new research proposals with which scientists apply
for funding. Even though certain non-epistemic factors also play a role in such
an assessment, proposals for the research of new scientiﬁc theories should, in
principle, be attractive from an epistemic perspective as well. In other words,
we are usually interested in ﬁnancing the research of theories that are epistem-
ically worthy of pursuit. However, even if a theory is initially promising, that
does not guarantee that it will also remain worthy of further pursuit. There-
fore, we will show how our criteria of the potential coherence are applied when
evaluating theories in these two respects.
The initial pursuit worthiness will be assessed by means of the following
criteria:
C1. Potential Explanatory Power
C2. Potential Inferential Density
C3. Potential Consistency
C4. Programmatic character.
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For an assessment of the successive pursuit worthiness, we will use the same
set of criteria, but in addition, the criteria will require a gradual strengthening,
which takes into account our expectations concerning the growth of the theory.
It is important to notice that even though it is diﬃcult to pinpoint the
exact moment when a theory should be subjected to the evaluation of its initial
pursuit worthiness, principally speaking, we are referring to the moment when
it enters the discourse of the given scientiﬁc community (for example, by being
presented in a publication or at a scientiﬁc conference). This may also be a time
period during which the idea has been proposed and has received the initial
criticism. Moreover, the distinction between the initial and the subsequent
pursuit worthiness has to be done in view of the speciﬁc historical and scientiﬁc
context. For example, the subsequent pursuit worthiness could refer to the
subsequent models of the given theory, or the subsequent theories in the given
research tradition.
In the following two sections we will introduce each of the above mentioned
criteria. We will then in Section 3.7 give a meta-justiﬁcation for them. While
the aim of Bonjour’s meta-justiﬁcation is to show that his system is truth-
conducive, the task of our meta-justiﬁcation is to show that our criteria are
conducive – as much as that is possible in the context of pursuit – of the actual
coherence and the epistemic goal of robustness.
3.5 Initial Pursuit Worthiness
The initial pursuit worthiness is assessed in terms of the criteria C1–C4. Since
we are interested in possible future developments of a theory and possible ways
in which it can contribute to the development and robustness of our scientiﬁc
knowledge as a whole, the evaluation of the pursuit worthiness of a theory needs
to be done in view of already established scientiﬁc ﬁndings. In other words,
the theory is to be evaluated against the cognitive horizon characterized inter
alia by the more entrenched theories of its time, which it may in part inherit
and in part challenge. The cognitive horizon includes, for instance, questions
such as what is considered as an explanandum in the given domain, what are
important problems, what is a proper methodology for the research in the given
domain, etc.
3.5.1 Potential Explanatory Power
We begin by discussing ﬁrst Bonjour’s criterion regarding explanatory connec-
tions in the evaluated system of beliefs. According to Bonjour’s requirement,
the coherence of the system is decreased in proportion to the presence of un-
explained anomalies. However, as we have seen in Section 3.3 (for example, in
the case of Galileo’s physics and Dalton’s chemistry), what we need to focus on
in the context of pursuit is what the system can actually explain or predict10
10Since Bonjour treats explanations and predictions as involving the same sort of inferen-
tial relations (see (Bonjour 1985, p. 240, Note 15)), we will do the same. It would be possible,
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and on the question of how signiﬁcant those explanations and predictions are,
in spite of there being a number of unexplained anomalies. Therefore, we need
to introduce a weaker version of the requirement for explanatory power:
Potential Explanatory Power : The potential coherence of a cogni-
tive system is increased by the presence of explanations that are
considered to be signiﬁcant at that point of the scientiﬁc develop-
ment. An explanation11 is signiﬁcant if:
a) it addresses the phenomena for which the established or other
pursued rivals have either no explanation, or have explanations
which are weak (a weak explanation would be, for example, an
explanation that introduces new conceptual problems);
b) it addresses certain benchmark problems or questions in the
given scientiﬁc domain in a novel way.
For example the fact that classical thermodynamics could not solve the
problem of the blackbody radiation, made explaining this phenomenon signif-
icant. Or, for instance, during the development of Galileo’s physics a number
of anomalies appeared for the Aristotelian framework. Even though the propo-
nents of the latter one oﬀered explanations of these phenomena, they “smacked
of the artiﬁcial and the contrived” (Laudan 1977, p. 112). Finally, Copernicus’
heliocentric system provided an explanation (or rather a prediction) of plane-
tary movements from the assumption of a non-stationary Earth. In this case,
the explained phenomena were not observations that were unexplained in the
Ptolemaic system.12 Rather, Copernicus oﬀered a new way of explaining some
of the most important phenomena in the sixteenth century astronomy.
Let us conclude this section by discussing the epistemic status of explana-
tions of young theories. Explanations of young pursued theories have often
a certain prima facie or hypothetical character which may be, for instance,
due to their idealized nature, due to imprecision of the measurement of data
supporting them, or due to the fact that the epistemic status of (some of)
the evidence supporting the explanations is itself in need of investigation. In
contrast, although we probably never reach a state in scientiﬁc development in
which explanations are ﬁnal and “all-things-considered”, the explanations of an
accepted theory are “enough-things-considered” so that we characterize them
as epistemically justﬁed, together with the theory to which they belong.13
of course, to introduce a separate criterion for the predictive power of a theory.
11Even though we are not here discussing the notion of a scientific explanation, it is the
task of an account of explanation fitting our model to be able to dismiss spurious explanations
as non-scientific (e.g., if someone offers to “explain” all the phenomena by claiming that they
occur because god wanted them that way). For instance, in view of a causal-mechanical
account, most of spurious explanations can be rejected due to the fact that they do not offer
any underlying causal mechanism.
12As Friedel Weinert remarks: “Copenicus’ observations do not establish any new facts.
. . . It is therefore fair to say that from an observational point of view, the Copenican and
Ptolemaic systems were equivalent.” (Weinert 2009, p. 24-25, italics in original).
13Of course, “How much is ‘enough’?” is one of the essential questions of epistemic
justification in the context of acceptance.
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For instance, Miller (2002) argues that a certain ignorance concerning obser-
vational inaccuracies in experiments or experimental data is sometimes fruitful
for the explanatory strength and growth of young scientiﬁc theories. As an
example he brings Galileo’s thought experiment according to which, when a
stone is dropped from a moving ship, it will drop directly under the person who
has dropped it. Such a conclusion was in disagreement with Aristotelian as-
sumptions. But had Galileo “extremely precise measuring instruments” (Miller
2002, p. 36), then an empirical experiment would not have had the predicted
outcome. Various forces (such as the Coriolis force, the centrifugal force, etc.)
would have interfered Galileo’s idealized setting based on an inertial reference
system and a free fall through vacuum. Similarly was Einstein’s special theory
of relativity based on the idealized assumption “of an inertial reference system
in the sense that it only deals with measurements made in such systems, which
Einstein himself took to be its ‘logical weakness’” (ibid., p. 37).
Another example is the case of Galileo’s telescope, which allowed for impor-
tant discoveries and an increase in the explanatory power of the heliocentric
view. Initially there was no theory of lenses available to epistemically justify
the evidence gained by means of telescopes. Only later, around 1610, did “Ke-
pler [. . . ] have a knowledge of optics [. . . ] which enabled him to [. . . ]the theory
of the telescope.” (van Helden 1974, p. 40).14 However, as van Helden points
out, “the importance of the new discoveries [by means of telescopic observa-
tions] was tremendous”, they “ were bombshells indeed” and although “the
opposition was powerful, and the instruments were very poor”, “the time it
took Galileo to convince all reasonable men was astonishingly short” (ibid.,
p. 51). One reason was that Galileo was able to signiﬁcantly improve the tele-
scopes (see (ibid., p. 52)). Moreover, telescopic observations were objective
in the sense that they were reproducible. Additionally “the telescope was in-
strumental in the growth of the idea that the laws of nature apply everywhere
equally [. . . ] everywhere in the universe” (ibid., p. 57) and thus it contributed
to a more unifying scientiﬁc worldview.
The fact that idealized settings, though being “less accurate” in terms of
data, are “more informative” often serves as a catalyst for a further fruitful de-
velopment in which the empirical precision step by step gets improved by more
and more accurate models. The same goes for ad hoc hypotheses, arguments by
analogy, the (temporary) acceptance of inconsistencies (see Section 3.5.3) and
similar epistemic tools that are often useful to master early obstacles of theory
building. Only later in Einstein’s general theory of relativity the approximative
character of his earlier model has been overcome by allowing for accelerating
reference systems. Similarly, Galileo’s discoveries served as a catalyst for the
study of lenses which “became an important part of optics” (ibid., p. 52), and
which in the long run deepened his cognitive system by epistemically justifying
the evidence gained by means of telescopes.
14We are indebted to Steffen Ducheyne for suggesting van Helden’s paper to us.
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3.5.2 Potential Inferential Density
The potential inferential density is evaluated in terms of the potential internal
inferential density and the potential external inferential density.
3.5.2.1 Potential Internal Inferential Density
It is easy to notice that the more phenomena can be explained by the same set
of hypotheses, the more unifying the system gets. For example, the underlying
idea of Kitcher’s account of explanatory uniﬁcation is that the same argument
pattern is to be used in the derivation of a wide range of explananda (Kitcher
1981a, p. 512). In a similar way Thagard suggests that “we should prefer the-
ories that generate explanations using a uniﬁed core of hypotheses.” (Thagard
1992, p. 67). Now, to ask how inferentially dense a system is, is in fact to ask,
how uniﬁed it is (Bonjour 1985, p. 97). Therefore, if a theory which is being
evaluated for its potential coherence, has a more uniﬁed core of hypotheses
than its rivals, this will contribute to its potential inferential density. More
precisely:
Potential internal inferential density: The potential coherence of
the cognitive system is increased by the presence of a uniﬁed core
of hypotheses.
For example, during the revolution in the geological sciences, Hess’ theory
of seaﬂoor spreading which explained the mechanism of the continental drift
– oﬀered a highly uniﬁed explanation of the phenomena relevant to the ocean
basins. Hess’ main hypothesis could account for a wide range of phenomena, in
contrast to permanentist and contractionist theories that required additional
ad-hoc hypotheses to explain the same set of explananda (Le Grand 1988,
p. 198).
There are diﬀerent accounts of explanatory uniﬁcation (e.g. (Friedman 1974,
Kitcher 1981a, Weber 1999)) that could be applied for a more precise assess-
ment of unifying properties of scientiﬁc theories.
3.5.2.2 Potential External Inferential Density
If the theory in question shows certain inferential connections with other es-
tablished or pursued theories, for example, with those from diﬀerent scientiﬁc
domains, this will speak in favor of its potential coherence. An example of such
inferential connections would be analogical relations between theories: one the-
ory can develop using an analogy between its explananda and the explananda
of another, already developed theory. According to Laudan, analogy is, in
fact, the most common form of mutual reinforcement between theories (Lau-
dan 1977, p. 230). For example, Huygens used the analogy between the familiar
phenomena of water and sound waves and the hypothetical phenomena of the
light waves to explain the nature of the latter ones (Thagard 1981, p. 249).
Moreover, if the theory establishes inferential connections with theories with
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which the dominant rival has not managed to connect so far, this will increase
its potential inferential density. In this way a young theory shows the promise
of contributing to the aim of robustness: it points out some of the advantages
it can introduce in case the dominant rival turns out to be a weak theory after
all. We can thus formulate the following criterion:
Potential external inferential density: The potential coherence of
a cognitive system is increased by the presence of signiﬁcant in-
ferential connections between this system and other established or
pursued scientiﬁc theories. The connection is signiﬁcant if:
a) it links the system to a theory with which a dominant or a pursed
rival has not managed to connect so far;
b) it links the system to a theory that is itself considered estab-
lished.
For example, the fact that Galileo’s physics had inferential connections
with Kepler’s astronomy and Copernicus’ heliocentric system, contributed to
the promising character of all three theories.
3.5.3 Potential Consistency
Finally, the criterion of consistency needs to be modiﬁed. The following dis-
cussion will refer to both logical and probabilistic inconsistencies. First of all,
if we make a distinction between a theoretical framework and observations,
we can make a diﬀerence between, on the one hand, inconsistencies within a
theory or between theories, and on the other hand, inconsistencies between a
theory and observations (see (Priest 2002, p. 122)).
We ﬁrst discuss those within or between theories. Taking into account the
place in the theoretical framework where the inconsistency appears, we can
distinguish between:
1. Internal inconsistency, which concerns inconsistencies within the theory.
We say that a theory15 is logically internally inconsistent if it contains a
proposition and its negation. Using Bonjour’s notion of probabilistic in-
consistency (see Section 3.2), we can say that a theory is probabilistically
15We take a theory to consist of a certain set of propositions and all their consequences.
We restrict the latter to the consequences which are known at the given time point since
the coherence evaluation can only take into account the known consequences and thus the
inconsistencies known at that time point. On the basis of new consequences it may turn out
that a seemingly consistent theory is in fact inconsistent. Two other remarks are important
at this point. First, we are of course aware of the fact that the language of propositional
logic is rather suboptimal for the task of a proper formalization of scientific theories. We use
it as a simplification (and so does Bonjour). It is an open question what formal language
is best for this task, and if there is any one (!) such language at all. Second, it is often
the case that especially (but not only) immature theories contain contradictions. To speak
about consequences of such systems in terms of classical logic is not very helpful, since in
face of contradictions classical logic derives anything. Logicians have developed various ways
to cope with such situations by use of paraconsistent logics (see e.g.
(Be´ziau and Carnielli 2006, Batens et al. 2000)).
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internally inconsistent if it states P and also that it is highly improbable
that P.
2. External inconsistency, which concerns inconsistencies (logical or probabilis-
tic) between the evaluated theory and other, already established theories.
We say that a theory is logically externally inconsistent if it contains a
proposition, while some other, established or pursued theory contains the
negation of this proposition. A theory is probabilistically externally incon-
sistent if it states P while some other, established theory states that it is
highly improbable that P (or the other way around). We can further make
a diﬀerence between two types of external inconsistencies:
a) a theory T1 is inconsistent with an established rival theory T2;
b) a theory T1 is inconsistent with an established theory T2 belonging to a
diﬀerent scientiﬁc domain.
3.5.3.1 Potential Internal Consistency
It is important to notice that it is an oversimpliﬁcation of the scientiﬁc practice
to treat the criterion for consistency as absolutely necessary (see (Bonjour
1985, p. 247)). The higher the potential explanatory power of a theory is, the
more forgiving we are towards possible inconsistencies in it. More precisely,
by temporarily accepting certain inconsistencies, we may enhance the overall
potential explanatory power of the system. As Thagard points out: “It may
turn out at a particular time that coherence is maximized by accepting a set A
that is inconsistent, but other coherence-based inferences need not be unduly
inﬂuenced by the inconsistency, whose eﬀects may be relatively isolated in the
network of elements.” (Thagard 2000, p. 74-75).16 In a similar vain, Lakatos
suggests that “it may be rational to put the inconsistency into some temporary
ad hoc quarantine, and carry on with positive heuristic of the programme. This
has been done even in mathematics, as the examples of the early inﬁnitesimal
calculus and of naive set theory show” (Lakatos 1978, p. 58).
Another example is Bohr’s theory of the atom, which included both classical
electrodynamic principles as well as quantum principles, which were mutually
inconsistent. Bohr’s idea was to temporarily ignore this inconsistency and to
proceed on the inconsistent foundations (Lakatos 1978, p. 55). However, the
developing theory was not abandoned due to this: “Though the theory was cer-
tainly considered as problematic, its empirical predictions were so much better
than those of any other theory at the time that it had no real competitor.”
(Priest 2002, p. 123).
Thus, we should not consider it an initial drawback if a young research is
still burdened by internal inconsistencies. However, since we strive for a high
16Even though Thagard doesn’t clarify what he means by an inconsistency being isolated
in the network of elements, he probably refers to avoiding the explosion which is inevitable
in terms of classical logic. Some logics that are able to deal with inconsistencies block prob-
lematic applications of certain rules, such as disjunctive syllogism, to inconsistent formulas
while at the same time allowing for the full classical derivative power for the consistent
parts of a theory (see (Batens and Meheus 2006, Batens 1999)). In this sense they isolate
inconsistencies since they prevent them from spreading.
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actual coherence in the long run, it is a positive property of a cognitive system
if it provides means to tackle these problems in its further development (see
Sections 3.5.4 and 3.6). Of course, in the fortunate case that a young theory is
internally consistent, this contributes to its attractiveness as does any problem
that is avoided in ﬁrst place and hence does not have to be tackled in the
further development. Thus, we can formulate the following criterion:
Potential internal consistency: The potential coherence of the cog-
nitive system is increased if the system is consistent.
3.5.3.2 Potential External Consistency
The external inconsistencies of the ﬁrst type – between a new and a rival,
already established theory – have often been a reason for suspicion towards
the former one. Just take the example of Copernicus or Galileo whose theories
had some major inconsistencies with assumptions of the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic
physics, which caused a serious resistance of the scientiﬁc community towards
the acceptance of the new framework. Rejecting a pursued theory on the basis
of such inconsistencies would make our assessment too conservative in charac-
ter. Moreover, if the evaluated theory has a high potential explanatory power,
it might very well turn out that it could one day become more (actually) coher-
ent than its rival. In this case, the assumptions of the latter one would cease to
belong to the accepted scientiﬁc views, and consequently, these inconsistencies
would become irrelevant. That is why inconsistencies of this type do not neces-
sarily have to be resolved by reconciling the opposing theories, but they could
instead become obsolete, due to the winning of one of the rivals. Therefore,
they should not be burdening for a theory which is assessed in the context of
pursuit.
This also means that there is no reason why we should favor a theory that is
consistent with the currently established one in the same domain (representing,
for example, a possible development in the same research tradition). Allow-
ing for both - developments that are consistent with the currently established
theories, and those that are not, and that may even introduce new research
traditions, are equally important for achieving the epistemic goals of coherence
and robustness.
Let us now take a look at the second type of external inconsistencies – those
between two theories belonging to two diﬀerent domains. First of all, the fact
that a pursued theory is inconsistent with some other scientiﬁc systems is not a
suﬃcient reason for saying that it has a low potential coherence. For example,
even though quantum mechanics and general relativity – both belonging to
diﬀerent subdomains of physics – are mutually inconsistent, neither has been
rejected due to this inconsistency.
However, if a pursued theory turns out to be consistent with an established
or pursued theory from another domain with which the dominant rival is in-
consistent, this will speak in favor of its promising character. For example, if
quantum mechanics had a rival theory T which were consistent with general
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relativity, the potential external consistency of T would be increased. Similarly
to the case of the external inferential density, consistency with such theories
indicates that the pursued theory is promising of contributing to the robust-
ness of scientiﬁc knowledge in the given domain. We can thus formulate the
following criterion:
Potential external consistency: The potential coherence of a cogni-
tive system is increased if the system is consistent with signiﬁcant
theories. A theory is signiﬁcant if:
a) it is a pursued theory with which the rival of the evaluated theory
is inconsistent, or
b) it is an established theory in a diﬀerent domain.
Just like in the case of internal inconsistencies, the (temporary) acceptance
of external inconsistencies may be fruitful. For example, Adam Smith’s eco-
nomic theory was considered to be incompatible with the Newtonian thesis
of a balance of forces in nature, since on the one hand, it relied on a general
Newtonian balance of nature, while on the other hand, it postulated forces
of economic motivation (e.g. self-interest) which were seemingly incompatible
with such a balanced system (Laudan 1977, p. 230). Nevertheless, this incon-
sistency did not lead to the rejection of Smith’s account, since the explanatory
power of the theory was suﬃciently high. In fact, the inconsistency became
obsolete due to a conceptual change in view of which the notion of a force in
economics became distinguished from the one used in physics. As a contrasting
example, take Velikovsky’s explanation of some historical events (such as the
reported parting of the Red Sea for Moses), which was based on the hypothesis
that Venus passed near the Earth some 5000 years ago. Velikovsky’s theory was
rejected not merely due to its inconsistency with Newton’s law of motion (Tha-
gard 1992, p. 91), but because it did not exhibit a high potential explanatory
power. The phenomena it attempted to explain (namely, mythological events)
could not even be considered as historical explananda in the proper sense. Fur-
thermore, it did not have a sound and systematic methodology (see e.g. (Fitton
1974)), which would allow for an adequate programmatic character. Therefore
Velikovsky’s theory did not have the properties that could compensate for its
external inconsistencies, and which would render it worthy of pursuit.
3.5.3.3 Consistency with Observations
Finally, let us have a look at (in)consistency of a theory with respect to obser-
vations. Observational inconsistencies may be viewed as being addressed by the
explanatory properties of a theory. For instance, according to Graham Priest,
inconsistencies of this type are viewed as explanatory anomalies (Priest 2002,
p. 122), which is also the case according to Bonjour’s deﬁnition of anomalies
(see Section 3.2). When we talk about observations with which the theory is
consistent then we restrict the focus on relevant observations: of course, in the
majority of cases it is not of epistemic interest whether a scientiﬁc theory is
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consistent with contingent facts such as the fact that we are right now working
on this paper. Of epistemic interest here is, for instance, the evidential support
for the theory in question, such as successful predictions that fall within this
category. We have already mentioned that Bonjour treats these as being part
of the explanatory scope of a theory (see footnote 10). Moreover, it can be
argued that there is a positive feedback loop between an observation o falling
within the explanatory scope of a theory T and o being an evidential support
for T . Hence, our criterion for potential observational consistency is also in
analogy to the one for potential explanatory power:
The potential coherence of a cognitive system is increased by the
presence of evidential support by an observation o (or a class of
observations o), especially if o is signiﬁcant. The evidential support
provided by o is signiﬁcant in case o represents an explanatory
anomaly for the dominant and/or other pursued rivals.
3.5.4 Programmatic Character
So far we have presented adjusted versions of all three Bonjour’s criteria, suit-
able for the evaluation of the initial potential coherence of a theory T . These
criteria highlighted attractive features of T with respect to the criteria that
constitute Bonjour’s notion of coherence.
But in which way can we assure that a theory, which for instance oﬀers
certain signiﬁcant explanations, but is at the same time facing some diﬃcult
explanatory anomalies, a lack of inferential connections or certain inconsisten-
cies, is still worthy of pursuit?
First of all, it is important to notice that the fact that the theory cannot
solve such anomalies at the moment, does not mean it cannot work towards
ﬁnding the solutions. Especially in the early stages of a pursued theory, models
are still highly idealized and outline only the main features and ideas of the
young program. Thus, for instance, the empirical accuracy might in many
ways still be suboptimal. Only an iterative process of gradual reﬁnement can
successively reduce the abstract character and ﬁne-tune the models. What
needs to be assured then is that there are certain ways in which the given
theory can further be investigated. This is the purpose of our next criterion.
Programmatic character of a developing theory: The potential co-
herence of a cognitive system is increased to the extent to which the
system has a programmatic character and decreased to the extent
it lacks one. A cognitive system has a programmatic character if
it is embeded in a theoretical and methodological framework which
allows for the further research of the system to proceed in spite of
the encountered problems, and towards their systematic resolution.
Such a character of a cognitive system can be explicated by an example
from science policy. If we are to ﬁnance a new scientiﬁc project which oﬀers
some signiﬁcant explanations, but at the same time faces certain anomalies,
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what we would expect from the scientists arguing for its epistemic pursuit
worthiness is to show that their further research can proceed in spite of these
anomalies, as well as towards their systematic resolution. In other words,
a theory should exhibit an adequate perspective of the problem horizon into
which it is embedded and provide the heuristics capable of guiding the research
towards a possible resolution of the key problems with which the theory is
currently confronted. As Kitcher points out: “to defend a particular proposal
for modifying consensus practice, one must show, constructively, that it has
the potential to find solutions to the predicaments that it faces” (Kitcher 2000,
p. 31, italics added). So, even if the theory does not exhibit a high actual
explanatory power (and/or some other virtues regarding the inferential density
or consistency) at the early stages of its development, if the scientists show
that they are capable of proceeding with the further research, there is a good
reason to think that the project has a certain level of resilience concerning the
current anomalies. And even though we cannot be absolutely certain that the
research will have a successful outcome, such a programmatic character should
give us a reason to make a leap of faith.17
For example, we have already mentioned Bohr’s theory of atom as based on
inconsistent assumptions. However, the theory showed not only an explanatory
signiﬁcance, but also a methodological plan for introducing gradually improved
models (Lakatos 1978, p. 63). In that way, the programmatic character gave
credibility and a rationale to an inconsistent program (ibid., p. 64).
Another example is Wegener’s theory of the continental drift. The the-
ory had high potential explanatory power since it provided explanations for
the phenomena (such as paleontological similarities between the continental
regions on the opposite sides of the ocean), for which its rivals only had weak
explanations (for instance, in order to explain such similarities they had to
introduce the hypothesis of land bridges between the continents, which was
inconsistent with the theory of isostasy). Nevertheless, many geologists re-
garded Wegener’s theory as incapable of accounting for its main element – the
mechanism of drift. Not only was it unclear which forces could be responsible
for continental drifting, but according to some, any conceivable mechanism of
the drift seemed to conﬂict with the physical theory, since continents couldn’t
simply plough through the hard ocean ﬂoor ((Le Grand 1988, p. 129); (Laudan
1981, p. 230)). Nevertheless, Wegener’s theory, already in its early stages had
a programmatic character. Using the measurements obtained by others, We-
gener estimated that the oceanic crust was no more than 5 km thick in contrast
to continental blocks, the average thickness of which was taken to be around
100 km. Consequently, in Wegener’s model continents moved mainly through
the ﬂuid substrate, and had only a thin semi-rigid oceanic crust in their way.
In reply to the objection that such a plow would result in deformations of the
ocean ﬂoor, Wegener called upon isostasy which precluded the formation of
signiﬁcant elevations in the seeﬂoor (Oreskes 1999, p. 78-79). Thus, as Naomi
17Similarly, Whitt speaks of “programmatic research directives” that are provided by the
heuristic of a theory (Whitt 1992, p. 621); also see (Whitt 1990, p. 472-473).
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Oreskes explicates, even though Wegener’s model may seem completely wrong
from a nowadays geological perspective, in the 1920’s it was consistent with the
available understanding of terrestrial kinematic properties. And even though
the model was based on hypotheses which could not be proved, it showed that
the problem of the mechanism could in principle be resolved. Moreover, it
pointed to the problem-ﬁeld that required further investigation: isostasy and
the nature of the substrate, which seemed to be directly related to the question
of the mechanism of drifting. Thus, it gave a programmatic character to the
theory of continental drift with respect to this issue.18
3.6 Successive Pursuit Worthiness
So far we have explicated the notion of the initial pursuit worthiness. However,
as the research of a young scientiﬁc theory continues, these criteria alone cease
to be suﬃcient for answering the question, whether the theory has remained
worthy of pursuit. What we expect from a young theory in order to remain
worthy of pursuit, is also to show an improvement in its epistemic properties.
The successive pursuit worthiness evaluates whether a theory has remained
worthy of pursuit.
We have already seen that Laudan emphasizes the link between pursuit wor-
thiness and “the rate of progress” (see Section 3.3). Similarly, for Lakatos each
step of a research programme should be consistently content-increasing, consti-
tuting thus a consistently progressive theoretical problem-shift (Lakatos 1978,
p. 49). A developing research programme “is planted, as it were, in an inimical
environment which, step by step, it can override and transform” (Lakatos 1978,
p. 55). Such a diachronic element is rooted in the dynamic character of pursuit
itself: while both the actual coherence and the potential coherence evaluated
for the initial pursuit worthiness capture the epistemic state of the system at a
particular time point, the potential coherence regarding the successive pursuit
worthiness takes into account both the development of the system, as well as
its potentials for the future endeavor. It evaluates whether the system is on its
way to overcome its shortcomings and to fulﬁll its promising aspects that are
e.g. indicated by its programmatic character. In this way we check whether we
were and are still justiﬁed in giving a leap of faith to the theory and hence in
taking the risk that comes with it.
Of course, we expect our theory to still fair well with respect to the criteria
that were so far introduced. Hence, when we evaluate whether a theory re-
mains worthy of pursuit we again apply our four criteria C1–C4. However, our
evaluation should get increasingly more critical as time goes by in the sense
that we expect the theory to live up to its promise and to exhibit growth in
(at least one of) two respects:
1. Theoretical Growth: The scientists should make theoretic progress for
instance by applying the programmatic aspects of the theory and hence
18See also Chapter 4.
3.6. Successive Pursuit Worthiness 43
gradually overcome problems such as explanatory anomalies, inconsisten-
cies, etc.
2. Growth of the Programmatic Character: Problems that have not yet been
addressed by the programmatic character of the theory should gradually
become addressed by it.
Hence, these two aspects of a theoretical development function as con-
straints posed on C1–C4. A theory should either fulﬁll the promises that were
indicated by its programmatic character and thus exhibit a theoretical growth,
or at least improve the programmatic character itself. How do these two aspects
inﬂuence the evaluation of pursuit worthiness in terms of our four criteria?
Let us ﬁrst take a look at the theoretic growth. As time goes by we expect
that progress is made at least concerning the issues that have been addressed by
the programmatic character of the theory. For instance, if scientists manage to
get results by making use of the heuristics provided by it then this in turn serves
as a positive feedback for the programmatic character and gives us reasons to
ﬁrm our leap of faith in the theory. Fulﬁlling the promises indicated by the
programmatic character should result in a theoretical growth in one or more
of the following ways:
1. the growth of the explanatory power: by introducing additional explana-
tions or improving already existing explanations (by reﬁning or deepening
them, by introducing new evidence, etc.);
2. the growth of the internal, resp. external inferential density;
3. the growth of the internal, resp. external consistency.
In other words, the more promises (announced by the programmatic char-
acter) the theory manages to fulﬁll, the better it becomes with regards to its
potential coherence. Moreover, if the scientists manage to have a high rate of
progress, this will boost our trust in the theory even more. After all, if the
heuristics and methods are demonstratively applicable in a smooth way this
provides an index of the accuracy and adequacy of the theory and indicate
that the theory is on its way towards satisfying our epistemic goals. Note that
such a theoretical growth can also result from the improvements that were
not announced by the programmatic character, for instance from parallel de-
velopments in other scientiﬁc theories (e.g., an external inconsistency with an
established theory from a diﬀerent domain may be resolved by the develop-
ments in that domain alone).
However, should the scientists not manage to make any progress by means of
the heuristics, this will decrease its potential coherence. The reason is parallel
to our argument above: if the work along the methodological and heuristic out-
line of the programmatic character proves to be rather tenacious or stopped
entirely then this is a good reason to evaluate the programmatic character
worse than initially. This will especially be the case if no alternative heuristics
or methods are available, since the theory then seems to be on the wrong path.
Moreover, the unresolved anomalies that were supposed to be resolved, will
lower the score of the theory in the other criteria. For instance, if the program-
matic character was initially meant to address certain explanatory anomalies,
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the fact that this plan did not show any progress will in turn lower the potential
explanatory power of the theory.
The second constraint which is relevant for the assessment of the successive
pursuit worthiness is the growth of the programmatic character itself. The
more time goes by the more we expect the scientists to provide theoretic and
methodological means to address open questions that have not been addressed
by the programmatic character thus far. This may concern the explanatory
anomalies, (internal or external) inconsistencies, or the (external or internal)
inferential density the theory displays.
The main underlying idea of our evaluation of the potential coherence re-
garding the successive pursuit worthiness is that the problems addressed by
the programmatic character move to the set of resolved problems, while the
(old or new) problems that have neither been resolved nor addressed by the
programmatic character become addressed by it.
Let us look at an example. In the case of the pursuit of the theory of con-
tinental drift, Wegener’s model, which as we have seen gave a programmatic
character to his theory, was further improved. For instance, Arthur Holmes
proposed a model, according to which the continents were displaced by convec-
tion currents in the earth’s mantle, generated through radioactivity (Frankel
1979, p. 68). This model was inferentially connected with the theory of ra-
dioactivity, with which the rivals of the theory of continental drift were not
connected. Moreover, even though Holmes’ hypothesis of convection currents
could not have been substantiated at the time, it pointed to a possible path
towards a resolution of the problem of the mechanism of drift, and oﬀered
heuristics for its further investigation (such as the examination of the pres-
ence or indices of the presence of convection currents in the interior of the
earth).19 In addition, the number of signiﬁcant explanations was increased as
well through the work by Alexander du Toit, who found various similarities
between the South African and the South American coastlines on the opposite
sides of the ocean (Oreskes 1999, p. 157-166).
It is important to notice that the successive potential coherence depends
also on some non-epistemic criteria, such as the number and the expertise of
scientists working on the theory or the appropriate funding that allows for the
required resources. Hence, when evaluating the successive potential coherence,
and the satisfactory rate of growth, these factors should be taken into account
as well. For instance, even though Wegener’s theory of continental drift exhib-
ited a theoretical growth throughout the 1920s and 1930s, in the 1940s hardly
anyone was working on it. Hence, it is not surprising that the theory did not
exhibit any signiﬁcant growth in this decade.
19This was precisely the outcome of the expeditions conducted in the early 1930s, which
included Dutch geologist Vening Meinesz and North American geologists Richard Field and
Harry Hess. The results of their investigation confirmed an uneven distribution of radioactive
constituents and thermal properties in the earth, which made Meinesz conclude that “in the
actual earth there can be no doubt that convection currents must develop” (quoted from
(Oreskes 1999, p. 248)).
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3.7 Meta-Justification
In this section we will give a meta-justiﬁcation of our criteria for the pursuit
worthiness of a theory. The goal is to argue that following the lead of our
criteria is indeed conducive of epistemic aims of science. In Section 3.1 we
have speciﬁed two major epistemic goals of science: (a) to gain adequate and
accurate knowledge about the world and (b) scientiﬁc knowledge should be
robust, i.e. the scientiﬁc knowledge base as a whole should be able to avoid
and/or withstand perturbations. One may view science as a long-winded dia-
logue with nature with the ﬁnal aim to come to an agreement.20 Robustness
concerns the situation when nature answers “No” to our arguments: in these
cases we want to be able to respond. Sometimes it is enough to change our
arguments viz. theories, but sometimes – if nature’s “No” is too plentiful – it
is more promising to come up with new argumentative strategies viz. theories
and to give up on the old one. The central question in this chapter is: when
are we justiﬁed to pursue a new cognitive system T judged by its epistemic
virtues? In view of our dialogue with nature this is so if T is promising of
strengthening our repertoire of argumentative moves to dodge nature’s “No”’s.
More concretely, in view of our epistemic goals and the coherentist perspective
adopted in our account this is the case if T is promising of growing into a the-
ory that is (a) highly actually coherent and (b) that strengthens the robustness
of our scientiﬁc knowledge as a whole. It is promising of the latter in case it is
promising of growing into a backup candidate in case the dominant rival falls
into crisis. Of course, since T is in its development or yet to be elaborated
further we can only talk about its epistemic promise or potentials. This comes
with an essential risk and it is a worthwhile goal to control and reduce the
latter as much as possible. Hence, we are interested in indices of the epistemic
promise of theories. The epistemic justiﬁcation in the context of pursuit can
then be carried out by evaluating and comparing theories with respect to these
indices.
Two indices of epistemic promise are central in our approach: (i) the focus
on significant aspects concerning criteria of coherence and (ii) the programmatic
character and the focus on developmental aspects that comes with it.
Let us ﬁrst discuss point (i). Take for instance the potential explanatory
power (see Section 3.5.1). Here the focus was on significant explananda. On the
one hand, we have pointed out crucial and benchmark problems. In order for
a theory to be epistemically attractive, i.e. to provide an adequate grip on its
subject matter, it should be able to tackle these problems (or at least provide
a perspective for tackling them, see (ii)). On the other hand, some of these
are phenomena for which the dominant rival does not oﬀer a (satisfactory)
explanation. In view of the robustness of scientiﬁc knowledge we are interested
in tackling these problems. After all, these (and other) anomalies may very well
be deﬁcits of the dominant rival that may eventually be a part of the factors
20Pera rightly pointed out that it is more accurate and awarding to view science as a
discourse between multiple agents and nature (Pera 1994) (see Chapter 5). However, in
order to make our point it is fine to simplify matters.
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responsible for its downfall.21 In this case we need backup theories that can
ﬁll this lacuna and oﬀer alternative argumentative strategies to the “No”’s of
nature that produced them.
A similar situation occurs with respect to consistency and inferential den-
sity. In case the dominant rival is inconsistent with another established theory,
or it doesn’t oﬀer inferential connections with it, this again may be an index
of its deﬁciency. Hence, in order to gain a robust scientiﬁc knowledge base we
are again interested in theories that are able to ﬁll these gaps.
Since we are evaluating the pursuit worthiness of theories it is natural to
also address developmental aspects. This brings us to point (ii). Theories in the
context of pursuit are suboptimal in various respects: they are burdened with
explanatory anomalies, they may have to deal with inconsistencies, etc. Hence,
the only way to compensate for these shortcomings is to oﬀer a programmatic
character, i.e. a methodological heuristics for how to proceed further and how
to eventually overcome (some of) the shortcomings. The programmatic char-
acter indicates that a theory has the potential to grow into a richer and more
(actually) coherent one.
Of course, as time goes by we expect from a theory to actualize these
promises given by its programmatic character and also to widen the program-
matic character to address formerly open problems. These aspects are taken
into account in our evaluation of the successive potential coherence (see Sec-
tion 3.6). Our criteria require from a theory to exhibit a theoretical growth
or at least to develop its programmatic character. In this way we make sure
that the unresolved anomalies (that is, explanatory anomalies, the lack of a
unifying core of hypothesis, the lack of inferential connections with other es-
tablished theories, the lack of internal consistency, or the lack of consistency
with other established theories) are either resolved by the theory or addressed
by its programmatic character. Moreover, they make sure that as time goes
by, these anomalies become more urgent to be resolved, and that the epistemic
status of the theory is developing, or shows promising of developing, towards
the actual coherence. At the same time, such a development contributes to the
robustness of scientiﬁc knowledge: the more coherent the theory is, the more
entrenched it is, and so, the more robust our knowledge becomes.
3.8 Conclusion
In this Chapter we have presented an account of epistemic justiﬁcation suitable
for the evaluation of theories in the context of pursuit. We have built our
model paradigmatically on the basis of Bonjour’s coherence theory of epistemic
justiﬁcation. By adjusting the criteria of his concept of coherence and by
complementing them with the requirement for a programmatic character we
gave an account of what we have dubbed the potential coherence of a cognitive
21There may of course be more than one dominant rival. In this case our discussion can
easily be adjusted accordingly.
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system. This enabled us to judge whether the theory is suﬃciently promising
to be further investigated.
In this conclusion we want to point out a speciﬁc contextual character of our
framework. Many notions constituting our criteria have been left undeﬁned in
any strict manner. For example, what counts as a scientiﬁc explanation, what
counts as a benchmark problem in the ﬁeld, what counts as a uniﬁed core
of hypotheses, etc. – have been intentionally left unspeciﬁed. The meaning of
these notions needs to be obtained in view of the speciﬁc conceptual framework
characterizing the cognitive horizon of the time. However, such an approach
introduces the problem of relativism: if the criteria of potential coherence
can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways, doesn’t that mean that a theory may be
evaluated as worthy of pursuit in view of one interpretation, and not worthy
of pursuit in view of another? How can we avoid such a relativistic outcome
in cases of scientiﬁc controversies, in which, for example, the new theory may
challenge the traditional views on what counts as a valid standard of scientiﬁc
explanation or what counts as a valid explanandum in the given ﬁeld? A
detailed analysis of this problem would have to take into consideration not
only the change in the interpretation of the standards and in the weighting
that are placed on them, but also the change in more general goals of science.
We will say a bit more about this problem in Chapter 5. At this point, it is
important to mention that our account may not be suﬃcient for the modeling
of radical shifts in epistemic standards, in which the very criteria constituting
it may have to be altered.
It is also important to point out that we have built our account paradig-
matically on the basis of Bonjour’s coherentism. Bonjour’s criteria may be
suboptimal in certain respects when applied to the evaluation of scientiﬁc the-
ories,22 but they were suﬃciently simple for demonstrating our approach. Our
main aim was to show how the standards of epistemic justiﬁcation suitable for
the context of acceptance can be modiﬁed and adapted for the context of pur-
suit. Indeed, by modifying Bonjour’s account or by replacing it with some other
set of criteria, we could in an analogous way obtain alternative frameworks of
epistemic justiﬁcation, suitable for the evaluation of pursuit worthiness.
22For instance, it could be argued that the criterion of predictive power is insufficiently
represented in Bonjour’s account, or that the virtue of robustness of theories – although
indirectly addressed in terms of inferential density – could be presented in a more elaborated
way (see footnotes 1 and 5).
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4
Rationality and Irrationality
in the History of Continental
Drift
Was the Hypothesis of Continental Drift Worthy of
Pursuit?
. This chapter is based on a paper with the same title. It is co-authored
by the second author Erik Weber. We wish to thank Steffen Ducheyne and
Christian Straßer for the valuable comments on a former draft of this paper.
Summary The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegener’s theory
of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions
aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode.
Even though the debate included analyses in terms of scientiﬁc methodology,
applications of concrete accounts of epistemic justiﬁcation to this case study
have been rare. In particular, the question as to whether Wegener’s theory was
epistemically worthy of pursuit in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, that
is, in its early development, remained open or inadequately addressed. The
aim of this chapter is to oﬀer an answer to this question. The evaluation of
Drift will be done by means of an account of theory evaluation suitable for the
context of pursuit, developed in Chapter 3. We will argue that pursuing the
theory of continental drift was rational, i.e., that it was irrational to reject its
pursuit as unworthy.
4.1 Introduction
Ever since the revolution in the earth sciences culminated in the overall accep-
tance of the theory of plate tectonics, philosophers and historians of science
have been analyzing this shift in geology. What made the development in ge-
ology very interesting is its speciﬁc dynamics. Even though the hypothesis of
continental drift was proposed by Alfred Wegener already around the 1920s, it
was ﬁrmly rejected by many geologists not only as unacceptable but even as
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unworthy of further pursuit. Almost half a century had to pass in order for
this hypothesis to become ﬁnally accepted and elaborated into the theory of
plate tectonics. Such a development inspired discussions among philosophers
and historians of science, which especially focused around two issues: ﬁrst, the
nature of the revolution in geology and the applicability of diﬀerent method-
ological frameworks to it, and second, the rationality or irrationality of the
stances of scientists throughout the revolution.
With regard to the ﬁrst question, some philosophers and historians of sci-
ence argued that this episode can be described in terms of Kuhn’s notion of
scientiﬁc revolution (e.g. (Stewart 1990)). However, the majority of them
agreed that Laudan’s account of progress of science is more suitable for this
case-study (see e.g. (Le Grand 1988), (Frankel 1979), (Laudan 1987)). The apt-
ness of Laudan’s framework stems from two important notions in his account.
On the one hand, his notion of a research tradition as a broader theoretical
framework, constituted by speciﬁc scientiﬁc theories, has been shown useful
for capturing the rivaling camps in geology, neither of which could be reduced
to one generally accepted theory.1 On the other hand, his distinction between
the context of pursuit and the context of acceptance (Laudan 1977, p. 108-110)
proved to be important for analyzing questions of rationality regarding this case
study. According to Laudan, “acceptance, rejection, pursuit and non-pursuit
constitute the major cognitive stances which scientists can legitimately take
towards research traditions (and their constituent theories)” (Laudan 1977,
p. 119). As the names suggest, the context of acceptance deals with the ques-
tion as to whether a certain theory is to be accepted as the standard in the
given ﬁeld, while the context of pursuit deals with the question as to whether a
(possibly young, undeveloped) theory is at all worthy of further pursuit. Such
a distinction allows for a twofold analysis of the rationality of judgments made
by geologists during this time. This brings us to the second important topic
that attracted interests of philosophers and historians of science, as we have
mentioned above.
With respect to the context of acceptance, there has been a general agree-
ment that it was rational to reject Wegener’s theory of drift when it ﬁrst ap-
peared in the 1912-1915, and to accept Drift2 in the early 1960s, after it had
developed into the theory of plate tectonics. With respect to the context of
pursuit, most of the authors simply described the views of geologists at the
time. Nevertheless, the question: Was pursuing the theory of continental drift
1In contrast to Lakatos’ notion of a research program, Laudan’s notion of research tradi-
tion allows for an evolving hardcore, which, according to some authors, makes it especially
suitable for describing the geological sciences in the first half of the twentieth century (see
e.g. (Frankel 1979, p. 53)). According to Laudan, what makes theories belong to the same
research tradition is its hardcore, which, even though sacrosanct for its proponents, can still
evolve. In other words, theories belong to the same tradition not because some of their cru-
cial assumptions are identical, but rather because these assumptions overlap (see (Laudan
1977), p. 99).
2As it is usual in the literature on this case study, we will call this research tradition and
its constituting theories (running from Wegener’s theory of continental drift to the theory of
plate tectonics) – Drift.
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in the first half of the twentieth century at all rational (in the sense of being
epistemically justified), or was it rational to reject its pursuit? – so far has not
been properly addressed.
The aim of this chapter is to answer this question in terms of a concrete ac-
count of epistemic justiﬁcation. To this end, we will use the account developed
in Chapter 3, which will be slightly modiﬁed in order to allow for the notion
of pursuit worthiness in a strong sense.
The chapter is structured as follows. We begin in Section 4.2 by oﬀering
a brief historical overview of the revolution in geology. In Section 4.3 we will
show that so far this question has not been properly addressed in the litera-
ture on this historical episode. In Section 4.4 we will present the account of
epistemic justiﬁcation which we shall employ in this chapter. Sections 4.5 to
4.8 bring an evaluation of pursuit worthiness of Drift in the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century. In Section 4.9 we will discuss the epistemic stances of ge-
ologists in this time period in view of our evaluation. Moreover, we will point
out the importance of the evaluation of epistemic pursuit worthiness and some
undesirable implications for scientiﬁc debates once this type of assessment has
been neglected. Section 4.10 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Historical Overview of the Revolution in Geology
4.2.1 Rivaling Theories
Alfred Wegener launched the idea of continental drift in a short article in (We-
gener 1912). A more elaborate version appeared as a book in 1915 (Wegener
1915). His central claims were that all the continents had once been united,
had broken apart and had drifted through the ocean ﬂoor to their current lo-
cations (Le Grand 1988, p. 1). Following Le Grand we call adherents of the of
large scale lateral movements of continents drifters. Wegener probably was not
the ﬁrst drifter, but he was the ﬁrst to develop a full-ﬂedged argumentation
for it. He tried to show that Drift is superior to the two theories that already
existed, viz. permanentism and contractionism. The summary of views and
arguments presented below is based on (Le Grand 1988) (especially p. 19-28,
40-46 and 55-57).3
According to permanentists “... the continents were formed in remote ge-
ological times as the earth had gradually cooled down and contracted. Since
then, they had been permanent features of the earths surface.” (Ibid., p. 20-21).
Continents do not move laterally (this is how permanentism diﬀers from Drift)
and do not disappear (this is how it diﬀers from contractionism, see below).
James D. Dana, professor at Yale University from 1850 to 1892 and one of the
main adherents of this theory, used the slogan “Once a continent, always a con-
tinent; once an ocean, always an ocean” (quoted from: Ibid., p. 21). According
3Even though Le Grand offers a good overview of this debate, some details that are
relevant for our discussion are better worked out in (Oreskes 1999) (see Sections 4.5-4.8).
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to permanentists there have been small elevations (producing mountains) and
small subsidences (producing e.g. shallow inland seas).
The most important representative of contractionism was the German ge-
ologist Eduard Suess. The central claim of his theory was the following: “As
the earth lost its heat, a rigid crust formed. As the earth continued to cool
and shrink, this crust wrinkled, folded and subsided” (Ibid., p. 25). This pro-
cess explains how mountains come into existence (lateral movement of parts of
crust). The collapses occur sporadically, creating new oceans and new conti-
nents: when the crust collapses in a certain region, the water ﬂows to the new
lowest point; continents thus can become oceans and oceans land. Because
the collapses occur sporadically, contractionists see the history of the earth as
divided into periods of rapid change and periods of stability.
According to Wegener the earth consists of a series of concentric shells with
diﬀerent compositions and densities (highest density in the near to the core).
The temperature also is higher closer to the core. The continents constitute
the outermost shell and consist of blocks of sial (silica + alumina) which (like
icebergs in the sea) partially ﬂoat on and extend into blocks of sima (silica +
magnesia). The oceans are situated between the blocks of sial, and ocean ﬂoor is
made of sima. The continents once were united in the super-continent Pangaea,
which broke apart in the Cretaceous (Wegener did not give e reason for this
break). Since then, the continents are propelled by one or more forces through
the ocean ﬂoor. Sometimes they move apart (Africa and South America).
Sometimes they collide, resulting in mountains (e.g. the collision of India and
Asia creating the Himalayas).
In order to understand Wegener’s theory and the arguments discussed be-
low well, it is important to elaborate the analogy with the icebergs. Icebergs
are solid, while the water in which they ﬂoat is ﬂuid. Analogously, the con-
tinents are solid, and the sima in which they ﬂoat is (relatively) ﬂuid. The
density of the icebergs is lower than that of the surrounding water, so they
ﬂoat; analogously, the density of the continents (sial) is lower than that of the
surrounding ocean ﬂoor (sima), so the continents ﬂoat. Wegener invoked two
forces: pole-ﬂight (Polﬂucht, a force due to the rotation of the earth and di-
rected form the poles to the equator) and a tidal force (from east to west) as
a result of gravitational attraction of the sun and the moon.
4.2.2 Arguments in the Debate
Here is an overview of the arguments that were exchanged:
1. Permanentism cannot explain the distribution of fossils (palaeobiogeog-
raphy) and living species. If oceans and continents are permanent, sim-
ilarities between species separated by oceans cannot be explained. Drift
explains the similarities, because the continents were once united. con-
tractionists assumed that there are sunken continents and/or sunken
landbridges that connected the continents we have now. These sunken
continents and landbridges explain the similarities. Suess postulated the
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existence of the palaeocontinent Gondwana, of which the central part
sunk in the Indian Ocean. What remained is now: Australia, India and
Africa. For the connection between Africa and South America he left the
two options open. In the terminology of (Laudan 1977), the distribution
of fossils and living species is an anomaly for permanentism.
2. Permanentism cannot explain geological similarities between continents.
Mountain chains and coal-basins seem to continue on both sides of the At-
lantic Ocean (e.g. coal ﬁelds in Pennsylvania on one side, French-Belgian
coal basin on the other side). Drifters can easily explain these similarities.
Contractionists have to assume that the sunken parts have the same geo-
logical structure as the parts to be explained (so they formed a geological
connection, not just a route for plants and animals). Permanentists have
to claim that the similarities are accidental. This is another anomaly in
Laudan’s terms.
3. Contractionism is incompatible with isostasy (see above: sima and sial)
that was well supported at the beginning of the 20th century by all
kinds of measurement. If the landbridges consist of sial, they cannot sink
through the denser sima of the ocean ﬂoors. The same for the sunken
connecting continents. In Laudan’s terminology, this is an external con-
ceptual problem for contractionism.
4. Contractionism is incompatible with the presence of radioactive materi-
als in the earth’s crust. Physicists discovered that radioactive material
was widely distributed in the earth’s crust, and that they produce heat
when decaying. In 1909 the Irish physicist John Joly argued that for
this reason it is very problematic to maintain that the earth cools down
through loss of internal heat. Rather, the most plausible state is that the
temperature of the earth remains constant or increases a little bit. This
is incompatible with the extreme cooling down that contractionists have
to assume (e.g. 1200○C to explain the formation of the Alps, much more
for higher mountains). This is another external conceptual problem for
contractionists.
5. As mentioned above, Wegener invoked two forces (pole-ﬂight and tidal
force) that propelled the continents. The problem is that these forces are
too weak:
The earth did behave like a ﬂuid in some respects, but no one
was proposing that the ocean ﬂoors were in fact liquid: they
were composed of dense, basaltic rocks. How could the con-
tinents move laterally through such ﬂoors without crumbling
to bits? What enormous force not only moved the continents
but had crumpled them up to form the Alps, Rockies, Andes
and Himalayas? The forces which Wegener invoked did exist
but they were far too weak. A force nearly 1 000 000 times
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stronger was needed, and if it did exist it would surely have
been noticed by physicists. (Le Grand 1988, p. 55-56)
In Laudan’s terminology, this is an external conceptual problem. The
problem is of a less strong type than the conceptual problems facing
contractionism: physics makes Drift implausible, but there is no logical
incompatibility.
6. The complementary shapes of coast lines (e.g. of Africa and South Amer-
ica) can be explained by Wegener if he assumes arbitrary changes of
shape. His rivals judged that he could not explain the jig-saw ﬁt, and
that this was a problem for all three theories. In Laudan’s terminology,
this is an unsolved problem for all three theories.
7. Wegener tried to develop geodetic evidence. He participated in several
expeditions in Greenland (and died during one of them in 1930). He
tried to measure whether Greenland was moving. His results were well
within the margin of error of his apparatus and method (it was not sure
that the measurements were made at exactly the same spot). In Laudan’s
terminology this is a failed attempt of Wegener to create an extra anomaly
for his rivals.
4.2.3 Seafloor Spreading
Given these arguments for and against the three theories, it is not surprising
that none of them became dominant. Each of them was confronted with a
number of problems. The situation changed in the 1960s, after ﬁndings in pa-
leomagnetic studies and investigations of the seaﬂoor gave additional evidence
for Drift. Moreover, Harry Hess’ idea of seaﬂoor spreading oﬀered a mechanism
of drift that both solved the problem of mechanism and was supported by a
suﬃcient amount of evidence:
The nub of his theory was that new seaﬂoor was generated at ridges
by the upwelling of mantle material. The old seaﬂoor gradually
moved from the ridges and was eventually dragged down at the
trenches and reconverted into mantle. The cycle was driven by con-
vection currents rising under ridges and descending under trenches.
. . .
The continents were passive passengers seated on dynamic ocean
ﬂoors. Hess’s model provided a solution to the conceptual problem
with which Drifters have wrestled for ﬁfty years: how could the
continents drift through the ocean ﬂoor? Hess’s answer was that
they moved with the crust, not through it. (Le Grand 1988, p. 197)
In order to see why the conceptual problem disappears, it is important to
notice that the new theory requires diﬀerent forces (at other places, and less
4.3. Others on Drift in the Context of Pursuit 55
strong).4 After Hess introduced this idea, Drift became the dominant theory
very rapidly. Adherents of the other theories changed side.5
4.3 Others on Drift in the Context of Pursuit
In this section we will discuss the work of other scholars that have analyzed
the development of Drift in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. Our aim is
to show that the question as to whether Drift was worthy of pursuit has been
either neglected or inadequately addressed.
On the one hand, most of the authors who analyzed this revolution focused
primarily on the context of acceptance. For example, Paul Thagard (in his
(Thagard 1992)) oﬀered an analysis of this revolution in terms of his account of
explanatory coherence. His primary aim was to answer the question: “Why was
Wegener’s theory of continental drift largely rejected in the 1920s, and why, in
contrast, were the new ideas about seafloor spreading and plate tectonics largely
accepted in the 1960s?” (p. 171, italics in original6). Both research questions
address only the context of acceptance. Similarly, Ronald Giere in his (Giere
1988) discussed why there was no revolution in the 1920s in contrast to the
1960s (p. 227-277).
On the other hand, those authors who did discuss the rationality in the con-
text of pursuit, did not take into consideration what we are primarily interested
in. They were concerned with the question as to why some geologists pursued
Drift and why some others did not pursue it, but not whether pursuing Drift
in general was rational or not.7 For example, Miriam Solomon in her (Solomon
2001) explicates which epistemic and non-epistemic factors inﬂuenced a dissent
among geologists in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, and which factors
later on led to the consensus over the theory of plate tectonics. Her approach
aims at explicating why some geologists decided to pursue Drift, and why some
others decided not to purse it. But this does not answer the question: Was
Drift around the 1920s-1930s epistemically worthy of pursuit or not?
Another example is Henry Frankel who agued in his (Frankel 1979) that
if Laudan’s methodological framework is applicable to the development and
reception of Drift, then this tradition “should not be accepted by the relevant
scientiﬁc community if it does not have greater problem-solving eﬀectiveness
than competing traditions, and should be pursued only by those scientists who
believe it has promise of its future ability to solve problems” (p. 75; italics
added). In addition, he suggested that for certain geologists (such as Arthur
4As we shall see, Arthur Holmes proposed a similar mechanism of the drift already few
decades earlier. For a detailed discussion of Hess’ proposal and its development see (Frankel
1980).
5Some geologists accepted Drift only after the evidence from some of its novel predictions
was confirmed (see (Laudan and Laudan 1989, p. 221)).
6Henceforth, italics appearing in a quoted text are present in the original as well, unless
otherwise indicated.
7Most of these approaches make use of Laudan’s criterion for when pursuing a theory is
rational. We will take a closer look at Laudan’s criterion in Section 4.4.
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Holmes and Alexander du Toit) the theory of drift was suﬃciently promis-
ing since it could solve a number of empirical problems (in Laudan’s sense of
the term) without necessarily creating more conceptual or empirical problems.
Without going into discussion on the notion of rationality underlying such a
“subjective” assessment of pursuit worthiness, let us just notice that Frankel’s
approach to the rationality in the context of pursuit does not answer the ques-
tion we are interested in. What we wish to investigate is not whether Drift was
worthy of pursuit for some, but whether it was worthy of pursuit in general,
for the geological community at the time.
In a similar vein, Homer Le Grand (Le Grand 1988, p. 95) as well as Rachel
Laudan (Laudan 1987, p. 205-213) both explicate why some geologists engaged
in the actual pursuit of Drift, and why other geologists did not pursue it. As
mentioned above, such an approach does not answer our research question.
Let us then present the account of epistemic justiﬁcation in the context of
pursuit, which we shall use to evaluate Drift.
4.4 The Notion of Pursuit Worthiness in a Strong Sense
and the Main Claims of the Chapter
As we have announced, we will show that Drift was worthy of pursuit in a strong
sense (henceforth: WPSS).8 By this we mean that it satisﬁed the criteria of
pursuit worthiness in the most important respects. More precisely, our main
claims are, ﬁrst, that Drift was initially WPSS, and second, that it remained
WPSS throughout the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century.
We say that a research tradition is initially WPSS if it satisﬁes the following
criteria, formulated on the basis of our account of potential coherence:
1. Presence of Significant Explanations: A theory has to oﬀer explanations
that are signiﬁcant at that point of the scientiﬁc development.9
2. Inferential Density:
a) Internal Inferential Density: A theory should not have a less uniﬁed
core of hypotheses than its dominant rival or it should be able to
address such a lack by means of its programmatic character.
b) External inferential density: A theory should be at least as inferen-
tially connected with established theories from other scientiﬁc do-
mains as its dominant rival or it should be able to address the lack
of such connections by means of its programmatic character.
8We will use the same shortcut also for “pursuit worthiness in a strong sense”.
9For what counts as a significant explanation here see Chapter 3.
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3. Programmatic character: A theory should have a programmatic character
that addresses all the major problems of the theory (such as explanatory
anomalies, inconsistencies, etc.).10
We say that the research tradition remains WPSS if the previous criteria are
satisﬁed in view of:
1. a theoretical growth or
2. a growth in the programmatic character.
In contrast to our account of potential coherence, which allows for a gradual
evaluation of pursuit worthiness of theories (or research traditions), the criteria
of WPSS are presented in a discrete manner and (to make things simpler)
without introducing the concept of coherence. In other words, the criteria of
WPSS are formulated in such a way that if a theory or a research tradition
satisﬁes them, we can say that it is (or in case of the past theories: was)
certainly WPSS.
It is important to notice that satisfying the criteria of WPSS is a suﬃcient
condition for a research tradition to be worthy of pursuit, even though it may
not be a necessary one.11 There are various examples of scientiﬁc theories
that were worthy of pursuit even though they did not fully satisfy all of these
criteria.12 In such cases, a theory has to score very high in some respects
in order to compensate for a low score in others. However, by showing that
Drift was WPSS we can avoid a discussion involving such a weighting of its
properties. Moreover, showing that Drift was WPSS makes it easier to argue
that the view according to which Drift was not at all worthy of pursuit can be
considered epistemically unjustiﬁed.
When evaluating pursuit worthiness of research traditions, we are in fact
evaluating the pursuit worthiness of its constituting theories. Therefore, ex-
amining the initial WPSS of Drift will refer to Wegener’s model. However, it
is important to mention that even though Wegener’s theory appeared around
1915, most North American geologists became familiar with his work only in
1924, when English translation of Wegener’s book was published (Marvin 2001,
p. 21). This complicates rooting the initial WPSS of Drift in a speciﬁc year,
and somewhat blurs the demarcation line between the initial WPSS and the
property of remaining WPSS. Our approach will be the following: we will an-
swer the ﬁrst issue in view of the discussion that occurred in between 1912 and
the mid-1920s, including Wegener’s model of Drift as well as the ﬁrst criticisms
10The criterion of consistency has been skipped since for the notion of WPSS we are
focusing only on possible problems a theory may have in this respect, i.e. inconsistencies, for
which we require to be addressed by the programmatic character.
11That means that if a theory satisfies our criteria then it is (or was) WPSS; however, if
it does not satisfy them, we cannot make any claims about its WPSS.
12This is especially the case with theories that are initially internally inconsistent. For
example, a theory with a strong explanatory power, whose programmatic character might
not address some inconsistencies in it, could still be worthy of pursuit (see (Lakatos 1978,
p. 55)).
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of it. The latter issue will be discussed in view of the arguments and alternative
models of Drift that were oﬀered by Wegener’s followers (even though some of
them were proposed already in the early 1920s).
The historical presentation will be mainly based on (Oreskes 1999), which
is one of the most recent studies of this episode, as well as on (Le Grand 1988).
4.5 Presence of Significant Explanations
As we have mentioned in Section 4.2, when Wegener ﬁrst proposed his theory
in 1912 its main explanatory rival – Suess’s theory of contraction – had been
under a serious attack (also see (Oreskes 1999, p. 21-55)). If the principle
of isostasy was correct (and by the time of Wegener’s proposal there was a
growing conviction that it was), continents and ocean ﬂoors had to be diﬀerent
either in structure or in composition. This conﬂicted with Suessian idea of
interchangeability of oceans and continents, and thus with the hypothesis of
land bridges, used for explaining the similarities between the coastal regions
on the opposite sides of oceans. Even though some geologists found a solu-
tion for the conﬂict between contractionism and isostasy in the permanentist
perspective, permanentism had even more trouble explaining such similarities.
Therefore, both rivals of Drift – contractionism and permanentism – can in
this case be regarded as oﬀering either a weak explanation for the similarities
between the continents or no explanation at all. Two particularly signiﬁcant
types of similarities that Wegener’s theory could account for were the following.
First, the paleontological similarities. The evidence for them was at this
point already well established by paleontologists independently of Wegener’s
hypothesis (Oreskes 1999, p. 56). Not only was there an overall resemblance of
fossil forms indicating that continents must have been somehow connected in
the past, but there was also an evidence of a distribution of certain organisms,
such as earthworms, which aren’t capable of swimming or ﬂying or having
resilient seeds or a dormant life cycle or free-ﬂoating larval stage, which could
allow for their passive distribution (Ibid., p. 57). A similar case are certain
species of snails that were, just like the earthworms, unlikely to have crossed
all the way across the land bridges (Le Grand 1988, p. 43).
Second, there was an evidence of nearly identical stratigraphic sequences
and structural patterns on the coastlines of the matching continents. Moreover,
Caledonian fold belts in North America matched with the Appalachian ones in
Europe, while the Gondwana beds in India were nearly identical to the Karroo
sequence of southern Africa (Oreskes 1999, p. 57).
Another signiﬁcant explanation that Drift oﬀered regarded a paleoclimatic
evidence. By the twentieth century there was a consensus that the earth’s
climate had undergone repeated ﬂuctuations. For example, glacial deposits in
South Africa and Australia indicated that the climate had been much colder in
Permian. However, the cause of these climatic ﬂuctuations, which came to be
known as the problem of Permo-Carboniferous glaciation, was unknown (Ibid.,
p. 58). The main problem for permanentist and contractionist accounts was
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that diﬀerent climatic conditions occurred at about the same time at diﬀerent
parts of the globe, which prohibited explanations stating that the earth as a
whole was once hotter or cooler than now (Le Grand 1988, p. 44). In contrast,
Wegener oﬀered an explanation in terms of a shift of geophysical poles (so-
called polar wandering), as well a shift of continents relative to the poles.
Without going further into details of the explananda which the Drift was
able to account for, it is important to notice that the presence of signiﬁcant
explanations does not mean that Drift had no explanatory anomalies. For
example, the evidence of Carboniferous glaciation was also found near Boston,
which, according to Wegener’s account, must have been in the tropical climate
at the time (Le Grand 1988, p. 56). Nevertheless, such explanatory anomalies
are a usual component of young scientiﬁc theories, and should, thus, not be the
reason for rejecting their pursuit. One of the main tasks of further developments
of the theory is exactly to remove such problems. And that a research towards
fulﬁlling this task can proceed is guaranteed by the programmatic character of
the theory, which is our next criterion of evaluation.
We can thus conclude that Wegener’s theory had signiﬁcant explanations
in the the sense deﬁned in Chapter 3.
4.6 Inferential Density
When it comes to internal inferential density, it is easy to see that none of
the three rivaling theories was especially uniﬁed. Drift could not provide a
precise mechanism of drifting, but it was able to account for many geological
phenomena with the same hypothesis (namely, the hypothesis of the continental
drift). In contrast, both contractionism and permanentism had to introduce
an additional hypothesis, such as the idea of land bridges and isthmian links
which in the past connected the continents, in order to account for the vast
evidence of similarities between the coastal regions on the opposite sides of
oceans (or to leave the phenomena unexplained). Thus, Wegener’s theory at
least did not have a less uniﬁed core of hypotheses than its rivals.
As for the external inferential density, we will show in Section 4.7 that
Drift successfully addressed potential problems with physics and seismology.
Moreover, we will show that it had inferential links with the theory of isostasy,
in contrast to contractionism that was not well connected with it. In view of
these insights it will be clear that Wegener’s theory satisﬁed the criterion of
external inferential density as well.
4.7 Programmatic Character
Let us start with an example of how an anomaly is addressed by the program-
matic character – the above mentioned evidence of glaciation in the North
America. With respect to this explanatory anomaly Wegener pointed out that
the vast majority of other evidence indicated that the area was in a tropical
climate which made the glacial origin of these deposits suspicious. He thus
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suggested that the deposits could have originated in some other way (Brooks
1949, p. 232). For instance, the Appalachian orogenic belt, in which some of the
deposits were found, could have been a high mountain range at the time (see
also (Holmes 1944, p. 502). This hypothesis also indicated in which direction
could the further examination of this problem proceed.
In this section we will focus on two major problems Drift was confronted
with: ﬁrst, the problem of the mechanism of Drift, and second, the conﬂict
between Drift and seismology. We will show that with respect to both of them
Wegener’s theory had a programmatic character.13
4.7.1 The Mechanism of Drift
As we have already mentioned, the main problem of Drift was the question of
the mechanism governing the continental drifting. It has become common in
the literature on Drift to argue that in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century it
was not only unclear which forces could be responsible for continental drifting,
but that any conceivable mechanism of the drift seemed to conﬂict with the
physical theory (e.g. (Le Grand 1988, p. 129), or (Laudan 1981, p. 230); also
see Section 4.2.2 in this chapter).
In contrast to such a view, Oreskes argues that Wegener’s proposal was
well rooted in the theory of isostasy. She starts oﬀ by pointing out that for
Wegener the principle of isostasy was “nothing more than hydrostatic equilib-
rium according to Archimedes’ principle, whereby the weight of the immersed
body is equal to that of the ﬂuid displaced.” (quoted from (Oreskes 1999,
p. 65)). Thus, continents could be seen as ﬂoating in hydrostatic equilibrium,
which means that the substrate in which they are embedded has to behave,
over geological time, in a ﬂuid manner.
But such an idea of a mobile substrate was not a novelty of Wegener’s the-
ory. The basic idea of isostasy refers to a condition to which the crust and
the mantle tend, in the absence of disturbing forces. The ﬁrst conceptions
of isostasy from the second half of the nineteenth century conceived of crust
as ﬂoating on the denser underlying mantle (Watts 2001, p. 1). Only by in-
troducing the idea of a ﬂuid or plastic substrate could they account for the
oscillations of the earth’s crust. Airy’s model of isostasy, which was well ac-
cepted throughout Europe, hypothesized that a thin layer of crust overlays a
ﬂuid layer of greater density just like timber blocks ﬂoat on water (Ibid., p. 12,
21). English geologist Reverend O. Fisher in his book Physics of the Earth’s
Crust from 1881 suggested that the crust is analogous to the broken-up area of
13We have chosen these two problems as the major attacks on Drift on the basis of
Oreskes’ study. According to Henry Frankel though, the problem of explaining the Southern
Glaciation was another heated topic in debates over the continental drift (Frankel 1987).
Frankel presents a number of objections raised against Wegener’s explanation of Permo-
Carboniferous Ice Cap, but also replies by drifters, where particularly important were the
arguments given by Alexander du Toit, Arthur Holmes and George C. Simpson (Ibid., p. 212-
216). These replies were the basis of the programmatic character of Drift with respect to
this issue, though for the details of this discussion, we are referring the interested reader to
Frankel’s article.
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ice, ﬂoating upon water, obeying Archimedes’ principle (Ibid., p. 15). Similarly,
North American geologist Clarence E. Dutton spoke of the ﬂotation of the crust
upon a liquid or highly plastic substratum ((Ibid., p. 16-17); (Oreskes 1999,
p. 67)). By the time Wegener’s work was translated into English in 1924, there
was a rough consensus among European and North American geologists that
there was a mobile layer beneath the earth’s crust (Oreskes 1999, p. 66-80).
Moreover:
The idea of moving continents was perhaps not as great a concep-
tual leap as might otherwise appear. Chamberlin, Dutton, Hayford,
and others had written explicitly of ’lateral creep’ and continental
’spreading’; the unknown issue was the scale of these eﬀects, and
whether they operated in a cyclical manner, as Chamberlin seemed
to suggest, or whether they could actually produce a net lateral
motion, as Hayford might be interpreted to imply. (Ibid., p. 72-73)
Oreskes adds that the prominence of the advocates of isostasy makes it
unlikely that other geologists did not know about their research. And even if
they were ignorant of isostasy, the idea of a mobile substrate was inherent in
the theory of geosynclines which was well known among the North American
geologists (Ibid., p. 73-74). Finally, the Fennoscandian uplift represented a
phenomenological evidence for the mobile substrate. The uplift was a result
of the removal of glacial ice, and according to Fisher, a direct consequence
of isostasy. For Wegener, the Fennoscandian uplift demonstrated that the
substrate had to be suﬃciently mobile to ﬂow out of the way of the depressing
continent, and upon the removal of the glacial load to ﬂow back under the
continent (Ibid., p. 76).
Thus, the main novelty of Wegener’s theory was not the possibility of the
horizontal movements, but their scale and extent. But what about the rigid
ocean ﬂoor through which, according to his model, continents had to plow?
Oreskes writes:
Wegener’s argument hinged on the belief that the ocean ﬂoor was
more like the crustal substrate than the continental blocks – or, to
use the terminology of the day, it was simatic (rich in silicon and
magnesium) rather than sialic (rich in silicon and aluminium). This
was not a particularly controversial view: it had long been suggested
by evidence from ocean dredging and the basaltic composition of
most ocean islands. ... And if ocean ﬂoor was primarily composed
of basalt, then ... the continents had deep roots and the ocean
basins were composed of denser material than the continents. If so,
then the continents plowed mostly through plastic substrate and
needed only to dislodge a thin veneer of crust at the top. (Ibid.,
p. 77)
Using the results of gravity work obtained by others, Wegener estimated
that the oceanic crust was no more than 5 km thick in contrast to continen-
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tal blocks, the average thickness of which was taken to be around 100 km.
Consequently, in Wegener’s model continents moved mainly through the ﬂuid
substrate, and had only a thin semi-rigid oceanic crust in their way. In reply
to the objection that such a plow would result in deformations of the ocean
ﬂoor, Wegener called upon isostasy which precluded the formation of signiﬁcant
elevations in the seeﬂoor (Ibid., p. 78-79).
Thus, as Oreskes explicates, even though Wegener’s model may seem com-
pletely wrong from the nowadays geological perspective, in the 1920’s it was
consistent with the available understanding of terrestrial kinematic proper-
ties. And even though the model was based on hypotheses which could not
be proved, it showed that the problem of the mechanism could in principle
be resolved. Moreover, it pointed to the problem-ﬁeld that required further
investigation: isostasy and the nature of the substrate, which seemed to be
directly related to the question of the mechanism of drifting. Thus, it gave a
programmatic character to Drift with respect to this issue.
As for the origin of forces governing the drift, Wegener hypothesized two
possible causes: pole-ﬂight force and tidal retardation. Even though they
turned out to be too weak to account for drift, at the time when Wegener
proposed them, they contributed to the programmatic character of Drift, by
indicating in which direction a further investigation of this question could go
(namely, examining if these forces are strong enough to move the continents).
4.7.2 The Conflict with Seismology
The second major objection to Drift concerns the inconsistency (and hence also
the lack of inferential connections) between Drift and seismology.
Harold Jeﬀreys was a strong opponent of Drift coming from the contrac-
tionist side. One of his main arguments against the drifters was that their
theory was inconsistent with seismology (in contrast to contractionism which
was compatible with it). According to him, the propagation of seismic waves
at depth of the earth’s interior implied a solid and rigid earth. This conﬂicted
with the idea of a ﬂuid substrate upheld by the drifters (Oreskes 1999, p. 83).14
However, Jeﬀreys’ arguments were rebutted, on the one hand, by the the-
ory of isostasy which required a ﬂuid substrate, and on the other hand, by the
drifters themselves. As for Wegener’s reply to this objection, he argued that
earth materials may behave in a rigid manner in response to short-duration
disturbances, such as seismic waves. But the same materials may exhibit plas-
ticity in response to a small, steady and slow pressure over geological times
(Ibid., p. 79). Such a reply showed that further examination of the substrate
14It is interesting to notice that even though Jeffreys’ arguments are often considered to
have played a significant role in the rejection of Wegener’s hypothesis, Oreskes suggests that
they “proved quite insufficient to move most geologists” (Ibid., p. 89). She mentions both
British and North American geologists who were either not inclined to fully accept Jeffereys’
views or who did not have too high opinion of him as a scientist. Also see (Oreskes 2001,
p. 218).
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was needed to conﬁrm the relation between Drift and seismology, and that the
conﬂict between the two was not at all inevitable.
We can thus conclude that Wegener’s theory had a programmatic charac-
ter, which at least temporarily addressed the major problems it was confronted
with.
So far we have shown that Drift satisﬁed all the required standards for
being initially WPSS. In the following section we will examine whether it also
remained WPSS.
4.8 Theoretical growth and the Growth in the
Programmatic Character
In this section we will show that Drift exhibited a theoretical growth throughout
the 1920s and the 1930s.
4.8.1 Growth that Drift Exhibited in the 1920s
4.8.1.1 Increase in the Number and Quality of Significant
Explanations
Up to the 1920s the main geological evidence, ﬁrst for Suess’ hypothesis of
Gondwana and then for Wegener’s Drift were the similarities between Karroo
formations in South Africa and age-equivallent rocks elsewhere in the world
(Oreskes 1999, p. 157). However, a direct comparative study of the so-called
Gondwana beds was missing, and both Suess and Wegener built their ideas by
combining results obtained by other geologists, rather than themselves conduct-
ing a ﬁeld investigation. North American geologist Frederick Wright realized
that the similarities between these regions could thus be taken as a prediction
of Drift. He proposed that the examination of the evidence be conducted by
an expert in this ﬁeld, namely Alexander Logie du Toit, a leading specialist in
the geology of South Africa who thus had a suﬃcient expertise for comparing
South African coast with the South American one (Ibid., p. 158). The proposal
was accepted and in 1923 du Toit embarked on a journey to South America,
sponsored by the Carnegie Institution of Washington, to study the geology of
the eastern coast of the continent. The results of his study were, according to
du Toit himself, strikingly in favor of the Drift hypothesis. Litho-stratigraphic
characteristics of the South American east coast were so similar to those of the
South African coast that du Toit concluded the two continents must have been
at one time no more than 400-800 kilometers apart (Oreskes 1999, p. 161). For
example, the facies patterns on both sides of the Atlantic exhibited less change
when compared to each other than to much closer facies within their respective
continents (Ibid., p. 166). According to du Toit, this evidence required direct
physical proximity of the continents, and could thus be explained only by Drift.
The study thus greatly contributed to the increase of signiﬁcant explanations
oﬀered by Drift. The results were presented in Du Toit’s monograph A Geolog-
64 Chapter 4. Rationality and Irrationality in the History of Drift
ical Comparison of South America with South Africa published in Washington,
D.C. in 1927.
In addition to du Toit’s work, Drift showed a growth in the work of some
other geologists as well. Swiss geologist Emile Argand improved Wegener’s
solutions of orogenic problems by oﬀering a more detailed account of the for-
mation of mountain ranges and island festoons ((Frankel 1981, p. 202); (Oreskes
1999, p. 115)). Arthur Wade, a geologist who ﬁrst lived in England and then
in Australia, approached Drift from the perspective of his oil exploration work.
He found Drift to be fruitful for accounting for the structure and history of New
Guinea, whose crustal deformation he attributed to its mashing against Aus-
tralia. Calling upon Drift even had practical consequences in this case, since it
could help in locating sites for future oilﬁelds (Le Grand 1988, p. 86).15 The
explanatory power of Drift was also improved by the work of some Australian
biologists. For example, zoologist Launcelot Harrison considered the problems
of Australian bio-geography and suggested that if the land connections between
the southern continents had to be rejected on geophysical grounds, Drift was
the only remaining hypothesis oﬀering an explanation of species distribution
in the South (Ibid., p. 87).
4.8.1.2 Improved Programmatic Character – The Mechanism of
Drift
As we have seen, Wegener addressed the problem of the mechanism of the drift
by calling upon the theory of isostasy, and in addition, by hypothesizing two
forces that could be responsible for the continental movements. Nevertheless,
neither of these forces turned out to be suﬃciently strong to account for the
drift. Wegener eventually had to distance himself from this question and to
admit that “The Newton of drift theory has not yet appeared.” (Wegener
1966, p. 167). The opponents argued that ﬁnding such a force was improbable,
which introduced an external probabilistic inconsistency between Drift and
the physical theory. Nevertheless, throughout the 1920s Wegener’s followers
(Reginald Daly, John Joly and Arthur Holmes) oﬀered possible solutions for
this problem. We will take a closer look at the most important of these accounts
– Arthur Holmes’ model of Drift.
Among all the models of Drift from the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century,
the account oﬀered by British geologist Arthur Holmes in the late 1920s most
successfully addressed both the question as to whether Drift was conceivable
in light of the physical theory, as well as the question as to which forces could
be responsible for such a movement of continents (see (Frankel 1978, p. 131)).
Coming from the ﬁeld of radiology, Holmes argued that due to the thermal
processes resulting from the radioactive materials in the inside of the earth,
there was an accumulation and a discharge of the heat. Thus, on the one hand,
15Wade made further contributions in the 1930’s after emigrating to Australia, where he
worked on the geology of Western Australia. His research showed that there was a fitting of
the southern continents to Antarctica as well as the matching-up of some of their geological
features (Ibid., p. 86).
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he disqualiﬁed the basic idea of the contractionist tradition – the hypothesis
of the cooling earth. On the other hand, he proposed the idea of the con-
vection currents in the substratum, resulting from the diﬀerential heating by
radioactivity. His model has been sometimes labeled as “seaﬂoor thinning”:
it supposes that the continents drift apart by being carried along the backs
of the convection currents, which arise beneath continents, diverge and move
towards the continental edge; as a result, the currents produce a “stretched
region” of crustal material, which eventually becomes a new ocean ﬂoor (Ibid.,
p. 131-143). In addition to being compatible with the results of the research
in radiology, his hypothesis had a strong explanatory power: it could account
not only for the features of the continental drift, but also for the phenomena
such as mountain building, oceanic deeps, geocynclines, rift valleys, the dis-
tribution of earthquakes and volcanos, etc. (Holmes 1931, p. 600).16 Holmes
thus managed to address both, the alleged conﬂict between Drift and physics
(by showing that the continental drift is possible even without assuming that
continents plow their way through the seaﬂoor), as well as the question of the
forces governing the drift (by proposing the forces of the drift, namely, the
convection currents in the earth’s mantle).
However, Holmes was careful enough to see his hypothesis as a “preliminary
survey”:
So far the treatment has been almost entirely qualitative and there-
fore it inevitably stands in need of criticism and quantitative revi-
sion. The hydrodynamics of the substratum and its behaviour as
a heat engine need to be attacked on sound physical lines. The
capacity of substratum currents to promote magmatic corrosion,
transport and crystallisation, and to produce migrating sub-crustal
wave forms, calls for detail treatment. The full bearings of the hy-
pothesis on petrogenesis have yet to be investigated. Meanwhile its
general geological success seems to justify its tentative adoption as
a working hypothesis of unusual promise. (Ibid., p. 600)
We see here a number of tasks that Holmes points out as relevant for further
examination of his hypothesis. Hence, the idea of the convective currents in
the substratum can be taken as a prediction of his model of Drift, which could
be investigated in diﬀerent ways in future ﬁeld work.
To sum up, Holmes’ model obviously gave a programmatic character to the
theory with respect to the problem of the mechanism of Drift. Even Harold
Jeﬀreys, one of the biggest opponents of Drift, had to admit that Holmes’
proposal rendered the idea of Drift “physically possible” (though he still found
it to be very implausible) (Frankel 1978, p. 147).
16Note that these features of Holmes’ model (its compatibility with radiology and a strong
explanatory power) are not directly relevant for the programmatic character of Drift, though
they will turn out to be important for the criterion of external inferential density.
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4.8.1.3 Improved Programmatic Character – Seismology
In addition to Wegener’s replies to Jeﬀrey’s objections (see Section 4.7.2), other
proponents of Drift also discussed this issue. Already in the early 1920s Regi-
nald Daly argued that this objection to Drift conﬂated rigidity with solidity
(Oreskes 1999, p. 93). The results of seismic studies supported the idea that the
substrate was rigid, but this did not imply that it was solid (similar to the prop-
erties of glass, which is solid at room temperature, but which under pressure
and over time actually ﬂows). Daly further explicated that when it comes to
properties of the substrate which are relevant for Drift, what mattered was not
the distinction between liquidity and solidity, but the one between crystalline
and non-crystalline materials. And if the substrate were non-crystalline (like
glass), it could appear as rigid in response to seismic waves, but plastic in re-
sponse to long-term eﬀects (Ibid., p. 93-94). John Joly had a diﬀerent response
to this objection: according to his model, the substrate beneath the continents
was periodically and locally (rather than continuously and uniformly) molten
(Ibid., p. 108).
Therefore, the proponents of Drift oﬀered further possible solutions for the
conﬂict between their theory and seismology, the validity of which depended
on further investigations of the properties of the substrate.
4.8.1.4 Increase in the Internal and External Inferential Density
As we have seen, Holmes’ model of Drift provided a more uniﬁed core of hy-
potheses than Wegener’s one in view of the growing criticism of the latter for
the lack of plausible forces of drifting.17 Furthermore, through Holmes’ model
(and previously through Joly’s model as well) Drift obtained inferential con-
nections with the theory of radioactivity, which became problematic for both
of its rivals. The incompatibility of radioactivity with either contractionism or
permanentism was the primary reason for Holmes to become a proponent of
Drift, since it was the only theory that could account for the accumulation and
discharge of heat, necessitated by the presence of radioactive materials.
Drift showed an additional growth by improving its inferential connections
with the theory of isostasy. In the second half of the 1920s William Bowie,
a proponent of permanentism, organized an international collaboration aimed
at investigating isostasy, but indirectly relevant for the hypothesis of drift as
well (Oreskes 1999, p. 236-261). The aim of the investigation was to test
the theory of isostasy by obtaining gravity data from the ocean ﬂoor. Up
to that point isostasy had been conﬁrmed only on the continents due to the
fact that there were no precise instruments for measuring gravity at sea. In
the meantime, Dutch geologist Felix Vening Meinesz developed an improved
gravimeter, suitable for the sea measurements as well. The results of the in-
vestigation conﬂicted with the assumptions of Pratt’s model of isostasy, used
in the permanentist conception of geology. Indirectly, it indicated that Airy’s
17For a detailed discussion of the unifying aspect of Holmes model see (Lewis 2002).
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model of isostasy, compatible with Drift, might be correct after all. Thus, the
inferential connections between Drift and isostasy were in this way improved.
4.8.2 Growth that Drift exhibited in the 1930s
4.8.2.1 Increase in the External Inferential Density
Expeditions organized in the 1930’s corroborated the above mentioned results
of the research on isostasy, which were in accordance with Airy’s model, and
thus with Drift as well (Oreskes 1999, p. 245). By the mid-1930s seismic
evidence refuted Pratt’s model of isostasy (Ibid., p. 258). In view of these re-
sults, American geologist Richard M. Field pointed out in 1937 that Wegener’s
hypothesis played a great role in stimulating geological and geophysical inves-
tigations (Ibid., p. 259). Moreover, Bowie himself acknowledged in 1936 the
link between these results and Wegener’s ideas:
The Wegener hypothesis has received a great deal of attention in
recent years and deservedly so. It is based upon the idea [of] isostasy
. . . . Many students of the Earth’s crust feel that the Wegener
hypothesis does violence to certain mechanical principles, but, in
any event, it is something that should be looked into. (quoted from
Ibid., p. 261).
4.8.2.2 Further Improvement of the Programmatic Character -
The Mechanism of Drift
Vening Meinesz in a volume from 1934, which discussed results of his inves-
tigations of gravity, addressed some of Jeﬀreys’ objections to the hypothesis
of convection currents as the force governing the drift. According to Jeﬀreys,
any signiﬁcant thermal diﬀerentials in the earth must have been eradicated
throughout its cooling history. However, Meinesz pointed out that the het-
erogeneous nature of the earth’s inner structure, with an uneven distribution
of radioactive constituents and thermal properties meant that “in the actual
earth there can be no doubt that convection currents must develop” (quoted
from Ibid., p. 245-248). Meinesz’s work oﬀered support to the hypothesis of
Holmes’ model, which, as we have seen, gave a programmatic character to Drift
with respect to the problem of the mechanism of drifting.
4.8.2.3 Increase in the Quality of Significant Explanations
Some explanatory anomalies pointed out by the opponents of Drift were ad-
dressed by Alexander du Toit’s capital work Our Wondering Continents, which
came out in 1937 (du Toit 1937). For example, in order to account for more
explananda, Du Toit proposed in place of Wegener’s one super-continent, two
original super-continents – Laurentia in the north and Gondwanaland in the
south.
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4.8.3 State of affairs in the 1940s
In spite of exhibiting a theoretical growth and a growth of its programmatic
character throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, Drift was rarely discussed in the
’40s ((Le Grand 1988, p. 117); (Oreskes 1999, p. 226)). This was partially due
to the eﬀects of World War II, during which many North American geologists
were employed in the war eﬀort, while the immediate post-war years were not
very fruitful of theoretical developments.
The development of Drift seemed to have reversed by the articles published
by North American paleontologist George Gaylord Simpson. However, Simp-
son’s objections were rebutted by du Toit ((Oreskes 1999, p. 295-296); (Frankel
1987, p. 217-219)).18
To sum up, we have shown that Drift had a theoretical growth throughout
the 1920s and 1930s. In spite of this growth, it received hardly any attention
in the 1940s. It is thus not surprising that its theoretical growth was missing
in this decade.19
4.9 The Consequences of Our Account for the Epistemic
Stances of Geologists
Our analysis has shown that Drift scored well in each of the criteria of our
evaluation. Thus, we can conclude that it was both initially WPSS and that it
remained WPSS in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. That means that it
was rational to consider Drift as worthy of pursuit, and that it was irrational
to reject its pursuit as unworthy. It also means that characterizing Drift as
worthy of pursuit was not conﬂicting with rejecting its full acceptance.
In this section we are going to show that most of those who had a positive
opinion of Drift actually found it to be worthy of pursuit. Furthermore, we will
also show that there were geologists whose opinions of Drift can be considered
irrational in the above explicated sense.
4.9.1 The Supporters of Drift
Even though Wegener himself had a strong epistemic stance towards his own
theory, most of those who argued in favor of Drift, maintained that it was a
18Moreover, in the mid-40s du Toit began a work on a manuscript entitled “On the
mathematical probability of continental drift” (Ibid., p. 297) in which he planned to offer
a quantitative account of Drift based on the degree of similarity among species and the
distances among them. The work was never finished due to du Toit’s death in 1948. Thus,
this work cannot be considered as a contribution to the explanatory growth of Drift, but
it does represent a contribution to its programmatic character in the time when Drift was
mainly abandoned.
19Note that this conclusion differs from R. Laudan’s view according to which “far from
showing a greater rate of progress than rival theories, drift stood still, or even regressed
between 1930 and 1955” (Laudan 1987, p. 214). In view of our analysis, Laudan’s estimation
is too rough since it does not apply to the 1930s.
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theory requiring and worthy of more investigation. Let us mention some of
them.
In Europe, German paleontologist Karl Andree found Wegener’s theory to
be a stimulus to research even though it could not be accepted in all of its
details (Le Grand 1988, p. 58). Austrian paleontologist Bruno Kubart main-
tained that a combination of ideas taken from older theories together with
those from Wegener’s Drift could form a suitable basis for further research
(Ibid., p. 60). Dutch geologist Gustaﬀ A. F. Molengraﬀ argued that eastward
drift was a possibility (Stewart 1990, p. 37). For a British geologist Charles
Seymour Wright, Drift oﬀered a promise since it could explain certain fossil
deposits on Antarctica which indicated that previous to glaciation there was
a period of warmth in this area (Le Grand 1988, p. 89-90). Irish geologist
John Joly suggested that Drift was a logical possibility within his theory of
periodic convection currents (Stewart 1990, p. 37). North American geologist
Chester Longwell pointed out that “if the doctrine of continental displacement
is accepted as a working hypothesis, to be tested and tried fairly along with
others, it may be productive of valuable results” (quoted from (Stewart 1990,
p. 38)). Joseph T. Singewald suggested that, in spite of the obvious failures
of Wegener’s presentation, the hypothesis should be tested on the basis of its
worth for guiding research (Le Grand 1988, p. 71). Even Arthur Holmes found
Drift to be a possible working hypothesis rather than a theory suﬃciently de-
veloped to be accepted (Stewart 1990, p. 41).20 Leo Arthur Cotton, Australian
geologist, found Drift (though not Wegener’s version) to be worthy of pursuit
or entertainment with respect to the problems that concerned him (Le Grand
1988, p. 85). Arthur Wade, who was educated in England, and afterward emi-
grated to Australia and who was engaged in oil exploration around the world,
characterized Drift as a working hypothesis and pointed out its application
to economic geology of those regions in which he had conducted his research
(Ibid., 86). Similar was the opinion of Australian zoologist Launcelot Harrison
who found Drift explanatory of the southern species distribution and thus to
be a useful working hypothesis (Ibid., p. 88).
As we have mentioned, the positive stance towards pursuit of Drift is not
necessarily conﬂicting with rejecting Drift in the context of acceptance. It is
easy then to see that debates among the proponents of Drift advocating its
pursuit and the opponents rejecting its full acceptance sometimes consisted
of not necessarily conﬂicting arguments. That means that the awareness of
the distinction between theory evaluation in the context of pursuit and theory
evaluation in the context of acceptance may sometimes help scientists to avoid
unnecessary debates. In other words, the question of pursuit worthiness is not
20Stewart remarks that the fact Drift was for Holmes only a possible working hypothesis
shows that Holmes’s stance towards it was very weak and can hardly be seen as the one
of a strong supporter of the theory, who would encourage his colleagues and students to
advocate a novel and widely opposed theory (Ibid., p. 42). However, Stewart’s conclusion
shows that he does not recognize that judging a theory as worthy of pursuit represents a
valuable contribution to its further development, even though such a stance may very well
be the most rational form of supporting a newly developing theory.
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only of signiﬁcance for philosophical discussions regarding issues of rationality,
but it is also of signiﬁcance for scientiﬁc practice and epistemic stances of
scientists.
Among the opponents of Drift there were also those who rejected not only
its acceptance, but also its pursuit worthiness. Let us take a closer look at
their points of view.
4.9.2 Opponents who Rejected Pursuit Worthiness of Drift
That Drift was not always acknowledged as worthy of pursuit is exempliﬁed in
the opinions of geologists who explicitly ridiculed it. For example, Bailey Willis’
1944 article was titled “Continental Drift, Ein Ma¨rchen” – a fairytale. As Le
Grand puts it: “His hostility to Drift, even as a permissible working hypothesis
for other geologists, was unabated in 1944” (Le Grand 1988, p. 118). Similarly,
Charles Schuchert still spoke of “the Wegener sliding circus” in 1931 (Oreskes
1999, p. 212), while Max Semper explicitly rejected the idea of pursuing this
“absurd theory” (Le Grand 1988, p. 59). Even in the 1950s advocates of Drift
were still publicly ridiculed (Oreskes 1999, p. 218). These opponents not only
found Drift to be unworthy of pursuit, but disregarded it even as a serious
scientiﬁc theory.21 A similar attitude towards Drift can be found also in later
discussions. For example, geophysicist Seiya Uyeda suggested that Drift could
scarcely be regarded as scientiﬁc since it could not explain what had originally
caused the continental movements (Oreskes 1999, p. 63, fn. 28).22 All of these
views strongly diverge from the result of our analysis.
But we have to pause here and take into consideration a possible objection
that geology in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century had diﬀerent method-
ological standards, and that thus our criteria of pursuit worthiness are not
applicable to the notion of rationality governing scientiﬁc research at the time.
More precisely, North American geology in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth cen-
tury was rooted in a methodological framework which was deeply embedded
in inductivist ideals. Many authors who discussed this historical episode sug-
gested that these geologists primarily focused on ﬁeld research and practically
valuable results, placing less signiﬁcance on global geological theories and their
explanatory power. And if this is correct, then their criteria for what counts
as epistemically worthy of pursuit might have been diﬀerent as well.
However, Naomi Oreskes shows that the view according to which North
American geology was deeply inductivist and anti-theoretically driven is in
fact a historiographic cliche, and that describing these geologists as naive em-
piricists or narrow utilitarians doesn’t do justice to their research. Not only
21As Frankel remarks: “I do not find it surprising that they would not accept the drift
hypothesis, but I do find it surprising that they would not treat it as a serious research
program.” (Frankel 1976, p. 319).
22Note that Uyeda’s epistemological standard, requiring for a deepening of explanations
offered by a given theory as the condition for it to be regarded as scientific, differs from our
standards which allow for problems of this kind to be tackled by the programmatic character
of the pursued theory. For further discussion on the validity of Uyeda’s standard see: Ibid,,
p. 63-64.
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were they not opposed to theoretical activities as such, but some of the major
theoretical contributions to earth sciences came from the United States (for ex-
ample, James Dana’s work on the origin of continents and oceans, James Hall’s
geosyncline theory, or Clarence Dutton’s work on isostasy) (Ibid., p. 129). Fur-
thermore, Thomas C. Chamberlin, one of the most important American geol-
ogists from this time period, promoted the unity of theory and practice (Ibid.,
p. 130-133).
Where American geologists diﬀered from European ones was in their sus-
picion of theory-driven science and in requiring a thorough empirical research
as a necessary step preceding any theoretical claims (Ibid., p. 134-136). A di-
rect observational statement of geological phenomena was to come before any
theoretical conclusions. Moreover, the research was to be done as much as pos-
sible in terms of G. K. Gilbert’s and T. C. Chamberlin’s method of multiple
working hypotheses. As the name suggests, the underlying idea of the method
was to view observational facts in light of competing explanatory frameworks,
rather than in view of an already established theory. The goal of the method
of multiple working hypotheses was to navigate between the risks of dogmatic
deductivism and the infertility of naive inductivism (Ibid., p. 140).
In view of such methodological standards, Oreskes argues that the key rea-
son why North American geologists reacted so negatively to Wegener’s theory
is the fact that Wegener violated these standards in several respects. First, his
program aimed at proposing a grand geological theory. Second, he regarded
the supporting evidence as “proofs” necessitating Drift, rather than as obser-
vations or geological facts which were best explained by his theory. Finally, he
presented the idea of Drift not as a working hypothesis, but as a “fundamen-
tally correct” theory, in contrast to contractionism and permanentism which
he saw as based on erroneous premises (Ibid., p. 153-154). As a result, some
American geologists not only rejected Drift, but found Wegener’s approach to
be unscientiﬁc.23
It is not diﬃcult to understand then why Wegener’s approach was not ap-
pealing for North American geologists. The fact that his theory violated the
standards of how science is to be done in their view explains why his theory
could not be accepted at the time. But was Drift, in view of these standards,
also unworthy of pursuit? All that the above mentioned objections show is
that Wegener might have been incautious and that he might have had an un-
justiﬁed epistemic stance towards his own theory. But they do not attack the
fact that Wegener’s theory exhibited an explanatory power for a certain set of
phenomena. The closest Wegener’s opponents came in criticizing the fact that
Wegener’s theory oﬀered some explanations was to argue that he “generalized
too easily from other generalizations” (Stewart 1990, p. 37). Nevertheless, they
did not mind that their own “generalizations” depended on ad hoc hypotheses
– for example, on the idea of land bridges for which they had no mechanism
23For example, American geologist Rollin. T. Chamberlin questioned the scientific status
of the entire field of geology in view of the fact that it allowed for theories like Drift “to run
wild” (Le Grand 1988, p. 64).
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which would explain their disappearance (Ibid.). In addition, the explananda
addressed by Drift were not merely posited by Wegener, without any empirical
back-up. For example, paleontological similarities between coastal regions on
the opposite sides of the oceans were researched by others as well, and even
aknowledged by Wegener’s opponents.24 Finally, the research conducted by
du Toit, Holmes and others introduced much more substantiated evidence and
thus improved Wegener’s theory in view of American methodological require-
ments. Therefore, there was no methodological reason why Drift would not be
taken seriously as any other working hypotheses. Yet, as we have seen, some
geologists found Drift to be unworthy of pursuit even in the 1930s – long after
Wegener’s original proposal had been signiﬁcantly improved. The root of their
epistemic stance can thus be found primarily in their biasness towards the ﬁxist
frameworks, rather than in a fair application of a speciﬁc set of methodological
standards.25 As a matter of fact, our criteria of pursuit worthiness do not con-
ﬂict in any signiﬁcant way with these methodological standards. In contrary,
they are compatible with the underlying idea of the method of multiple work-
ing hypotheses: they allow for a simultaneous pursuit of diﬀerent hypotheses,
since more than one theory (or a research tradition) can be, according to our
framework, WPSS.
We can thus conclude that, in spite of the methodological diﬀerences among
geologists, the opinion that Drift was worthy of pursuit in the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century, and especially in the 1920s and the 1930s, can be character-
ized as rational (in the sense of being epistemically justiﬁed), and the rejection
of its pursuit worthiness as irrational.
4.10 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented en epistemic evaluation of the pursuit wor-
thiness of Drift in its early development. For this purpose we have used the
framework of epistemic justiﬁcation suitable for theory evaluation in the con-
text of pursuit, which we have adapted for the evaluation of pursuit worthiness
24For instance, Charles Schuchert, very critical of Wegener’s theory, acknowledged at the
1926 American Association of Petroleum Geologists symposium on continental drift “that
Wegener’s hypothesis has its greatest support in the well known geologic similarities on the
two sides of the Atlantic, as shown in strikes and times of mountain-making, in formational
and faunal sequences, and in petrography.” (quoted from (Oreskes 1999, p. 180)). Ironically,
Wegener was actually attacked for using results of the research conducted by others, instead
of doing all the field work on his own since, as Schuchert remarked, “it is wrong for a
stranger to the facts he handles to generalize from them to other generalizations” (quoted
from (Oreskes 1999, p. 156)).
25A biased approach of North American geologists is also reflected in the fact that their
judgment was made in view of locally relevant sets of explananda, disregarding geological
phenomena belonging to other regions around the world, for which Drift was highly explana-
tory. Le Grand calls such an approach “localism” (Le Grand 1988, p. 95-97), while Oreskes
characterizes it as “epistemological chauvinism” or “epistemological affinity”(Oreskes 1999,
p. 52-53), pointing out that placing a higher preference on certain subsets of the available
data was often motivated not only by a specific geographical context, but also by a national
or disciplinary one.
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in a strong sense. We have shown that Drift had a number of signiﬁcant expla-
nations, that it did not have a lower internal or external inferential density than
its rivals, and that it had a programmatic character with respect to its major
problems. Moreover, we have shown that throughout the 1920s-’30s Drift ex-
hibited a theoretical growth and a growth in its programmatic character, and
thus remained worthy of pursuit in a strong sense throughout this time period.
On the one hand, this means that it was not only rational to pursue Drift, but
that characterizing Drift as worthy of pursuit was not conﬂicting with rejecting
its full acceptance. Hence, we have emphasized that the distinction between
theory evaluation in the context of acceptance and the one in the context of
pursuit may help scientists to avoid some unnecessary debates. On the other
hand, we have shown that it was epistemically unjustiﬁed to reject Drift as
unworthy of pursuit, and that consequently, opinions of some geologists in the
ﬁrst half of the twentieth century can be regarded as irrational.
It is important to clarify that our analysis did not take into account the
question of pursuit worthiness of other rivaling theories at the time. However,
it may very well be the case that a closer look at contractionism and permanen-
tism would reveal that they were also worthy of pursuit. A detailed evaluation
of each of them remains a task for the future research.

Chapter
5
Argumentative Shift in
Methodology
. I wish to thank Christian Straßer for the valuable comments on a former
version of this chapter.
Summary In this chapter we will address some questions concerning possi-
ble relativism underlying the evaluation of epistemic pursuit worthiness. Since
the problem of relativism in theory evaluation is usually connected to Kuhn’s
views, we will take a closer look at his stance on theory evaluation in the context
of pursuit. We will show that the idea of persuasion and argumentative rea-
soning, proposed by Kuhn, can help in reducing possible relativistic outcomes.
We will then track these two ideas in works of Mcmullin and Pera: while,
McMulllin extends Kuhn’s notion of persuasion from the level of scientiﬁc the-
ories to the meta-theoretic level, that is, the level of methodological standards,
Pera uses Kuhnian persuasion as a motivation for an argumentative approach
to methodology in general. By showing the signiﬁcance of argumentative rea-
soning in theory evaluation, we will motivate a speciﬁc argumentation-based
approach to formal modeling of scientiﬁc reasoning.
5.1 Introduction
The previous two sections presented and exempliﬁed the epistemic evaluation
of the pursuit worthiness of theories regarding the rationality underlying a
given scientiﬁc community. We ﬁnished the discussion on Drift by examining
whether the diﬀerence in epistemic standards used by the proponents of the
rivaling research traditions could pose a problem for our evaluation. To this
end, we took a closer look at the methodological discussions at the time, as well
as at the arguments constituting the debates between the scientists. In this
way we could determine which types of reasons were used to attack Drift, and
whether these reasons indicated diﬀerent epistemic standards of theory evalu-
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ation or not. This discussion points to two more general questions regarding
the evaluation of the epistemic communal pursuit worthiness. First, we may
ask which possible obstacles can stand in the way of a non-relativistic outcome
of such an evaluation, and if there are ways in in which such obstacles could
be surpassed. Second, we have so far presented this type of evaluation only in
an informal way. But what about the formal modeling? What kind of formal
modeling would be suitable for this task?
The aim of this chapter is to shed some light on these two questions. By
answering the former question (or at least, pointing to the direction in which
it could be tackled), we will also show important properties that the formal
modeling of theory evaluation in the context of pursuit should allow for. With
regards to the ﬁrst question, the problem of a relativistic theory evaluation
immediately points to a Kuhnian perspective. Hence, in the following section
we will take a look at the status of theory evaluation in the context of pursuit
in Kuhn’s writings. Kuhn’s concept of persuasion will turn out to be an im-
portant tool in facilitating the debates regarding pursuit worthiness of rivaling
paradigms. In subsequent sections we will show that the role of argumenta-
tive reasoning in theory evaluation has been also pointed out by McMullin and
Pera. In view of this discussion we will suggest that if formal modeling of
theory assessment, suitable for the context of pursuit and the context of accep-
tance, should replace the old ideal of a rule-based approach, and instead reﬂect
the dynamics of argumentative reasoning, it has to allow for an assessment in
view of arguments constituting scientiﬁc debates.
5.2 Kuhn and the Context of Pursuit
The main obstacle in understanding Kuhn’s stance on pursuit worthiness is
his neglect of the distinction between the context of pursuit and the context
of acceptance. Both contexts are discussed under the topic of theory choice,
that sometimes regards the early stages of a development of a paradigm, and
sometimes the later stages in which one paradigm is replaced by another. De-
spite the lack of an explicit distinction between them, there are places in which
Kuhn clearly addresses the question of theory pursuit. In this section we will
try to explicate his stance on this issue by closely reading his writings (espe-
cially the 1969 Postscript to The Structure1). I will argue that Kuhn’s views
on theory change and rationality that underlies it do not render the evaluation
of pursuit worthiness as relativistic as the evaluation of theories in the context
of acceptance. To this end, I will show:
1. ﬁrst, that Kuhn often describes theory evaluation in the context of pursuit
in terms that are more suitable for theory evaluation in the context of
acceptance;
1Published in (Kuhn 1996, 174-210).
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2. second, that he makes an implicit distinction between the idea of the
initial and the successive pursuit worthiness (which has been explicated
in Chapter 3;
3. third, that he does not clearly distinguish between group and individual
rationality in the context of pursuit and that his discussion of theory
choice in the context of pursuit primarily regards the notion of individual
pursuit worthiness without being distinguished as such;
4. fourth, that Kuhn provides certain tools that may be helpful in achieving
an agreement regarding the communal pursuit worthiness, but reserves
them only for the evaluation of the successive pursuit worthiness.
Let us begin with Kuhn’s notes on the context of pursuit from The Struc-
ture:
. . . if a new candidate for paradigm had to be judged from the start
by hard-headed people who examined only relative problem-solving
ability, the sciences would experience very few major revolutions
. . . But paradigm debates are not really about relative problem-
solving ability, though for good reasons they are usually couched
in those terms. Instead, the issue is which paradigm should in the
future guide research on problems many of which neither competitor
can yet claim to resolve completely. A decisions between alternate
ways of practicing science is called for, and in the circumstances
that decision must be based less on past achievement than on future
promise. The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage
must often do so in deﬁance of the evidence provided by problem-
solving. He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will
succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing
only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of
that kind can only be made on faith. (Kuhn 1996, p. 157-158, italics
added)
The parts in italics indicate that Kuhn here obviously speaks of theory
evaluation in the context of pursuit. Discussions regarding pursuit worthiness
of a new candidate for a paradigm concern the future promise of a theory. Such
a promise is based on faith that the paradigm will succeed in solving its current
problems. Kuhn goes on to argue that a crisis is important precisely in order
to allow for a new candidate to be at all noticed. He then adds:
But crisis alone is not enough. There must also be a basis,
though it need be neither rational nor ultimately correct, for faith in
the particular candidate chosen. Something must make at least a
few scientists feel that the new proposal is on the right track, and
sometimes it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic considera-
tions that can do that. Men have been converted by them at times
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when most of the articulable technical arguments pointed the other
way.
This is not to suggest that new paradigms triumph ultimately
through some mystical aesthetic. On the contrary, very few men
desert a tradition for these reasons alone. Often those who do turn
out to have been misled. But if a paradigm is ever to triumph
it must gain some ﬁrst supporters, men who will develop it to the
point where hardheaded arguments can be produced and multiplied.
And even those arguments, when they come, are not individually
decisive. Because scientists are reasonable men, one or another
argument will ultimately persuade many of them. But there is no
single argument that can or should persuade them all. (p. 158,
italics added)
There are three points that should be noted in view of the above quote:
1. First, the quote indicates that Kuhn subscribes properties that are more
characteristic for the context of acceptance to the evaluation in the con-
text of pursuit. On the one hand, immediately after mentioning that
there needs to be a certain basis for the faith in a new paradigm, he adds
that the reasons forming such a basis have converted scientists, in spite of
the counterarguments. By linking the reasons used for arguing that a the-
ory is worthy of pursuit with the epistemic stance of convergence2 which
amounts to a full theory acceptance, Kuhn implicitly overlooks a more
moderate stance towards pursuit worthiness. For, why would he other-
wise go as far as to speak of conversion, in order to show that, in spite
of criticism, a young theory may still be considered worthy of pursuit?
As we have pointed out many times, a scientist may assess a paradigm
as worthy of pursuit (for the given scientiﬁc community) without en-
gaging in its actual pursuit. On the other hand, Kuhn writes that the
basis for pursuit worthiness which he explicates in this quote should not
suggest “that new paradigms triumph ultimately through some mystical
aesthetic”. Once again he directly links the context of pursuit with the
epistemic stance that is typical for context of acceptance: a “triumph”
of a paradigm indicates its superiority towards other paradigms, which
is not at all needed for it to be considered as worthy of pursuit.
2. Second, Kuhn here seems to distinguish between two stages of the eval-
uation of pursuit worthiness of a paradigm. On the one hand, the first
supporters of a paradigm feel that the new proposal is on the right track.
Kuhn here departs from rational reasons one might have for evaluating
a new paradigm as initially worthy of pursuit. He allows for “personal
and inarticulate aesthetic considerations”, which may turn out to have
2Kuhn distinguishes persuasion – a process in which one person convincing another that
the former one’s view is superior and ought therefore supplant the view of the latter (p. 203)
from conversion – a process in which one is not only persuaded, but also internalizes the
new theory and is “at home in the world it helps to shape” (p. 204).
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been misleading, to serve as the basis of the evaluation. On the other
hand, if the ﬁrst supporters develop the paradigm further, it may reach
the point where arguments can ﬁnally be used. This is the second stage
of the evaluation of pursuit worthiness, which proceeds in rational terms,
and where the process of persuasion can begin.
3. Third, when speaking of pursuit worthiness, Kuhn seems to focus exclu-
sively on the notion regarding the individual scientists, rather than on the
notion regarding the given scientiﬁc community.3 He claims that on the
basis of certain reasons some scientists may ﬁnd a new theory worthy of
pursuit. Moreover, by linking the evaluation of pursuit worthiness with
the notions indicating theory acceptance (conversion, triumph), he seems
to assume that if a scientist evaluates a theory as worthy of pursuit, she
will also engage in its actual pursuit, since she has found it superior to
other candidates. Such an approach refers to the “individual” pursuit
worthiness, rather than to the “communal” one.4
We will now take a closer look at the latter two points.
5.2.1 The Criteria of Pursuit Worthiness
We begin with the second point, regarding diﬀerent stages of the evaluation in
the context of pursuit. In response to the criticism accusing him of irrationality
underlying theory choice, Kuhn argues in the Postscript that his stance does
not entail that proponents of incommensurable paradigms cannot communicate
with each other, nor that in their debates there can be no recourse to good
reasons (Kuhn 1996, p. 199). He rejects accusations according to which such
reasons are ultimately personal, subjective or irrational. He explains that his
point was rather to show that debates over theory choice cannot be cast in a
form that fully resembles a logical or mathematical proof (p. 199).
If these comments are also applicable to the context of pursuit (and as his
remarks in (Kuhn 1977, 320-339) show, they are), Kuhn then seems to argue
that his treatment of the evaluation of pursuit worthiness of paradigms is not
based on reasons that are ultimately personal or subjective. Indeed, once the
ﬁrst supporters of the paradigm have developed it, the process of persuasion can
begin. What Kuhn rejects is that this subsequent stage of pursuit worthiness
evaluation can be given in a form or a logical or mathematical proof. Hence,
he address the latter of the two stages in the evaluation of pursuit worthiness –
the successive pursuit worthiness. Let us see his characterization of this stage.
Regarding the evaluation of the successive pursuit worthiness of paradigms,
Kuhn rejects what we have elsewhere called the strong notion of rationality5
3For the distinction between the two see Chapter 2.
4This is not to say that in order for a theory to be worthy of pursuit for an individual sci-
entist, she needs to go through a process of conversion, or even to assess the young paradigm
as superior to its rivals. These are just some of the sufficient (but not necessary) reasons for
an individual pursuit worthiness.
5See (Sˇesˇelja and Straßer 2009, p. 323), also printed in the Appendix of this thesis.
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governing theory choice. According to this notion, by applying the criteria
that are shared by the scientiﬁc community, one obtains a unique choice of a
scientiﬁc theory. In other words, this notion assumes that all scientists will have
the same preference order on theories on the basis of a shared set of criteria
with which they evaluate them. Such an idea of rationality Kuhn compares
to an “algorithmic path” or “a logical or mathematical proof” (Kuhn 1996,
198-199). According to him, discussions among scientists instead of such an
algorithmic path often take the path of persuasion:
. . . the superiority of one theory to another is something that can-
not be proved in the debate. Instead, I have insisted, each party
must try, by persuasion, to convert the other. . . . Nothing about
that relatively familiar thesis implies either that there are no good
reasons for being persuaded or that those reasons are not ultimately
decisive for the group. Nor does it even imply that the reasons for
choice are diﬀerent from those usually listed by philosophers of sci-
ence: accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like. What it should
suggest, however, is that such reasons function as values and that
they can thus be diﬀerently applied, individually and collectively,
by men who concur in honoring them. (p. 198-199)
Kuhn here tells us that the process of persuasion is formulated in terms
of arguments that call upon a set of epistemic values. In his (Kuhn 1977) he
speciﬁes these values as a set of shared criteria or the shared basis for theory
choice:
“These ﬁve characteristics – accuracy, consistency, scope, simplic-
ity, and fruitfulness – are all standard criteria for evaluating the
adequacy of a theory. . . . I agree entirely with the traditional view
that they play a vital role when scientists must choose between an
established theory and an upstart competitor. Together with oth-
ers of much the same sort, they provide the shared basis for theory
choice.” (Kuhn 1977, p. 322)6
Taking into account Kuhn’s remarks on the context of pursuit that we have
previously mentioned, we can now say that persuasion is a process in which
scientists try to convince one another, by means of shared epistemic values, that
a certain theory is promising of being further investigated. And precisely the
fact that criteria of theory choice function as values, rather than rules, allows
them to function as criteria also “in the earliest stages of theory choice” (Kuhn
1977, p. 321), that is, in the evaluation of the successive pursuit worthiness of
theories.
However, Kuhn points out that “There is no neutral algorithm for theory-
choice, no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead
6See also (Kuhn 2000, p. 96).
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each individual in the group to the same decision” (Kuhn 2000, p. 200, ital-
ics added). This is due to the fact that “Individually the criteria are impre-
cise: individuals may legitimately diﬀer about their application to concrete
cases.”(Kuhn 1977, p. 322). Furthermore, even though the pursuit worthiness
is evaluated in terms of a set of shared values, in order to explain why an
individual scientist is an early convert to a new system, we need to look at
idiosyncrasy as well (Ibid.).7
Let us summarize Kuhn’s point in view of these quotes. According to Kuhn,
scientists initially begin to pursue a paradigm due to, so to say, a gut feeling,
inarticulate aesthetic considerations or personal reasons. Once a paradigm has
shown a number of results, its pursuit worthiness can be evaluated on the basis
of shared epistemic standards. However, diﬀerent scientists may ﬁnd diﬀerent
theories worthy of pursuit, due to the fact that they may apply the shared
criteria diﬀerently, and thus have diﬀerent preference orders on given theories.
This brings us to our third point: the pursuit worthiness regarding individual
scientists.
5.2.2 Individual and Communal Pursuit Worthiness
As the above quotes already suggested, when it comes to the context of pursuit,
Kuhn’s primary focus is set on the pursuit worthiness regarding the individual
rationality. Moreover:
Before the group accepts it, a new theory has been tested over time
by the research of a number of men, some working within it, others
within its traditional rival. Such a mode of development, however,
requires a decision process which permits rational men to disagree,
and such disagreement would be barred by the shared algorithm
which philosophers generally have sought. If it were at hand, all
conforming scientists would make the same decision at the same
time. With standards of acceptance set too low, they would move
from one attractive global viewpoint to another, never giving tradi-
tional theory an opportunity to supply equivalent attractions. With
standards set higher, no one satisfying the criterion of rationality
would be inclined to try out the new theory, to articulate it in ways
which showed its fruitfulness or displayed its accuracy and scope. I
doubt that science would survive the change. (Kuhn 1977, p. 332)
In view of the individual pursuit worthiness, diﬀerent scientists may ﬁnd
diﬀerent theories more worthy of pursuit than others, and hence each of them
may decide to engage in a pursuit of a diﬀerent theory. In order to allow for
such a diversity of pursued theories, Kuhn argues that we need to allow for a
disagreement among scientists in their evaluation of pursuit worthiness of the
7Note that Kuhn here again uses the terminology characteristic for the context of accep-
tance to describe the context of pursuit: “. . . idiosyncrasy must be invoked to explain why
Kepler and Galileo were early converts to Copernicus’s system” (Ibid., italics added).
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given theories. What Kuhn here completely overlooks is the notion of com-
munal pursuit worthiness. Similarly to others who have conﬂated these two
notions (discussed in Chapter 2), he overlooks the fact that more than one
theory may be simultaneously evaluated as worthy of pursuit. On the basis of
a shared algorithm for the evaluation of communal pursuit worthiness, not all
conforming scientists would have to make the same decision regarding which
theory each of them should pursue. They would not have to move, as Kuhn
maintains, from one attractive viewpoint to another, never giving a chance to
the traditional theory. In contrary, both new candidates as well as the tradi-
tional rival could simultaneously be worthy of pursuit for the given community
at the time. Hence, by emphasizing a disagreement as a key condition for
theoretical diversity in the context of pursuit, Kuhn shows that he not only
focuses primarily on the individual notion of pursuit worthiness, but that he
also neglects the diversity that can be obtained by means of the communal
notion.
But what would be Kuhn’s stance on the communal notion of pursuit wor-
thiness? Would he also argue that a disagreement about which theories are
worthy of pursuit for the given scientiﬁc community is necessary for scientiﬁc
development, or that it is unavoidable taking into account the speciﬁc ways in
which the shared criteria are applied by individual evaluators? The following
quote sheds some light on these questions:
. . . despite the incompleteness of their communication, proponents
of diﬀerent theories can exhibit to each other, not always easily, the
concrete technical results achievable by those who practice within
each theory. Little or no translation is required to apply at least
some value criteria to those results. (Accuracy and fruitfulness are
most immediately applicable, perhaps followed by scope. Consis-
tency and simplicity are far more problematic.) (Kuhn 1977, p. 339)
Here Kuhn seems to suggest that proponents of rivaling theories can, at
least partially, evaluate each other’s theories in terms of the shared epistemic
standards. Moreover, there is a speciﬁc “tool” they can use in order to improve
their mutual understanding, namely, the process of translation:
However incomprehensible the new theory may be to the propo-
nents of tradition, the exhibit of impressive concrete results will
persuade at least a few of them that they must discover how such
results are achieved. For that purpose they must learn to trans-
late. . . (Ibid.)
A more detailed explication of the process of translation can be found in
the Postscript. With regard to the conceptual diﬀerences8 between the op-
8Conceptual differences refer here to Kuhnian incommensurabilities that arise from the
differences in similarity relations, which govern the grouping of objects and situations into
similarity sets. These sets are “primitive in the sense that grouping is done without an
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posing scientiﬁc views which cause problems in communication between their
respective proponents, Kuhn writes:
The men who experience such communication breakdowns must,
however, have some recourse. . . . both their everyday and most
their scientiﬁc world and language are shared. . . . what the par-
ticipants in a communication breakdown can do is recognize each
other as members of diﬀerent language communities and then be-
come translators. (Kuhn 1996, p. 201-202)
Kuhn explains that by discovering the diﬀerences in their respective dis-
courses, the proponents of rivaling paradigms can try to present them to each
other by resorting to their shared everyday vocabularies: “Each may, that is,
try to discover what the other would see and say when presented with a stimu-
lus to which his own verbal response would be diﬀerent.” (p. 202). The process
of persuasion, enriched by the process of translation, thus allows the scientists
to see some merits and defects of each other’s perspectives.9
However, both processes of translation and persuasion are for Kuhn possible
only in later stages of the context of pursuit:
But each language community can usually produce from the start a
few concrete research results that, though describable in sentences
understood in the same way by both groups, cannot yet be ac-
counted for by the other community in its own terms. If the new
viewpoint endures for a time and continues to be fruitful, the re-
search results verbalizable in this way are likely to grow in number.
For some men such results alone will be decisive. They can say:
I don’t know how the proponents of the new view succeed, but I
must learn, whatever they are doing, it is clearly right. (p. 203,
italics added)
Kuhn here suggests that the initial results of a theory can only be described
by the scientists working in a rivaling paradigm, but they cannot be accounted
for, explained in their own terminology. Only if the theory exhibits a growth,
some scientists will realize that they should learn the new theory, that is, step
into the circle of the new paradigm and learn to speak its language. Hence,
the process of translation and persuasion can begin only with regard to the
evaluation of the successive pursuit worthiness.
Nevertheless, Kuhn does not explain why these tools, capable of facilitating
rational theory evaluation in the context of pursuit, are applicable only in the
later stages of pursuit. If scientists are able to learn the new theory once
answer to the question, ‘Similar with respect to what?’” (Kuhn 1996, p. 200). In the times
of revolutions, some of the similarity relations change. For example, sun, moon, Mars and
earth stood in different similarity relations before and after Copernicus (Ibid.).
9It is interesting that when Laudan in his (Laudan 1984) criticizes Kuhn for neglecting
the context of pursuit, he himself completely neglects Kuhn’s concepts of persuasion and
translation, highly relevant for this issue.
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it has shown a number of results, why can’t they learn its initial results as
well, and evaluate its initial pursuit worthiness? I’d like to suggest that the
main reason why Kuhn rejects (or rather disregards) this possibility lies in
his assumption that evaluating a new theory as worthy of pursuit amounts to
actually pursuing it. We have already seen that his neglect of the communal
pursuit worthiness leads him to this stance. And since, in his view, science
can survive the change only by preserving diversity, that is, by allowing for
diﬀerent rivals to be simultaneously pursued, not all scientists should engage
in a pursuit of a young theory. But once a theory shows further promise,
scientists should gradually switch towards its acceptance. By reasoning in this
way, Kuhn rejects the possibility of translation and persuasion in the early
stages of theory pursuit in other to save the diversity of pursued theories.
However, once we have distinguished between individual and communal
pursuit worthiness, it is easy to see that there is no reason why these processes
would not be possible in the early stages of a pursuit.10 This does not mean that
every scientist is to learn any new theoretical candidate and evaluate whether
it is initially worthy of pursuit. Rather, in order to be able to evaluate the
initial pursuit worthiness of a new theory, a scientist must ﬁrst learn about it.
She must be able to step into the circle, and evaluate the merits and problems
of the theory, even though she is currently working in a rivaling theory. If she
does not learn about the new theory, then she is not competent in judging
about its initial pursuit worthiness.
5.2.3 Conclusion
In view of the above quotes, we can conclude that while Kuhn did not explic-
itly consider the possibility of the communal notion of pursuit worthiness, he
discussed certain aspects of the debates between scientists that can be helpful
in this type of theory evaluation. He related these features only to the eval-
uation of successive pursuit worthiness, leaving the initial one to be assessed
in terms of subjective, personal reasons. Nevertheless, we have argued that by
neglecting to distinguish between individual and communal pursuit worthiness,
Kuhn neglected the fact that the processes he suggests for the evaluation of
successive pursuit worthiness are applicable to the evaluation of initial pursuit
worthiness as well.
However, it is important to notice that even in the case of successive pur-
suit worthiness, an agreement regarding communal pursuit worthiness, that
is, the question, which theories are worthy of pursuit for the given scientiﬁc
community, is not guaranteed in view of the processes Kuhn suggests. Kuhn
10Hence, when Gerald Doppelt argues that in Kuhn’s view “The arguments one paradigm
presents to its rival may be powerful and sound; but they ‘cannot be made logically or even
probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step into the circle’. (Kuhn 1996, p. 94)”
(Doppelt 1978, p. 80), it is important to keep in mind that “refusing to step into the circle”
does not amount to a cognitive or methodological necessity, but to refusing to take part in
the process of translation. The fact that scientists indeed often avoid such a process speaks of
their neglect of the requirements in the context of pursuit, rather than of a methodologically
valid norm.
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could have still argued that the diﬀerences among speciﬁc applications of the
shared criteria may be such, that even the agreement about the communal pur-
suit worthiness may not always be possible.11 Nevertheless, what is important
here is that he suggests certain tools that can be helpful in reaching such an
agreement. In addition to the process of translation, the idea of argumenta-
tive reasoning underlying the process of persuasion plays an essential role here.
Moreover, it is this latter process that in Kuhn’s view connects theory evalu-
ation in the context of pursuit with the one in the context of acceptance, in
terms of a gradual shift: “as argument piles on argument and as challenge after
challenge is successfully met, only blind stubbornness can at the end account
for continued resistance.” (Kuhn 1996, p. 204). In the remainder of this section
we will explore the signiﬁcance of argumentative reasoning in theory change,
pointed out by other philosophers who were inspired by Kuhnian insights.
5.3 Argumentative Approaches to Methodology –
McMullin and Pera
5.3.1 McMullin on Meta-Theoretic Argumentation
While Kuhn ﬁnds argumentative reasoning to be essential for the debates re-
garding the pursuit worthiness or acceptance of scientiﬁc theories, he does not
see it as a part of meta-theoretic changes, that is, changes in the epistemo-
logical and methodological standards upheld by scientists. With regard to the
changes in the ways in which the set of shared epistemic standards are applied,
or in the relative weights attached to them, Kuhn writes:
. . .many of these variations in value have been associated with par-
ticular changes in scientiﬁc theory. Though the experience of sci-
entists provides no philosophical justiﬁcation for the values they
deploy (such justiﬁcation would solve the problem of induction),
those values are in part learned from that experience, and they
evolve with it.(Kuhn 1977, p. 335)
In response to Kuhn, McMullin points out:
This is to take the Hume-Popper challenge to induction far too
seriously (unless, of course ‘justiﬁcation’ were to be taken to mean
deﬁnitive proof). The characteristic values guiding theory-choice
are ﬁrmly rooted in the complex learning experience which is the
history of science; this is their primary justiﬁcation, and it is an
adequate one. (McMullin 1982, p. 21)
11Therefore, incorporating Kuhn’s stance on theory change into coherentist epistemology
in order to preserve stronger notions of rationality may conflict with Kuhn’s views – see the
discussion in the Appendix of this thesis.
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Hence, McMullin extends the use of argumentation also to the meta-theoretic
discussions. According to him, the values involved in theory appraisal are in-
strumental, rather than ends in themselves: “They can be justiﬁed only by
the extent to which they further the goals that science is taken to aim at.”
(McMullin 1984, p. 57). McMullin maintains that the rationality of science,
the values used for the evaluation of theories can be philosophically justiﬁed:
What philosophers of science have labored so long to show is that
such values as fertility are an appropriate criterion of theory. Their
arguments are in a broad sense logical or epistemological. . . .What
happens in philosophy of science reﬂects at the second level what
happens in science itself. That is, it is empirically discovered in
scientiﬁc practice that certain kinds of evaluative procedures or of
epistemic demands (like the reproducibility of experimental results)
are eﬀective in bringing about the broadly-stated goals of science.
(Ibid.)
The change of scientiﬁc goals is, therefore, based on reasons that reﬂect
scientiﬁc practice. McMullin shows how the focus on prediction, which was
characteristic for Babylonian astronomy, and on explanation, characteristic for
Greek astronomy, conjoined into the complementary goals of the new science
of the seventeenth century (ibid., p. 48). He argues that such changes occur
on the basis of reasons internal to the scientiﬁc activity (p. 53). For instance,
scientists may gradually realize that their ideal goals are in fact not achievable,
and should be replaced with more realistic ones.12
If we perceive scientiﬁc changes in this way, argumentative reasoning be-
comes the cornerstone of scientiﬁc change and scientiﬁc methodology, both at
the object level and meta level. In contrast to an algorithmic, rule-based ap-
proach to theory evaluation, which both Kuhn and McMullin reject (McMullin
1984, p. 56), the criteria underlying epistemic evaluation of theories are con-
sidered to function as values, presented in the form of arguments. One of the
most detailed formulations of such an approach to theory evaluation has been
given by Marcello Pera.
5.3.2 Pera’s Dialectical Model of Science
Pera starts oﬀ from the shift that occurred in philosophy of science: from the
traditional image of science, according to which science is perceived as certain,
infallible, universal, and objective knowledge, guided by method that guaran-
tees its aims, to a historically minded approach, which rejects the possibility
of such a universal and precise method (Pera 1994, p. 1-5). Pera remarks that
a common point of both of these views is an assumption that science without
a method is not a cognitive and rational endeavor – an assumption which he
dubs the Cartesian syndrome (p. 4).
12A similar point can be found in (Laudan 1984), where Laudan gives a number of reasons
in view of which epistemic goals of science can be altered.
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In contrast to many philosophers who belong to either the “methodological”
or the “counter-methodological model” of science, Pera distinguishes Kuhn as a
philosopher who managed to escape the Cartesian syndrome, and hence also the
dilemma between methodological rationalism and irrationality: “he proposed
a new way of understanding scientiﬁc rationality by replacing the old view
based on method with a diﬀerent one grounded in persuasive argumentation”
(p. 10). Pera points out that this novelty introduced by Kuhn has been largely
unrecognized, on the one hand, due to the fact that Kuhn had not developed
a systematic and detailed account of his new approach, while on the other
hand, the Cartesian syndrome prevented others from using the right categories
needed to understand Kuhn’s views on science.
In view of these insights, Pera takes a position “suggested but not fully
developed by Kuhn” (p. 10). Aiming at ﬁnding a way out of the Cartesian
dilemma, he proposes the dialectical model of science. In contrast to the two
older models which view science as a game between two players – a researcher
and nature, the dialectical model requires three players:
a proposer who asks questions, nature that answers, and a com-
munity of competent interlocutors which, after a debate hinging on
various factors, comes to an agreement upon what is to be taken
as nature’s oﬃcial voice. In this model nature does not speak out
alone. It only speaks within the debate and through the debate.
(p. 11)
Pera deﬁnes his dialectics as the logic of convincing (or rhetorical) argu-
ments, or as the logic of the rhetorical use of formal logics, or as a logic of
debate (Pera 1994, p. 107-108), (Pera 2000, p. 60-61). In contrast to rhetoric
which he deﬁnes as an act or practice of using convincing arguments, the task
of dialectics is to evaluate such a practice. Pera suggests that the winner in a
scientiﬁc debate is the one who refutes the arguments of his or her opponent,
that is, who produces a convincing argument (Pera 2000, p. 59). A scientiﬁc
argument (in a certain ﬁeld of inquiry and for a certain purpose) is convinc-
ing if i) its premises are accepted and the factors it relies on are admitted by
the community, in that ﬁeld and for that function; ii) the rules of debate (the
inference rules of formal logics and the material constraints ruling scientiﬁc de-
bates) are considered pertinent by the community; and iii) it is valid according
to such rules (p. 61). Hence, the opponents in scientiﬁc debates need to ﬁnd
certain areas if agreements which can serve as the basis of their argumentation:
. . . the contenders must ﬁrst ﬁnd, among the substantive factors of
scientiﬁc dialectics, a minimal area of agreement (the e´ndoxa); on
the basis of this area and their mutual confessions, they must then
produce arguments with the aim of confuting each other. The de-
bate is rationally over when the arguments of one party are stronger
than those of the rival party. . . . Those arguments that confute a
rival on the basis of, or starting of with, a minimal area of agree-
ment are stronger. Locating that area depends on the interlocutors’
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rhetorical abilities. Though it may not be easy if their opinions are
far apart, it is not impossible, for even if a new opinion is radi-
cally innovative, there is no way it can alter or reject at the same
time all the factors of scientiﬁc dialectics without being cast outside
scientiﬁc tradition itself. (Pera 1994, p. 186-187)
Thus, even in the case of theories with radically diﬀerent conceptual systems
such a debate is possible:
The obstacle we face in this case, that is, the problem of diﬀer-
ent references of the descriptive terms of the theories due to the
diﬀerent conceptual schemes they depend on, does not prevent a
discussion between rival parties from taking place. As communica-
tion is possible even across such schemes, interlocutors may try to
convince each other. It is enough for the parties to ﬁnd a few shared
premises to start with and then, by a sort of “rhetorical ascent”, to
go on step by step until one of them slowly yields while the other
gets stronger and ﬁnally wins victory. (Pera 2000, p. 62-63)
Even though Pera does not make a distinction between theory evaluation
in the context of pursuit and the one in the context of acceptance, it is easy to
notice that his dialectics applies to both, the process of persuasion in the early
stages of the development of a theory, as well as to the later stages, when one
party wins over another. By focusing on scientiﬁc debates as “facilitators” of
theory change, Pera shows in which ways Kuhnian translation and persuasion
can actually be performed.
The aim of this brief overview of Pera’s points is to show the signiﬁcance
he places on argumentative reasoning in theory change and theory evaluation.
Moreover, instead of methodology based on strict rules of acceptance, rejection
and preference, methodology is in Pera’s model “absorbed by values” (Pera
1994, p. 117-118). In this respect, Pera takes a stance similar to Kuhn and
McMullin, according to which, theory evaluation proceeds on the basis of values
that are formulated in terms of arguments.
5.4 Conclusion: Modeling of Theory Evaluation in View
of an Argumentative Approach to Methodology
Which conclusions can we make for the evaluation of pursuit worthiness in view
of the argumentative shift in methodology?
In the case of informal modeling, such as our account of potential coherence,
there are few important points to be made (some of which have already been
mentioned in the previous two chapters):
1. the criteria of evaluation need to be understood as values, whose nature
and weighting is to be interpreted in view of the speciﬁc historical context;
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2. the historical context is to be presented in terms of scientiﬁc debates
regarding the given theory;
3. both the arguments regarding the theory (object-level arguments), as well
as the arguments regarding speciﬁc criteria used for theory evaluation
(meta-level arguments) are to be taken into consideration.
This somewhat relativizes our account of pursuit worthiness in the sense
that we have already mentioned at the end of Chapter 3. We have pointed out
there that the main aim of our application of Bonjour’s concept of coherence
to the context of pursuit was to demonstrate that such an adaptation of an
account of epistemic justiﬁcation is possible. In case a speciﬁc historical context
sets diﬀerent criteria of theory evaluation, our framework might have to be
adapted. We have presented this type of meta-justiﬁcation of our framework
in case of the continental drift debate in Chapter 4, where we have argued that
our criteria ﬁt the methodological standards of the geological community at
the time. More precisely, we have shown that Drift was worthy of pursuit even
in view of the standards upheld by its rivals.
However, in cases of more radical diﬀerences between rivaling theories, in
which, for example, the explanatory power of a new theory is not even ac-
knowledged by the standards of the rival, the evaluation is more complex. We
have mentioned in Chapter 3 the case of Galileo’s evidence obtained through
the telescope, which is an example of such a problem. We have also mentioned
in Section 5.3.1 the example of an even more radical diﬀerence in the evalua-
tive standards of theory evaluation: the conﬂict between Galileian mathemati-
cal approach to astronomy and natural philosophy, with Aristotelian scientiﬁc
practice for which mathematical demonstrations held no credibility with regard
to material entities (see also (Biagioli 1993, p. 220)).13 In such cases, meta-
theoretic arguments, which, as we have seen, McMullin pointed out, need to be
taken into account as well. The pursuit worthiness is then evaluated not only as
the question: “Is this theory worthy of pursuit?”, but also as the question: “Are
there good epistemic reasons to allow for a diﬀerent set of epistemic standards
for theory evaluation?”. Taking into account the epistemic aim of robustness
of scientiﬁc knowledge (see Chapter 1) may be helpful in resolving this type
of disputes, but what precisely the nature of such a meta-evaluation is, which
criteria it consists of, how object-level arguments interplay with meta-level ar-
guments, etc. requires a discussion of its own that goes beyond the scope of
this thesis.14 It is important to notice though that allowing for the changes in
the criteria of theory evaluation does not mean that “anything goes”. Rather,
just like in the case of the evaluation of the pursuit worthiness of theories,
13I am indebted to Maarten Van Dyck for bringing Biagioli’s work to my attention.
14(McMullin 1984) as well as (Laudan 1984, Chapter 3) provide interesting ideas of how
this problem should be tackled from an epistemic point of view. In contrast, (Biagioli 1993)
argues that both epistemic and non-epistemic factors were crucial for the seventeenth century
mathematical shift in natural philosophy. Such an approach is challenged by Pera’s (1994)
discussion of Galileo’s rhetoric, and the epistemic merit of his arguments.
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what needs to be evaluated at the meta-level is the epistemic beneﬁt of new
epistemic standards.
In the case of formal modeling, the main challenge that the argumentative
shift posed to formal approaches to theory evaluation is the question: how is
formal modeling of theory choice at all possible if it should not be presented in
terms of a set of pre-given methodological rules, functioning as an algorithm
of theory choice? In the following chapter, we will propose a modeling that is
based on arguments constituting scientiﬁc debates. The aim of this modeling
will not be to oﬀer a direct representation of our account of potential coher-
ence. As has already been mentioned, our account could be modiﬁed to capture
diﬀerent accounts of epistemic justiﬁcation. Hence, our primary concern will
be the question, how to build a formal framework that can, in principal, model
epistemic justiﬁcation in both the context of pursuit and the context of accep-
tance. We will oﬀer the basis of such a framework, which can be enhanced in
diﬀerent ways. Diﬀerent enhancements can then be used to represent diﬀerent
epistemic and methodological criteria.
Chapter
6
Abstract Argumentation and
Explanation Applied to
Scientific Debates
. This chapter is based on a paper with the same title, published in Syn-
these (Sˇesˇelja and Straßer 2011). The paper is a joint work with Christian
Straßer. We are indebted to Erik Weber and two anonymous reviewers for
valuable comments on a former draft of this paper.
Summary Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool
within many ﬁelds such as artiﬁcial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In
this chapter we enhance Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework
with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation
framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of
scientiﬁc debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of
explanatory and justiﬁcatory arguments constituting rivaling scientiﬁc views.
On the other hand, diﬀerent procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding
to diﬀerent methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation,
can be formulated in view of our framework.
6.1 Introduction
Formal theories of argumentation have been extensively researched within the
ﬁelds of artiﬁcial intelligence, philosophy, logic and computer science. One of
the most inﬂuential accounts of argumentation is Dung’s abstract argumenta-
tion framework (see (Dung 1993), (Dung 1995)). The signiﬁcance of Dung’s
approach derives from the fact that it abstracts away from the nature of argu-
ments and argumentation rules, which allows the user to focus on the interplay
of arguments rather than on their speciﬁc structure. More precisely, an argu-
mentation framework (AF) consists of a set of arguments A, which are taken
to be abstract entities represented by alphabetical letters, and the binary (so-
called attack) relation → deﬁned over this set. AFs are used to select sets of
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arguments from A that satisfy certain standards of acceptability. Selection
criteria are deﬁned in order to explicate these standards: for instance selected
sets of arguments are supposed to be non-conﬂicting and to be able to defend
themselves against all argumentative attacks.1 An extensive research on ab-
stract argumentation has shown that such systems are capable of formalizing
various approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in the ﬁelds of artiﬁcial intel-
ligence, logic programming and human reasoning. The fruitfulness of Dung’s
framework stems not only from its abstract character, but also from the fact
that it is easily enhanceable with additional properties and useful in diﬀerent
application contexts.2
In this chapter we will enhance AFs with explanatory features. The aim of
this enhancement, which we will call an Explanatory Argumentation Frame-
work (EAF), is, on the one hand, to equip AFs with tools that can model
explanatory reasoning, and on the other hand, to demonstrate that abstract
argumentation provides a useful formal framework for the modeling of scien-
tiﬁc debates. The basic idea of our enhancement is to introduce to AFs a set
of explananda and an explanatory relation. This will allow us to express cer-
tain notions, such as explanatory power and explanatory depth, in terms of
our framework. Moreover, we will show that EAFs allow for a comparison of
diﬀerent sets of arguments in view of their explanatory virtues. Taking into
account that scientiﬁc explanation is one of the key constituents of scientiﬁc
reasoning, EAFs will turn out to be a handy modeling tool in ﬁelds dealing
with the reconstruction and the modeling of scientiﬁc debates, such as the phi-
losophy of science. To this end we will oﬀer a set of criteria which are useful
for the demarcation of rivaling scientiﬁc views in terms of arguments, as well
as for an evaluation of such views in terms of their argumentative and explana-
tory properties. As a result we will be able to formulate new selection criteria,
suitable for the modeling of argumentation and explanation in a scientiﬁc con-
text. Finally, we will show that our approach may be embedded or linked to
the argumentative shift in methodology that is associated with scholars such
as Marcello Pera (see the discussion in the previous chapter) and Marcelo Das-
cal. Since a number of enhancements developed for AFs can also be applied to
EAFs, we will suggest that in this way abstract argumentation can provide an
even more reﬁned and more realistic modeling of scientiﬁc debates.
The chapter is structured as follows. We begin in Section 6.2 by explicat-
ing the close relation between argumentation and explanation, on the basis of
which we will motivate the signiﬁcance as well as the structure of our frame-
work. In Section 6.3 we introduce the basic notions of abstract argumentation.
In Section 6.4 we present EAFs. In Section 6.5 we informally introduce crite-
ria and selection procedures that allow for a more realistic representation of
scientiﬁc reasoning than the standard selections oﬀered within Dung’s abstract
1We give a formal account of this and other standard selection criteria in Section 6.3.
2For the enhancements that have been developed for AFs see Section 6.7.3. As for the
different application fields, for instance, AFs have been used for an improved account of
default reasoning (Bondarenko et al. 1997), (Dung and Son 1996), as well as for multi-agent
systems (Coste-Marquis et al. 2007), (Bench-Capon 2003).
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argumentation framework. In Section 6.6 we formally explicate the explanatory
properties that have been previously introduced. Section 6.7 oﬀers a discus-
sion on some additional questions concerning the virtues of our framework.
We show here that EAFs reﬂect some of the key ideas underlying rhetorically
minded approaches to scientiﬁc rationality, and we point out the novelties of
our framework, as well as possible enhancements of it. Section 6.8 concludes
the chapter.
6.2 Argumentation and Explanation
Explanation and argumentation have been studied in philosophy of science,
epistemology and logic. While some authors have discussed the two in close
relation, others have pointed out the need to distinguish them as two diﬀerent
processes of reasoning. In this section we will explicate the relation of argu-
mentation and explanation in our framework and situate it within the broader
context of the discussion on this matter.
6.2.1 The Goal-Directed Perspective
One way to look at the problem of distinguishing argumentation and explana-
tion is to explicate what it is that explanations try to achieve. Hughes states
that
the purpose of an explanation is to show why and how some phe-
nomenon occurred or some event happened; the purpose of an ar-
gument is to show that some view or statement is correct or true.
Explanations are appropriate when the event in question is taken
for granted, and we are seeking to understand why it occurred. Ar-
guments are appropriate when we want to show that something is
true, usually when there is some possibility of disagreement about
its correctness. (Hughes 1992, p. 76, italics added)
Thus, the goal of an explanation is to reach an understanding of the why or
how something occurred, depending on the type of explanation. The occurrence
itself is thereby taken for granted.
The quotation above suggests even more, namely that explanations are dis-
tinguished from arguments due to the diﬀerent types of goals that the respective
notions achieve. In contrast to explanations, arguments are justiﬁcatory, they
show that something is the case and not why or how. Thus, the quotation
suggests a clear distinction between arguments and explanations. However, we
will subscribe in the following to the view that justiﬁcatory arguments are a
certain subclass of arguments, and that explanations (in a strict sense) should
be conceived of as a certain type of arguments as well.
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6.2.2 Explanations as Arguments
The view that explanations are arguments has a long history. According to
Hempel’s covering law model of explanation, which is considered to be one
of the origins of the contemporary study of explanation,3 an explanation is
an argument in which a sentence describing a phenomenon to be explained
is derived from the class of those sentences which are adduced to account for
this phenomenon, and which contain at least one law of nature (Hempel 1965,
p. 247). A similar view on explanations as arguments or argument patterns
can be found in uniﬁcationist accounts of explanation (e.g. see (Kitcher 1981b),
(Weber 1999)). Moreover, the view that some arguments have an explanatory
function is not foreign to the literature on argumentation either (e.g. see (Pera
1994) p. 110, (Pera 2000) p. 57).
In order to see which type of arguments explanations are we should ﬁrst of
all analyze the notion of an argument a bit more. Mayes in his (Mayes 2000)
distinguishes between two meanings of this term: a formal and an evidentiary
one. In a broader, formal sense, an argument is a ﬁnite sequence of propositions
(called premises) followed by a proposition (called conclusion), in which the
premises are intended (or taken) to entail the conclusion (ibid., p. 363). In
a narrower, evidentiary sense, we are speaking of a speciﬁc type of formal
arguments, namely those in which premises provide a rational justiﬁcation for
believing the conclusion (ibid., p. 364). This is the sense in which Hughes
uses this term and what we have called justiﬁcatory arguments. However, as
Mayes points out, beside justiﬁcatory arguments there is another type of formal
arguments: explanatory ones or simply, explanations. The basic diﬀerence
between these two types of arguments, as we have already seen, is that while
justiﬁcatory ones aim at justifying that something is the case, explanatory ones
aim at answering the question why (or how) something is the case.4
In this sense, an explanation is a formal argument consisting of an explanans
and an explanandum, where the former one oﬀers the causes or the governing
law of the latter one and thus provides a better understanding of it. That
is, premises of an explanatory argument represent an explanans from which
a conclusion, representing an explanandum, can be inferred on the basis of a
certain inference relation (such as deduction, induction, etc.).
3The contemporary study of explanation is usually seen as originating in (Hempel and
Oppenheim 1948), which was further developed in (Hempel 1965).
4It is important to notice that sometimes we can determine whether a given argument is
justificatory or explanatory only by taking into account the given context, which reveals the
intention of the speaker. For example, an elliptically expressed argument “Shops are closed
today because it’s a public holiday.” – could in one context be an explanation given in reply
to the question “Why are shops closed today?”, where the fact that shops are closed is taken
for granted for both participants involved in the conversation. In some other context though,
the same argument could be expressed as a justification of the fact that shops are closed,
where this fact is doubted by one of the participants.
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6.2.3 The Processual Character of Explanations
Let us in the following put more emphasis on the notion of understanding. By
oﬀering an explanation to an explainee, the explainer tries to make the ex-
plainee understand why/how/etc. the explanandum occurred. However, noth-
ing guarantees that after oﬀering an explanatory argument, the explainee has
actually reached the point of understanding. Often an explanatory argument
needs to be complemented by a dialogical process that clariﬁes certain open
questions or doubts on part of the explainee. Thus, we can perceive expla-
nations in a broader sense to be an argumentative process aiming at the ex-
plainee’s understanding of the given phenomenon. Such a processual character
of explanations has been emphasized, for example, by Schurz who speaks of ‘ex-
planatory episodes’, characterized as relations between two cognitive systems
communicating with each other in order to achieve a better understanding of
the phenomena in question (Schurz 1991).
An explanatory episode is considered to be a process which includes not only
explanatory arguments but may also include justiﬁcatory arguments, where the
task of the latter ones is to further substantiate the former. Upon hearing an
explanation, the explainee may request further clariﬁcation and may express
his doubt for some of the arguments by either challenging (some of) them with
counter-arguments or by requesting further clariﬁcation. Consequently, the ex-
plainer may have to justify claims constituting her explanation. Thus, arguing
is often a constitutive part of an explanatory process not only because the ex-
plainer may wish to explicate and strengthen her claims, but also because the
validity of some of them may be brought into question in case the explainee
does not ﬁnd them suﬃciently accurate, clariﬁed, understandable, etc. Con-
sequently, explanatory reasoning does not have to result only in knowledge
accumulation, but may sometimes also include a revision and thus contraction
of the knowledge base of the explainee (see (Schurz 1991)).
Argumentation is thus a constitutive feature of explanatory reasoning. To-
gether with Mayes we can say that, “until an explanatory hypothesis has been
independently established through argument, it lacks the power to support
anything at all”, and the other way around, “until a justiﬁed belief has been
adequately explained it lacks the power to support anything at all” (Mayes
2000, p. 375). Let us take a closer look at Mayes’ description of such an inter-
active relation:
Explanation is a process that is triggered by a certain kind of in-
put, viz., a surprising fact, a salient feature of our environment
that we have somehow failed to predict. (E.g., the car wont start).
. . . Explaining a fact involves the formation of a causal hypothesis
(The battery is dead.). This possible cause is the output of the
explanatory process. But for any given fact there will always be a
number of possible causes. Hence, the process of explanation will
be useful as a way of gaining predictive control over our environ-
ment only if it is supported by another process whose function is to
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determine which, if any, of the possible causes should be accepted.
(ibid., p. 378).
6.2.4 Explanation and Argumentation in the Context of
Scientific Reasoning
In this chapter we will primarily focus on the modeling of scientiﬁc expla-
nations, or more precisely, scientiﬁc explanatory reasoning. In addition to the
dynamics of explanation and argumentation which has to be taken into account
in such a modeling, it is important to notice that a bilateral relation, involv-
ing one explainer and one explainee, is not the only possible situation in an
explanatory process. This is, for instance, the case in scientiﬁc contexts where
a number of scientists can participate in a discussion on a certain explanatory
issue. In such situations, the explanation proposed by one scientist (or a group
of scientists) undergoes a critical assessment by the other members of the given
scientiﬁc community. Moreover, diﬀerent scientists may oﬀer diﬀerent, mutu-
ally rivaling explanations. As a result, arguments used in explanatory reasoning
will be open for criticism in terms of counterarguments, while explanations will
be open for a comparison with other alternative explanations.
Thus, on the basis of the points presented in this section we can conclude
that an appropriate modeling of scientiﬁc explanatory reasoning should allow
for the following three properties:5
1. a dynamic view on explanatory reasoning, involving both justiﬁcatory
and explanatory arguments;
2. the possibility of expressing criticism in terms of counterarguments and
alternative explanations;
3. the possibility of multiple participants in an explanatory process.
In this chapter we will oﬀer a framework that can satisfy all three of these
requirements. First of all, rooting our framework in Dung’s account of ab-
stract argumentation allows for an abstract notion of an argument, which can
be seen as corresponding to an argument in a formal sense. Consequently, both
justiﬁcatory and explanatory arguments can be represented as argumentative
letters in general. Second, the dynamics of abstract argumentation, based on
the attack relation between arguments, allows for a modeling of counterar-
guments and alternative explanations. Finally, as we will demonstrate in our
examples, an abstract argumentation system allows for the input from multiple
parties to be represented in an explanatory process, which further contributes
to its ﬁtness for the modeling of scientiﬁc explanatory reasoning and scientiﬁc
debates.
Before we introduce our framework, let us give a summary of the main
concepts of Dung’s abstract argumentation.
5Even though these properties are important for the modeling of scientific explanatory
reasoning, they are not restricted to it. Similar kind of requirements may be posed on the
modeling of other explanatory contexts such as e.g. expert systems.
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6.3 Abstract Argumentation
Let us ﬁrst have a look at the classical deﬁnition of argument systems intro-
duced by Dung in (Dung 1995). We have a set of arguments and an attack
relation between them. The abstractness of the framework concerns both ele-
ments. On the one hand, we do not reveal the concrete structure of the given
arguments, but represent them by abstract letters. On the other hand, we do
not reveal the concrete nature of the attack relation.
Definition 6.3.1. An argumentation system (AF) is a pair (A,→) where A
is a set of arguments, and → ⊆ A × A is a relation between arguments. The
expression a → b is pronounced as “a attacks b” and → is called the attack
relation.
The central notion of AFs is acceptability. We are interested in selecting sets of
arguments, let us call them A-sets, which satisfy criteria of acceptability.6 For
example, the selected arguments should be at least conﬂict-free or should be
able to defend themselves from all the attacks by other arguments. Applied to
scientiﬁc discourse, an A-set represents a collection of arguments that satisﬁes a
certain, for instance, methodological virtue. The following deﬁnitions introduce
the standard selection criteria for A-sets.7
Definition 6.3.2. Given an argumentation framework (AF) (A,→) and an
A-set A ⊆ A we deﬁne:
(i) A defends the argument a iﬀ every attacker of a is attacked by a member
of A.
(ii) A is conflict-free iﬀ no argument in A attacks an argument in A.
(iii) A is said to be defended if it is conﬂict-free and every argument in A is
defended by A.8
(iv) We call maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) defended A-sets preferred A-sets.
Example 6.3.1.
We will demonstrate the concepts just introduced with the
attack-diagram to the right. The table lists the A-sets belong-
ing to selections based on the diﬀerent criteria:
a f
b c d
conﬂict-free defended preferred
∅,{a},{b},{c},{d},{f},
{a, d},{a, f},{b, d},{b, f},{c, f}
∅,{d},{f},{a, d} {a, d},{f}
6These were introduced by Dung as so-called “extensions”.
7Many other selection criteria for A-sets have been proposed in the literature (such as
being “stable” and “complete” in (Bondarenko et al. 1997), being “semi-stable” in (Caminada
2006), being “ideal” in (Dung et al. 2007), etc.). In order to make the technical level of the
chapter not too involving we stick to the selection criteria introduced in Definition 6.3.2.
Generalizations of our framework for other selection criteria are straight-forward.
8Defended A-sets are also often labeled “admissible”.
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6.4 Enriching Abstract Argumentation with
Explanations
In this section we will deﬁne explanatory argumentation frameworks (EAFs)
and some basic notions that can be expressed by them.
6.4.1 Explanatory Argumentation Frameworks (EAFs)
In order to equip argumentation frameworks with explanatory capabilities we
extend them with the following three elements:
1. A set of explananda X : we interpret elements of the set X as statements
describing a state of aﬀairs which is considered to be requiring an explana-
tion by all the parties involved in the given dispute or which is within the
explanatory scope of a given discipline. This could be a certain natural or so-
cial phenomenon, an experimental result, etc. In accordance with the standard
view on explanations which take the explanandum as indisputable in character
(in contrast to the conclusions of evidentiary arguments), we assume that the
set of explananda consists of facts which are considered to be indisputable in
the given ﬁeld. For example, an explanandum can be a description of, or a
reference to a certain observation or an experimental result.9
2. The second element we need to introduce is an explanatory relation ⇢
which holds between:
(a) an argument and an explanandum, i.e., ⇢ ⊆ A × X where A is the set of
arguments of a given AF and X is the set of explananda;
(b) between two arguments, i.e., ⇢ ⊆ A ×A.
Where a ∈ A and x ∈ A ∪X we designate “a⇢x” as “a explains x”. While the
explanatory relation between an argument and an explanandum links phenom-
ena requiring explanation with the reasons which should allow for their better
understanding, the explanatory relation between arguments themselves allows
for explanations to be deepened. In other words, argument b can be used to
explain one of the premises of argument a (which may itself be used to explain
explanandum e) or the link between the premises and the conclusion. The for-
mer case corresponds to Thagard’s idea of a deepening of scientiﬁc explanations
or Bermu´dez’s notion of a vertical explanation.10 The latter case can occur in
explanatory situations typical for everyday language, didactic situations or oral
disputes, in which arguments are usually expressed in an elliptic manner so that
the link between premises and the conclusion might not be suﬃciently clear. In
accordance with the abstract character of abstract argumentation frameworks,
we treat the explanatory relation in an abstract manner as well.
3. We introduce the third element that simpliﬁes the modeling of scientiﬁc
debates while making it at the same time more accurate. Sometimes two
9Nevertheless, sometimes there are disputes on what is to count as a valid or important
explanandum in a given scientific field. For the possibility of enhancing our framework so
that it can allow for such disputes, see Section 6.7.3.
10We will present both notions in Section 6.6.
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arguments a and b are based on incompatible presuppositions or premises. It
is important to notice that this does not necessarily indicate that a attacks b
or vice versa. This is often the case with alternative explanations of a certain
phenomenon. For instance, some geologists in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth
century explained the origin of mountains by the idea of continental drift (g),
while some other geologists explained it by the thesis of the earth’s contraction
(c). Although g and c were clearly incompatible (see Example 6.4.1, Section
6.4.2), g in itself was not suﬃcient to attack c (and vice versa): just naming an
alternative explanation is not considered as a counter-argument in a scientiﬁc
debate. And indeed, counter-arguments against both ideas were established
on independent grounds. For instance, contractionists attacked the theory of
drifters by pointing out that it cannot account for a mechanism that would
enable continents to plough through the dense seaﬂoor. In order to model
such incompatibilities between arguments we introduce another relation, the
incompatibility relation ∼.
In conclusion, we deﬁne:
Definition 6.4.1. An Explanatory Argumentation Framework (EAF) is a tu-
ple ⟨A,X ,→,⇢,∼⟩, where ⟨A,→⟩ is an AF, X is a set of explananda, ⇢ ⊆
(A×X ) ∪ (A×A), and ∼ ⊆ A ×A is a symmetric relation.
We call ⇢ the explanatory relation and the elements of ⇢ atomic explana-
tions. The elements of X are denoted by e, e1, e2, ..., and the elements of A by
a, b, c, d, f, g, .... Moreover, ∼ is the incompatibility relation and in case a ∼ b, a
and b are said to be incompatible.
Concerning the selection criteria introduced in Deﬁnition 6.3.2 little adjust-
ment is needed. The only change concerns the notion of conﬂict-freeness: In
the remainder of the chapter we call an A-set A conflict-free iﬀ no argument
in A attacks or is incompatible with an argument in A. As before, A is said to
be defended if it is conﬂict-free and every argument in A is defended by A.
6.4.2 Basic Definitions
In order to introduce some basic notions it is useful to ﬁrst deﬁne some basic
graph-theoretic concepts.
Definition 6.4.2. A directed graph (digraph) is an ordered pair G = ⟨V,↝⟩
where V is a set and ↝ is a binary relation on V , ↝ ⊆ V × V . The elements of
V are called vertices and the elements of ↝ are called arrows. G′ = ⟨V ′,↝′⟩ is
a sub-graph of G iﬀ V ′ ⊆ V , ↝′ ⊆ V ′ × V ′ and ↝′ ⊆↝. G′ is a proper sub-graph
of G iﬀ it is a sub-graph of G and V ′ ⊂ V or ↝′ ⊂ ↝. We say that there is a
path from x1 to xn in G iﬀ there are x1, . . . , xn ∈ V for which (xi, xi+1) ∈↝ for
all 1 ≤ i < n. G is circular iﬀ there is an x ∈ V for which there is a path from x
to x. Where V ′ ⊆ V , we deﬁne ↝V ′=df {(x, y) ∈↝ ∣ x, y ∈ V ′}.
We now introduce deﬁnitions that characterize explanations in EAFs.
Definition 6.4.3. Let A = ⟨A,X ,→,⇢,∼⟩ be an EAF, e ∈ X , and a ∈ A.
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(i) We call a sub-graph X = ⟨A,⇢A⟩ of ⟨A,⇢A⟩ an explanation of e iﬀ there
is a unique argument a ∈ A such that (i) a⇢ e and (ii) there is a path in
X from every a′ ∈ A ∖ {a} to a.
We say that the explanation X is circular if X is a circular graph.
We use the following writing conventions: In the case that an explanation
X only consists of a path ⟨P,⇢P ⟩, where P = {a1, . . . , an} and ⇢P =
{(ai+1, ai) ∣ 1 ≤ i < n}, we abbreviate X by ⟨a1, . . . , an⟩. We sometimes
write X[e] for X in order to indicate that X explains e.
(ii) An explanation ⟨A,⇢A⟩ is conflict-free iﬀ A is conﬂict-free.
(iii) An explanationX[e] is deeper than an explanationX ′[e] iﬀX ′ is a proper
sub-graph of X. We write X ′ ≺ X. We say that X ′ is a sub-explanation
of X.
(iv) X[e] and X ′[e] are alternative explanations of e iﬀ neither X ≺ X ′ nor
X ′ ≺X.
(v) An explanation ⟨B,⇢B⟩ is offered by an A-set A iﬀ B ⊆ A. We deﬁne the
set of all explananda for which A oﬀers an explanation by
ǫ(A) =df {e ∈ X ∣ there is an explanation X[e] oﬀered by A}.
Example 6.4.1. We give an example of a scientiﬁc debate, on the basis of
which we can clarify the notions that have so far been introduced, and which
will serve to show why and how our framework can be useful in an evaluation
of scientiﬁc theories. The following arguments, which correspond to the EAF
given in Figure 6.1, are central to (though they do not exhaust) the discussion
in the geological sciences around the 1920’s, which we have seen in Chapter 4.
Scientiﬁc debates are often very technical and complex. Hence, in order to
follow them a scholar has to be suﬃciently familiar with the involved topics. We
chose this example since the technical complexity of the given arguments allows
for a representation that is understandable and transparent also for scholars
that are not already familiar with the subtleties of the research in geology
at that time and it is thus ideal as a running example for demonstrating our
framework. We begin with an excerpt of the arguments given by drifters and
contractionists, which will be further extended at a later point in this chapter
(see Example 6.5.1). The explananda are as follows:11
e1 (fossils) Similar kinds of fossils were found on diﬀerent continents.
12
e2 (orogeny) There are mountains and mountain chains on continents.
e3 (glaciation) There is an evidence of glaciation which took place in the late
Paleozoic in the southern continents (the so-called Southern Glaciation
11Even though we will, for the sake of simplicity, focus on some arguments exchanged
between the drifters and the contractionists, it is important to notice that the permanentist
side could easily be included in our example, and that EAFs are suitable for the modeling of
any number of parties involved in an explanatory process.
12This is a simplified version of the actual explanandum, which states a peculiar distri-
bution of Cambrian trilobites – fossil arthropods that lived 500 to 600 million years ago
(see (Gould 1977)); we will make similar simplifications of other explananda and arguments
constituting this example in order to avoid burdening the reader with too many technical
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or the late Paleozoic glaciation).
The following arguments were oﬀered:
a (land bridges) In the past, the continents were apart like nowadays, but
connected by land bridges. This is how diﬀerent species of ﬂora and fauna
were distributed to diﬀerent parts of the world.
b (no land bridges nowadays) The hypothesis of the land bridges is not
plausible since it is not clear how such land bridges would have disap-
peared throughout the history.
c (contraction) Vertical displacements of the otherwise unmovable earth’s
crust result from the contraction of the earth, which causes shrinking
and lateral compression in the crust. That is why some rocks (such as
mountains) became elevated while some others (such as the land bridges)
subsided into the ocean.
d (cooling) The earth is contracting due to its cooling.
f (drift-paleontology) Continents were once connected into a super-continent,
before they drifted away from each other. Diﬀerent species of ﬂora and
fauna were distributed over diﬀerent continents in this way.
g (drift-orogeny) Drifting of continents results in the leading edge of the
continent being compressed and folded upwards due to the resistance of
the seaﬂoor. Consequently, mountains are being formed along the leading
coastlines of a drifting continent, or result from two continents colliding
against each other.
h (drift-glaciation) The nowadays southern continents were once a part of a
super-continent, and positioned more in the north. That is why glaciation
could occur on them in Paleozoic, before they drifted to the south.
i (drift) The earth consists of concentric shells, the density of which increases
from the crust to the core, so that the continents ﬂoat on and extend
into the ocean ﬂoors. This is why the continents, pulled by a particular
(currently unknown) force, could drift away from their original locations
where they once formed a super-continent.
Let us focus on maximal conﬂict-free sets of arguments that are able to
defend themselves in order to gain a ﬁrst approximative representation of the
rivaling scientiﬁc views.13 Hence, we are interested in preferred A-sets. In this
example we have two such A-sets: A1 = {f, h, g, i} and A2 = {a, c, d}, corre-
sponding to the two represented rivaling views in geology: Drift and contrac-
tionism. Next, we have two atomic explanations of e1: a and f , two atomic
explanations of e2: c and g, and one atomic explanation of e3: h. Each of
them is a sub-explanation of the following explanations, resp.: X1[e1] = ⟨a⟩,
X2[e1] = ⟨f, i⟩, X3[e2] = ⟨c, d⟩, X4[e2] = ⟨g, i⟩, and X5[e3] = ⟨h, i⟩ all of which
are conﬂict-free and non-circular. By Deﬁnition 6.4.3iv, ⟨g, i⟩ is deeper than⟨g⟩ alone. Explanations X2,X4 and X5 are oﬀered by the drifters, i.e. A1, and
explanations X1 and X3 are oﬀered by the contractionists, i.e. A2. Notice that
13We will offer more realistic selection procedures for the representation of scientific views
in Section 6.5.
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Figure 6.1: The EAF of Example 6.4.1. Solid arrows represent the attack rela-
tion, dotted arrows represent the explanatory relation, and solid lines represent
the incompatibility relation. Solid lines from the box around arguments f, g
and h to argument a and the box around d and c indicate that all three argu-
ments are incompatible with a, d and c. The explanatory arrow from i to the
box around f , g and h indicates that each of the three arguments is explained
by i.
the two preferred A-sets, A1 and A2, oﬀer explanations for diﬀerent sets of ex-
plananda: while A2 oﬀers explanations for e1 and e2, A1 oﬀers explanations for
e1, e2 and e3. Hence, while the two A-sets are in view of their argumentative
properties equivalent (i.e. they are both maximally defended and conﬂict-free),
their explanatory power is diﬀerent. Since a diﬀerence in the explanatory power
of A-sets can play an important role in the evaluation of scientiﬁc theories, we
will introduce criteria for selecting A-sets in view of their explanatory features
in Sections 6.5 and 6.6.
This example also demonstrates the usefulness of our incompatibility rela-
tion. We take the contractionists’ arguments a, c and d to be incompatible with
all of the explanations given in view of the Drift (f ,g,h and i) since they as-
sume mutually incompatible explanatory mechanisms.14 Obviously, argument
d refers to the level of cooling that can account for the level of contraction
needed to explain the formation of mountains (e2), and not to a more mod-
erate version of cooling and contracting, which would not be able to explain
such a phenomenon and which would be compatible with the Drift. Notice that
without our incompatibility relation, the arguments of the two sides would have
to be modeled either as formally unrelated in terms of EAFs or as related in
terms of bidirectional attacks (in place of the incompatibility relations). How-
ever, in the ﬁrst case, it would be impossible to distinguish between the two
14For example, one of the reasons for this incompatibility (which for the sake of simplicity
we have kept out of our examples) lies in the fact that Drift relied on the principle of isostasy,
which implied that continents and ocean floors had to be different either in structure or
in composition, and which conflicted with the contractionists’ idea of interchangeability of
oceans and continents (Oreskes 1999, p. 21-55).
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rivaling scientiﬁc views, since for instance {a, c, d, f, g, h, i} would be a conﬂict-
free A-set. The second option would allow for the distinction between the
rivaling views, but it would have some other implausible results. For example,
argument b would be taken as defended from c by any of the Drift arguments
f, g, h, i merely due to the fact that an alternative explanation has been pro-
posed, which would be counterintuitive.
6.5 Towards a More Realistic Modeling of Scientific
Debates
6.5.1 Criteria for the Modeling of Scientific Debates
As we have seen in Section 6.4, certain criteria for A-sets (such as being conﬂict-
free or defended) are useful for the representation of opposing views in scientiﬁc
debates. However, for a more realistic modeling of scientiﬁc views and their
evaluation, we need to add few more criteria and modify some of those that
have already been introduced. We will show that some of the key epistemic
values relevant in the evaluation of scientiﬁc theories can be expressed in terms
of our framework. On the basis of them, we will be able to formulate selection
types for A-sets that reﬂect certain methodological and epistemic preferences
scientists or philosophers may have when evaluating theories in view of the
available arguments. We will propose two procedures for such selections, which
are more apt for this purpose than the standard criteria introduced in Section
6.3.
It is important to mention though that it is beyond the scope of this thesis
to ﬁnally settle the question, which criteria (and combinations thereof) most
adequately capture the methodological and epistemic standards used in theory
evaluation, either descriptively or normatively. Many new criteria have been
studied since Dung developed his AFs, which reﬁne and optimize the ﬁrst
generation of selection criteria in many ways.15 It is a task left for future
research to clarify which (combinations of) criteria are the most suitable for
the modeling of the notions of acceptability underlying theory choice. What
we want to present here is rather a general directive for how this research may
proceed and in which way notions developed in terms of EAFs can be useful
for this task.
The criterion of conﬂict-freeness, introduced in the previous section, is a
minimal requirement that should be satisﬁed by A-sets representing a given
scientiﬁc view. In view of this criterion we can then distinguish between mu-
tually rivaling scientiﬁc views. Another epistemic standard signiﬁcant in the
evaluation of scientiﬁc theories is their explanatory power.
Explanatory power. The explanatory power of an A-set – usually also
referred to as explanatory scope or explanatory breadth – is given by the set of
explananda which are explained by its constituting arguments. We are inter-
ested in suﬃciently explanatory powerful (conﬂict-free) A-sets. There are two
15See Footnote 7.
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ways of comparing the explanatory power that may be relevant in the assess-
ment of scientiﬁc theories. On the one hand, if an A-set has a (clearly) smaller
explanatory scope compared to another A-set, then it is usually considered to
be a suboptimal candidate in the context of theory acceptance (other things
being equal). On the other hand, when we are evaluating whether a new sci-
entiﬁc theory is worthy of pursuit, it may be enough for an A-set to have some
novel explanations, i.e. to explain certain explananda that are not explained
by any alternative A-set. Therefore it will be useful to introduce two ways of
comparing the explanatory power of A-sets: on the one hand in a quantitative
sense and on the other hand in a qualitative sense. We will discuss them in
more detail in Section 6.6.1. Since the aim of this section is to present the
main idea underlying our new criteria, we will use only a simpliﬁed version of
the latter comparison type which we informally deﬁne as follows:
We say that an A-set A1 is explanatory more powerful than an A-set A2
iﬀ the set of explananda for which the arguments in A1 oﬀer an explanation is
a proper super-set of the set of explananda for which A2 oﬀers an explanation
(i.e., ǫ(A2) ⊂ ǫ(A1)).
Example 6.5.1. In order to get a more accurate picture of the discussion in
geological sciences presented in Example 6.4.1, we extend it with some addi-
tional arguments. The EAF corresponding to the example is given in Figure
6.2.
j (mechanism-problem) It is not at all clear how the continental drift can
occur, since continents cannot simply plough through the dense seaﬂoor.
k (radioactivity) Due to the discovery of radioactive material in the earth’s
crust, which produces heat when decaying, we can claim that the earth
cannot be cooling, at least not to such an extent that would account for
the origin of higher mountain chains.
l (why contracting?) It is not plausible to assume that the earth is contract-
ing unless we know the causes of such a process, and no such cause seems
to exist.
The most explanatory conﬂict-free A-sets are various super-sets of A1 ={f, g, h}, e.g. A2 = {f, g, h, i, l},A3 = {b, f, g, h, k, l},A4 = {b, f, g, h}, etc. Note
that any conﬂict-free super-set of {a, c} (i.e. A-sets representing contraction-
ism) only explains {e1, e2} and is hence explanatory weaker than A1, . . . ,A4.
Indeed, given the arguments introduced so far, the Drift oﬀers a broader ex-
planatory scope than Contractionism.
However, it is important to notice that in this example none of the most
explanatory A-sets, such as A1, . . . ,A4, are defended in a strict sense: after all
neither of these sets is able to defend itself from the attack by j. The only
preferred A-set is A′1 = {b, j, k, l}. Nevertheless, this set has no explanatory
power with respect to the given explananda. Note that the two preferred A-sets
from Example 6.4.1 – {f, g, h, i} and {a, c, d} – both oﬀer a greater explanatory
power than A′1. However, they are not anymore selected, since they are not
able to defend themselves from all the attacks. This situation is not atypical
in science since many theories that are accepted or pursued are confronted
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Figure 6.2: The EAF from Example 6.5.1.
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with objections and criticisms of various kinds, from which they cannot always
immediately be defended. This is especially so in the context of pursuit where
we are primarily interested in a theory that can oﬀer explanations for certain
phenomena in spite of having some open problems. For example, during the
confrontation of the above mentioned geological theories, the fact that none of
them was resistant against criticism was not a suﬃcient reason for abandoning
their further pursuit. Hence, in certain epistemic contexts we might wish to
lower our standard of defense, that requires from an A-set to defend itself from
all attacks.
Weakening the Standard of Defense. The idea of this weakening is to
say that an A-set A1 is more defended than another A-set A2 iﬀ A2 is attacked
by more arguments against which it cannot defend itself than A1.
16
Let us take a look at the most explanatory A-sets from Example 6.5.1. A2
is attacked by both j and d. Similarly, A4 is attacked by j and c. The A-sets
A3, A5 = {f, g, h, i}, and A6 = {f, g, h, i, k} fair better: they are only attacked
by j. The latter sets belong to the most defended of the most explanatory
A-sets.
Explanatory Depth. In addition to comparing sets of arguments in view
of their explanatory power, we can also compare them in view of their ex-
planatory depth. For instance, both {f, g, h} and {f, g, h, i} have the same ex-
planatory breadth since both oﬀer explanations for all the shared explananda
e1, e2 and e3. However, {f, g, h, i} is explanatory deeper than {f, g, h} since i
explanatory deepens arguments f, g and h. Note that the latter are not shared
explananda but theory-internal parts of the Drift. Since we are interested in
representing a scientiﬁc view as consisting not only of the arguments that di-
rectly explain the shared explananda (e.g. {f, g, h}), but also the arguments
that explanatory deepen the former, this criterion could be of use as well. We
will give a more precise deﬁnition of this notion in Section 6.6.2.
6.5.2 Selection Procedures for New Types of A-Sets
On the basis of the newly introduced criteria, we are now able to express
selection procedures that correspond to certain types of epistemic evaluation of
scientiﬁc theories, that is, views of scientists participating in scientiﬁc debates.
Procedure 1. The underlying idea of this procedure is to select the argu-
mentative core of the most explanatory scientiﬁc views or theories together with
arguments that are used for attacking their rivals. It consists of the following
steps:
16This is still, of course, a very rough account of the degree of being defended. It would
get more realistic if we took into consideration a weighting of the attacks, since some attacks
may be considered as more severe than others (see also our Discussion in Section 6.7.3).
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1. Select all the conﬂict-free A-sets.
2. Out of these, select the most explanatory A-sets.
3. Out of these, select the most defended A-sets.
4. Out of these, select the maximal A-sets (w.r.t. set-inclusion).
Applied to our example, the procedure delivers the A-set {b, f, g, h, i, l, k}.
First, by selecting conﬂict-free A-sets, we make sure that we distinguish be-
tween the rivaling theories. Second, we choose from these the most explanatory
powerful ones. Third, by choosing the most defended ones of these, we select
the least problematic of the explanatory powerful theories. Finally, by choosing
the maximal ones from the latter selection, we make sure we include as many
mutually compatible arguments as possible, thus also including those which
are used to attack the rivaling theories.
Procedure 2. The idea underlying this procedure is to select the explana-
tory core of the most explanatory theories.
1. Select all the conﬂict-free A-sets.
2. Out of these, select the most explanatory A-sets.
3. Out of these, select the most defended A-sets.
4. Out of these, select the explanatory deepest A-sets.
5. Out of these, select the minimal A-sets (w.r.t. set-inclusion).
In the ﬁrst three steps we proceed analogous to Procedure 1. By selecting the
explanatory deepest A-sets we want to make sure we include the explanatory
gist of the given theory. Finally, by choosing the minimal of these, we preserve
only those arguments belonging to such an explanatory core, while disregard-
ing, for example, the arguments used only for attacking the rivaling theories,
i.e. arguments that don’t have an explanatory or defensive function. Applied
to our example this procedure delivers the A-set {f, g, h, i} (as the reader can
easily verify).
Even though both of our procedures prioritize the criterion of explanatory
power to the criterion of defense, in some contexts we may wish to reverse this
order, and even use the full defense criterion. For instance, when evaluating
which theories should be accepted (and not only pursued), we may want to
allow only for theories that can be fully defended. Such a procedure would
begin with the selection of defended A-sets, followed by the selection of the most
explanatory ones of these. Obviously, by diﬀerent combinations of the criteria
we may obtain diﬀerent procedures suitable for diﬀerent epistemic contexts.
Let us also remark that the procedures oﬀered above are of a sequential or
vertical nature: selections with respect to various criteria are applied step-wise.
It is also possible to select “horizontally” by making use of weighting functions
for A-sets. Let us give a simple example. Given an EAF ⟨A,X ,→,⇢,∼⟩ and a
conﬂict-free A-set A we deﬁne:
π(A) = µd ∣A∖ α(A)∣∣A∣ + µe
∣ǫ(A)∣
∣X ∣ ,
108 Chapter 6. Abstract Argumentation and Explanation
where α(A) is the set of attackers of A against which it cannot defend itself.
Moreover, µd and µe are numerical weights that model the importance we
attach to the criteria defendedness and explanatory power respectively. Let us
apply π to some A-sets from Example 6.5.1 where µd = µe = 1: for the Drift we
have e.g. π({b, f, g, h, i, k, l}) = π({i, f, g, h}) = 10
11
+ 3
3
, while for contractionism
we have π({a, c, d, j}) = π({a, c, d}) = 10
11
+ 2
3
. Of course, horizontal and vertical
selection mechanisms may be combined. For instance, we could ﬁrst select A-
sets that maximize π and then select the maximal ones out of these. In the
example above we would end up with {b, f, g, h, i, k, l}.
In the following section we will give a more precise formal representation of
the comparisons in view of explanatory power and explanatory depth, which
will also allow for a reﬁnement of diﬀerent aspects of these two procedures.
6.6 A Formal Account of Explanatory Properties
6.6.1 Explanatory Power
Let us now properly deﬁne the two ways of comparing the explanatory power of
A-sets that have been introduced in the previous section and point out possible
reﬁnements for each of them.
Definition 6.6.1. Comparing the explanatory power in a qualitative sense: A
is explanatory stronger than A′, in signs A′ ⊏e A, iﬀ the set of explananda for
which A oﬀers an explanation is a super-set of the set of explananda for which
A′ oﬀers an explanation: ǫ(A′) ⊂ ǫ(A). This notion was used in Section 6.5.
Definition 6.6.2. Comparing the explanatory power in a quantitative sense:
A is explanatory stronger than A′, in signs A′ ⊏c A, iﬀ A explains numerically
more explananda than A′: ∣ǫ(A′)∣ < ∣ǫ(A)∣.17
Example 6.6.1. Let ⟨A,X ,→,⇢,∼⟩ be an EAF where X = {e1, . . . , e10}.
Let A and A′ be preferred A-sets for which ǫ(A) = {e1, . . . e8} and ǫ(A′) ={e6, . . . , e10}. Note that A′ ⊏c A since A explains 8 out of 10 explananda but
A′ only explains 5. However, A′ /⊏e A since ǫ(A′) /⊂ ǫ(A).
Sometimes the comparative measures of explanatory power oﬀered in Deﬁ-
nitions 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 are too strict. To see this suppose that there is a third
preferred A-set A′′ in our Example 6.6.1 for which ǫ(A′′) = {e4, . . . , e10}. Note
that A′′ ⊏c A. However, A numerically explains only one explanandum more
than A′′. Often if the explanatory power of two theories is not very diﬀerent
this is not a suﬃcient reason for preferring one over the other.
For a more reﬁned approach to representing both comparative notions of
explanatory power, we generalize them by introducing a threshold value τ . For
the quantitative notion we deﬁne A ⊏τc A
′ iﬀ ∣ǫ(A′)∣ − ∣ǫ(A)∣ > τ where τ is a
constant. Note that ⊏0c is equivalent to ⊏c. By introducing a threshold value
17It is easy to see that ⊏c and ⊏e are strict preorders on ℘(A) × ℘(A). (A strict preorder
is a irreflexive and transitive binary relation.) Obviously A ⊏e A′ implies A ⊏c A′.
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τ , for instance 1, both A-sets A and A′′ are equally explanatory strong with
respect to ⊏1c . This introduces an interesting option for the modeling of states
in science where diﬀerent scientiﬁc groups are characterized by similarly strong,
but nevertheless incompatible explanatory features. It is easy to see that ⊏e
can be generalized in a similar way using threshold values.
Example 6.6.2. Let us return to our Example 6.5.1. Take for instance the
two conﬂict-free A-sets: A7 = {a, c, d} and A8 = {b, f, g, h, i}. It is easy to see
that A8 has a greater explanatory power than A7 since it oﬀers an explanation
of e1, e2, and e3, while A7 only oﬀers an explanation of e1 and e2. Formally
speaking, A7 ⊏e A8 as well as A7 ⊏c A8.
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the two A-sets in question is similar
(although in our simpliﬁed modeling ǫ(A7) ⊂ ǫ(A8)): A8 explains only one
explanandum more than A7. By introducing a threshold τ = 1, we obtain both
extensions – A7 and A8 – as maximal elements of ⊏1c (with respect to all conﬂict-
free A-sets): due to their high and similar explanatory power they are both
acceptable according to this notion. Such a rendering would correspond, for
instance, to the view that geology in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century was
in a multi-paradigm state where both contractionism and the Drift (as well
as permanentism) were mutually rivaling paradigms (see e.g. (Stewart 1990,
p. 139)), in contrast to the above, strict rendering which corresponds to the
preference on the Drift as a more explanatory powerful conception. This is due
to the fact that the explanatory power of the two camps was very similar such
that, given an appropriate threshold τ , also for a more complete and realistic
modeling of this debate, A-sets representing both views would be selected.
6.6.2 Explanatory Depth
As we have seen in the previous section, we can also compare A-sets with
respect to their explanatory depth. This is important, for instance, in cases in
which we have two A-sets with the same explanatory power, but one of which
oﬀers a deeper explanation of some explananda than the other one. The formal
deﬁnition of explanatory depth is as follows:
Definition 6.6.3. Given two A-sets A1 and A2, we say that A2 is explanatory
at least as deep as A1, in signs A1 ⊑d A2 iﬀ for every explanation X1[e] of
e ∈ ǫ(A1) oﬀered by A1 there is an explanation X2[e] oﬀered by A2 such that
X1 ≺ X2 or X1 = X2. We say that A2 is explanatory deeper than A1, written
A1 ⊏d A2, iﬀ A1 ⊑d A2 but it is not the case that A2 ⊑d A1.
For instance, in Example 6.5.1, {f, g, h, i} is explanatory deeper than {f, g, h}.
In addition to their application in the selection procedures mentioned in the
previous section, our criteria for explanatory power and explanatory depth may
be interesting in capturing some philosophical notions as well. For example,
Thagard’s concepts of broadening – explaining new facts, and deepening – ex-
plaining why the theory works (Thagard 2007, p. 29) correspond to our notions
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of explanatory power and explanatory depth. Similarly, we can account for the
notions of “horizontal” and “vertical explanations” (see (Bermu´dez 2005)) by
representing them, respectively, with our notions of primary explanation and
its deepening.18
6.7 Discussion
In this section we address questions that are relevant for situating our frame-
work in the broader context of philosophy of science and methodology, Dung’s
abstract argumentation, as well as in the context of other formal accounts of ex-
planatory reasoning. Therefore we shall clarify the relevance and the novelties
of EAFs, as well as some possible enhancements.
6.7.1 EAFs and the Argumentative Shift in Methodology
Discussions in the ﬁeld of philosophy of science and scientiﬁc methodology in
the last couple of decades have witnessed a growing conviction that a rule-
based algorithmic approach to theory appraisal is problematic. One possible
attempt to preserve the normative idea of rationality in spite of abandoning the
idea of a static, universally applicable scientiﬁc method can be found in more
rhetorically minded approaches to scientiﬁc reasoning, such as Pera’s (1994)
or Dascal’s (2000). Instead of an algorithmic assessment of scientiﬁc theories,
Pera and Dascal emphasize the evaluation in view of the argumentative con-
text underlying the given episode in the history of science. Similarly, Longino
points out that a “method must [. . . ] be understood as a collection of social,
rather than individual, processes, so the issue is the extent to which a scientiﬁc
community maintains critical dialogue” (Longino 1990, p. 76). While formal
approaches to scientiﬁc reasoning have been mainly focused on the logical form
of arguments (that is, the nature of the inference relation), both Pera and
Dascal show that scientiﬁc debates (Dascal’s controversies) are typically not
resolved by the derivational reasoning that is characteristic for logic but rather
by scientists exchanging arguments and trying to convince each other by giving
reasons that substantiate their points:
The contenders pile up arguments they believe increase the weight
of their positions vis a vis the adversaries’ objections, thereby lead-
ing, if not to deciding the matter in question, at least to tilting the
‘balance of reason’ in their favor. Controversies are neither ‘solved’
18According to Bermu´dez, a “horizontal explanation is the explanation of a particular
event or state in terms of distinct (and usually temporarily antecedent) events or states.”
(Bermu´dez 2005, p. 32). For example, a horizontal explanation providing an answer to the
question why the window broke when it did, might call upon the baseball’s hitting it and a
generalization about windows tending to break when hit by a baseball. However, if we ask
why the mentioned generalization holds, that is, what features of the physical structure of
glass make it fragile in such circumstances – we are asking for an explanation of the grounds
of the given horizontal explanation. Such explanations Bermu´dez calls vertical explanations
(ibid, p. 32-33).
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nor ‘dissolved’; they are resolved. Their resolution may consist in
the acknowledgment (by the contenders or by their community of
reference) that enough weight has been accumulated in favor of one
of their positions, or in the emergence (thanks to the controversy)
of modified positions acceptable to the contenders, or simply in the
mutual clarification of the nature of the differences at stake. (Dascal
2000, p. 165, italics added)
Our account of EAFs is supposed to mirror the idea underlying such an
argumentative approach to scientiﬁc controversies in a formal way. Various
possible enhancements (which will be mentioned in subsection 6.7.3) allow for
a framework that reﬂects such a rhetorically minded approach to scientiﬁc de-
bates in a more reﬁned way. However, in contrast to an informal analysis such
as Pera’s Dialectics, which deals with rhetorical aspects of arguments in scien-
tiﬁc debates in terms of classifying argument types and explicating their roles
(see also Chapter 6), our approach abstracts from the concrete type of argu-
ments by focusing only on their roles as being attacks or explanations. This
allows us to inhabit a formal middle-ground for the modeling of the “tilting
of the ‘balance of reason’” by means of selection procedures deﬁned with the
help of our framework. Thus, EAFs (and more generally speaking, abstract
argumentation) can be considered to complement the informal theories of argu-
mentation by representing a formal tool that can serve to rationally reconstruct
scientiﬁc debates from an argumentative point of view.
6.7.2 The Novelty of EAFs
What are the main novelties of our framework? This question should be an-
swered in view of the research done in abstract argumentation frameworks, as
well as in view of other formal accounts of explanatory reasoning.
With regard to the former, it could be argued that since our explanatory
arrow is a kind of support relation, systems such as the bipolar one (see (Cay-
rol and Lagasquie-Schiex 2005)), which also feature an argumentative support
relation, might be suﬃcient to model the notions introduced by our framework
(such as explanations, explanatory power, explanatory depth, etc.). Neverthe-
less, the presence of the set of explananda X in EAFs makes an important
diﬀerence. Placing explananda outside of the set of arguments makes it pos-
sible not only to express notions such as the explanatory power of an A-set,
but also to represent alternative explanations of the same phenomenon and to
compare the explanatory virtues of diﬀerent A-sets. Moreover, on the basis
of such an enhancement we are able to formulate new selection types in view
of explanatory properties of the arguments, which are more suitable for the
evaluation of scientiﬁc views than the standard Dung’s selection types. Thus,
our explanatory relation cannot be substituted by the already existing support
relation.
With regard to other formal accounts of explanatory reasoning, it is im-
portant to notice that there are diﬀerent levels of abstraction on which formal
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representations can be based. First of all, we can formally analyze explana-
tory reasoning by focusing on the nature of the inferential relation present in
explanations. This will give us, for instance, logical systems of abduction (see
e.g. (Aliseda 2006)). Next, we can obtain formal representations by abstract-
ing away from the logical properties of explanatory reasoning and focusing on
the explanatory coherence of the propositions constituting a certain cognitive
system. Thagard’s account of explanatory coherence (Thagard 1992) and its
implementation in the computer program ECHO is an example of such an ap-
proach.19 Finally, if we abstract away from the propositional level, we can
represent explanatory reasoning in terms of arguments taken in an abstract
sense of the term, that is, without analyzing the speciﬁc type of inferential re-
lations involved in them. This kind of approach is the one employed in EAFs.
An important merit of such an approach is that it allows for a transparent rep-
resentation of scientiﬁc debates, while at the same time oﬀering handy tools for
evaluating A-sets in view of their argumentative properties (e.g. being conﬂict-
free and defended) and explanatory virtues. Moreover, by abstracting away
from the speciﬁc nature of inferential relations in argumentative reasoning, we
are able to model debates in which not every argument is necessarily based on
a valid inference (and which may lead to it being attacked by a counterargu-
ment). Hence, by applying such an approach to scientiﬁc reasoning, we have
not only introduced a novelty in the ﬁeld of abstract argumentation, but also
in the ﬁeld of formal representations of scientiﬁc reasoning, which has, to our
knowledge, so far not been linked with argumentation in an abstract sense of
the term.20
6.7.3 Enhancing EAFs
In order to allow for an even more realistic modeling of scientiﬁc debates, our
framework can be enhanced in diﬀerent ways. For example, we can easily in-
troduce a support relation (presented in (Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex 2005))
19It is important to notice that even though both Thagard’s explanatory coherence and
our EAFs aim at modeling the comparison of cognitive systems in terms of their explanatory
virtues, there is a number of differences between these two accounts. For example, while
the basic unit of Thagard’s coherentism is a proposition, our framework is constituted of
arguments and explananda; while Thagard’s notion of acceptability is defined in terms of
explanatory coherence, we speak of different types of acceptability, defined in terms of defen-
sibility and certain explanatory properties; while Thagard does not model the dynamics of
argumentation and thus cannot model the idea of an argumentative defense, we can; while
the distinction of the evaluation of theories in the context of pursuit and in the context of
acceptance is not explicated in his account, we have shown that such a distinction can be
made in EAFs; finally, our graphical representation is quite different from Thagard’s and may
be considered as more transparent when it comes to the representation of scientific debates.
20Even though in this thesis we have been primarily concerned with scientific explanations,
philosophy of science is not the only novel domain in which abstract argumentation in terms of
EAFs may be fruitfully applied. Another interesting application field is expert systems. For
example, Moulin et al. (Moulin et al. 2002) argue that in order to justify and ”convince their
users of the validity of their recommendations . . . , artificial agents should also be equipped
with explanation and argumentation capabilities.” (p. 172).
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which runs over the set of arguments.21 Another interesting enhancement
would be to introduce a weighting on arguments (by means of values (Bench-
Capon 2002), (Bench-Capon 2003), preferences (Amgoud and Cayrol 1998), or
audiences (Bench-Capon et al. 2007)), evidential support (Oren and Norman
2008), or to introduce diﬀerent types of joint attacks (Nielsen and Parsons
2006) or fuzziness (Janssen et al. 2008) that allows, for instance, for the relax-
ation of the standards of being conﬂict-free and of being defended. Introducing
nested attacks in a hierarchical manner into EAFs (see (Modgil 2006, 2009))
would allow for a formal distinction and an analysis of the interplay between
arguments given on the object level and methodological arguments address-
ing the former ones. Moreover, our explanatory relation could be reﬁned by
formally distinguishing between two types of deepening explicated in Section
6.4.1. Similarly to the above mentioned nested attacks, we could allow for a
nested explanatory relation: a⇢ b would in that case indicate that a explains
one of the premises of b, while a⇢(b⇢ c) would indicate that a explains the
explanatory link between b and c.
Another possible enhancement is related to the property of our framework
that explananda are not supposed to be a matter of dispute. Even though
this is often so, there are rare cases in which not all involved parties agree
about what is to count as a significant or even valid explanandum in the given
ﬁeld. For example, some geologists criticized Wegener for pointing out that
his theory of continental drift explained the jigsaw-ﬁt of continental coastlines,
since such a match was, according to them, not at all obvious and did not
represent a signiﬁcant explanandum for geological sciences. In order to model
such disputes, EAFs could be enhanced by allowing preferences or values on
explananda, so that diﬀerent opinions of scientists can be represented in that
way. However, if we want to model cases in which explananda can be rejected
as invalid on an argumentative basis, that is, if we want to allow for a dispute
on explananda we could enhance EAFs by allowing attack relation to run not
only over arguments, but also to go from arguments to explananda (that is,
→ ⊆ A×(A∪X )). As a result, explananda could be both criticized and defended,
while the modeling of explanatory virtues would have to be adjusted in order
to account for the fact that diﬀerent sets of explananda are acceptable with
respect to diﬀerent sets of arguments.
As we have mentioned in the introduction, an important virtue of abstract
argumentation is that a basic framework can easily be enhanced in various
ways. EAFs as presented in this chapter clearly provide an idealized modeling
with regard to the subtleties that occur in real scientiﬁc debates. By listing
possible enhancements of EAFs we have suggested in which way a more realistic
modeling could be obtained.
21After all, there are types of argumentative supports that are not explanatory in nature
and can hence not be represented by means of our explanatory relation.
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6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented the Explanatory Argumentation Framework
(EAF), obtained by enhancing Dung’s Abstract Argumentation Framework
with explanatory capabilities. We have motivated such an enhancement by
pointing out, on the one hand, the close relation between argumentation and
explanation, and on the other hand, the usefulness of our framework in the
modeling of scientiﬁc debates. We have demonstrated that EAFs allow for
a dynamic view on explanatory reasoning by involving both justiﬁcatory and
explanatory arguments. The relation to scientiﬁc debates has been explicated
by showing how multiple diﬀerent scientiﬁc views can be modeled by making
use of diﬀerent criteria for selecting arguments. In this way EAFs are able (i) to
model the criticism inherent to scientiﬁc debates in terms of counter-arguments,
(ii) to model alternative competing explanations, and (iii) to evaluate and
compare the explanatory features oﬀered by the competing scientiﬁc views.
Moreover, diﬀerent selection procedures that can model diﬀerent epistemic and
methodological preferences regarding theory choice can be formulated in our
framework.
Chapter
7
Adaptive Logic Framework
for Abstract Argumentation
. This chapter is based on a paper published under the name “Towards the
Proof-Theoretic Unification of Dung’s Argumentation Framework: An Adap-
tive Logic Approach” in the Journal of Logic and Computation (Straßer
and Sˇesˇelja 2011). The paper is co-authored by the first author Christian
Straßer. We are indebted to Diderik Batens, Joke Meheus, and two anony-
mous reviewers for valuable comments on the former draft of this paper.
Summary This chapter presents a unifying adaptive logic framework for ab-
stract argumentation. It consists of a core system for abstract argumentation
and various adaptive logics based on it. These logics represent in an accurate
sense all standard extensions deﬁned within Dungs abstract argumentation
system with respect to sceptical and credulous acceptance. The models of our
logics correspond exactly to speciﬁc extensions of given argument systems. Ad-
ditionally, the dynamics of adaptive proofs mirror the argumentative reasoning
of a rational agent. In particular, the presented logics allow for external dy-
namics, i.e. they are able to deal with the arrival of new arguments and are
therefore apt to model open-ended argumentations by providing provisional
conclusions.
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have presented the abstract argumentation frame-
works (AFs) as fruitful for modeling scientiﬁc reasoning. But which type of
reasoning governs the selections of arguments in AFs? One way to answer this
question is by developing a logical framework for such a reasoning.
Dung himself remarked that “Logic-based knowledge bases can be viewed
as argumentation systems where the knowledge base is coded in the structure
of the arguments and the logic is used to determine the acceptability of the
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arguments.” (Dung 1995, p. 856, italics added). Moreover, according to John
L. Pollock: “Constructing arguments is one thing. Deciding which conclusions
to accept is another. . . . The conclusions that ought to be believed are those
that are undefeated.” (Pollock 1987, p. 7). Hence, in a logical system modeling
the reasoning that underlies argumentation procedures, the focus is not on the
derivation of propositions from other propositions, but on the derivation of
arguments, and thus of the conclusions made by them, that are considered
acceptable in view of the whole set of arguments constituting the given debate.
In this chapter we oﬀer a proof-theoretic framework for all the standard
selections of arguments (that we have in the previous chapter called A-sets) in
AFs. Since this chapter will be more technical in character, we will introduce
AFs once again, and by using the terminology that is standard in the literature
on AFs, coming mainly from the research in artiﬁcial intelligence and computer
science. For instance, A-sets will now be called extensions of a particular
extension type.1 Let us ﬁrst recall the main features of AFs.
The key notion of Dung’s account is the acceptability of arguments. De-
pendent on the criteria for acceptance, it is possible to formulate diﬀerent
semantics. These deﬁne a number of extensions representing sets of acceptable
arguments, such as admissible, grounded, complete, (semi)-stable and preferred
extensions. Dung’s system has been extended and generalized in various re-
spects. We name just a few: preferences (Amgoud and Cayrol 1998), values
(Bench-Capon 2002) and audiences (Bench-Capon et al. 2007) in the sense of
Perelman (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) have been introduced, joint
attacks have been enabled (Nielsen and Parsons 2006), the system has been
used for an improved account to default reasoning (Bondarenko et al. 1997,
Dung and Son 1996), it has been applied to multi-agent systems (Coste-Marquis
et al. 2007, Bench-Capon 2003), new semantics/extensions have been presented
(Dung et al. 2007, Caminada 2006), game-theoretic approaches have been de-
veloped (Dunne and Bench-Capon 2003), etc.
This chapter oﬀers an adaptive logic framework with a speciﬁc core ax-
iomatic system, on the basis of which we deﬁne logics for obtaining all the
standard extension types of Dung’s account with respect to the skeptical and
the credulous acceptability of arguments. Adaptive logics were initially devel-
oped by Diderik Batens. Their ﬁrst application was the handling of inconsistent
premises. Since then they have been actively researched and used in order to
explicate a variety of defeasible reasoning forms (for a recent survey see (Batens
et al. 2009), for an explication of their meta-theory see (Batens 2007)). The
main idea of adaptive logics (ALs) is to interpret a premise set “as normally
as possible”, given a certain standard of normality. Based on the so-called
lower limit logic (LLL), they select certain LLL-models of a given premise set
which satisfy the standard of normality. Syntactically they enrich the deriva-
tive power of the LLL by allowing for certain rules to be applied conditionally.
1The logics for EAFs could be formulated in a similar way as those that will be presented
in this chapter. Hence, the work presented here can be considered as the basis for formulating
different types of logics for AFs and their enhancements.
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In case a condition turns out to be unsafe, formulas derived on this very condi-
tion are marked in the proof and thus not considered as being derived anymore.
Markings in ALs come and go while we reason on. Indeed, adaptive proofs are
dynamic in two ways: internally in the sense that during the reasoning process
certain conditions might turn out to be unsafe/safe (again) while we get more
insight into the given premises, externally in the sense that the introduction
of new information in the form of new premises may alter our treatment of
certain conditions and thus alter the markings in the proof. In argumentation
the situation is similar: as rational debaters we introduce an argument a in
such a way that we are willing to withdraw it under certain circumstances. For
instance in the case that it is conﬂicting with other arguments, or in the case
that we cannot defend it against certain counterarguments. However, at a later
point, a new argument which defends the attacked a, might enter the scene,
and cause the acceptance of the latter one again. Therefore, argumentation
is in a similar way dynamic as adaptive logic proofs: internally in the sense
that the progressing analyses of the relationship of given arguments might alter
our choice for accepted arguments, and externally in the sense that the intro-
duction of new arguments might make us reconsider the acceptance of some
arguments.
As we have already mentioned, Dung deﬁned various extension types which
select certain subsets of (non-conﬂicting) arguments with respect to given cri-
teria. This mirrors the semantic selection of adaptive logics: while the LLL
deﬁnes minimal criteria that have to be fulﬁlled in every model (such as the
absence of conﬂicts between the validated arguments and the property that
every validated argument is defended by the other validated arguments against
all possible attacks), the adaptive enhancements reﬁne the semantic selection
by modeling the criteria given by the various extension types. Furthermore,
the dynamic adaptive proofs model the reasoning process leading to these se-
lections. In summary, ALs are very suitable for providing a unifying logical
framework for abstract argumentation. Thus, the logics for abstract argumen-
tation which will be presented in this chapter are adaptive logics. They employ
the core set of axioms as LLL and deﬁne diﬀerent standards of normality. In
this way we can obtain logics for admissible, complete, preferred, (semi-)stable
as well as grounded extensions.
One of the main advantages of our approach compared to other proposals
for proof theories for abstract argumentation (see (Vreeswijk and Prakken 2000,
Cayrol et al. 2003, Dung et al. 2002)) lies in its unifying power. A single frame-
work is able to capture all standard semantics/extensions with respect to both
skeptical and credulous acceptance, which makes it an ideal logical surrounding
for their comparison, further elaboration, enhancements and generalizations.
In addition, our system represents a contribution to the research done in
applications of adaptive logics to diﬀerent dialogical contexts (for a survey see
(Batens 2001)). Furthermore, this chapter conﬁrms the claim that the adaptive
logic program oﬀers a general and unifying framework for nonmonotonic and
defeasible logics (as has recently been argued for in (Batens et al. 2009)).
The chapter is structured in the following way. First we present Dung’s ab-
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stract argumentation framework in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3 we introduce the
reader step-wise into our adaptive logic framework for abstract argumentation.
We begin by presenting a formal language and the basic axiomatic system in
Subsection 7.3.1. Furthermore, we discuss how abstract argumentation frame-
works can be represented as premise sets in Subsection 7.3.2. Subsection 7.3.3
contains representational requirements for our logics. In the remainder of Sec-
tion 7.3 we introduce the reader paradigmatically, on the basis of preferred
extensions and by means of examples, into the terminology and the modus
operandi of adaptive logics. In Section 7.4 we deﬁne all the adaptive logics for
the various extension types with respect to skeptical acceptance and state the
corresponding representational results. Section 7.5 features all the logics for
credulous acceptance and the respective representational results. In Section
7.6 we localize the adaptive logic approach within the ﬁeld of logical repre-
sentations of abstract argumentation and point out some advantages. All the
meta-proofs for our results are presented in (Straßer and Sˇesˇelja 2009).
7.2 Dung’s Argumentation Framework - Key Terms
We will use lower case letters a1, a2, a3, . . . for arguments and lower case fraktur
letters a,b, c, . . . as meta-variables for arguments. Let An =df {a1, a2, . . . , an}.
In (Dung 1995) Dung deﬁned his abstract argumentation frameworks as fol-
lows:2
Definition 7.2.1. A finite argumentation framework (AF) is a pair ⟨A,→⟩
where A ⊆ An is a ﬁnite set of arguments, and → ⊆ A×A is a relation between
arguments. The expression a→ b is pronounced as “a attacks b”.
Given an AF ⟨A,→⟩ we are particularly interested in giving an account of
reasonable choices of arguments in A: a minimal criterion is, for instance, that
no argument in a selection S should attack another argument in S. Of course,
more interesting selection types can be deﬁned:
Definition 7.2.2. Given an argumentation framework A = ⟨A,→⟩ we deﬁne
the following notions.
(i) An argument a is attacked by a set of arguments B ⊆ A iﬀ there is a b ∈ B
such that b→ a.
(ii) An argument a is acceptable with respect to a set of arguments C ⊆ A, iﬀ
every attacker of a is attacked by C. It is said that C defends a.
(iii) A set of arguments S ⊆ A is conflict-free iﬀ S doesn’t attack any argument
in S.
(iv) A conﬂict-free set of arguments S ⊆ A is admissible iﬀ each argument in
S is acceptable with respect to S.
2We restrict the discussion in this chapter to the finite case, i.e., to argumentation frame-
works with a finite number of propositional letters.
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(v) A set of arguments S ⊆ A is a preferred extension iﬀ it is a maximal (w.r.t.
⊆) admissible set.
(vi) A conﬂict-free set of arguments S ⊆ A is a stable extension iﬀ it attacks
every argument in A∖ S.
(vii) An admissible set of arguments S ⊆ A is a complete extension iﬀ F (S) = S,
where F (S) =df {c ∣ S defends {c}}.
(viii) A set of arguments S ⊆ A is a grounded extension iﬀ it is the minimal
(w.r.t. ⊆) complete extension.
(ix) A complete extension S ⊆ A is a semi-stable extension3 iﬀ S ∪ S+ is
maximal (w.r.t. ⊆), where S+ is the set of all arguments in A ∖ S which
are attacked by S.
(x) A set of arguments S ⊆ A is credulously accepted according to preferred
[(semi)-stable, complete or grounded] semantics (w.r.t. A) iﬀ it is con-
tained in at least one preferred [(semi)-stable, complete or grounded] ex-
tension of A.
(xi) A set of arguments S ⊆ A is skeptically accepted according to preferred
[(semi)-stable, complete or grounded] semantics (w.r.t. A) iﬀ it is con-
tained in every preferred [(semi)-stable, complete or grounded] extension
of A.
Suppose we select a conﬂict-free set E ⊆ A. There are two types of argu-
ments in A ∖ E which are not selected. On the one hand, arguments in E+
which are attacked by the selected arguments and on the other hand the ones
that are not attacked by E, i.e., arguments in A∖(E∪E+). We call the former
arguments defeated, since they are attacked by at least some of our selected
arguments E. Admissibility requires that the set of defeated arguments for
a given selection of arguments S consists at least of all the attackers of S.
Opposite to attacks, we only speak of a defeat in view of a given selection of
arguments: a attacks b iﬀ a→ b, while b is defeated iﬀ there is a selected argu-
ment a that attacks b. It would be misleading to confuse attack and defeat: an
agent may (argumentatively) attack another agent, but we only consider the
attack as a defeat if the argument used for the attack is considered as valid.4
3Semi-stable semantics were defined in (Caminada 2006) and are equivalent to Verhijs’
admissible stage extensions in (Verheij 1996).
4Our notion of defeat differs from the way defeat is defined in various preference or
value based enhancements of Dung’s abstract argumentation framework. Defeat is there
usually defined as a binary relation between arguments which is a subset of the attack
relation: a1 defeats a2 iff a1 attacks a2 and a2 is not ’preferable’ to a1. The preferability
of one argument over another is modeled in different ways: in terms of a preference relation
between arguments in (Amgoud and Cayrol 2002), by allowing for arguments to attack an
attack in (Modgil 2009), or in terms of mapping arguments into partially ordered values in
(Bench-Capon 2003).
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Figure 7.1 illustrates some basic relationships between the various extension
types. For a more thorough study of them we refer the reader to the rich
literature mentioned in the introduction.
stable extension
semi-stable extension grounded extension
preferred extension complete extension admissible extension
is a
is a is a
is a is an
Figure 7.1: The relationship between the extensions types.
a1
a2 a3 a4
Figure 7.2: An attack-diagram.
Argumentation frameworks ⟨A,→⟩ are often represented by directed graphs,
the so-called attack-diagrams (see Figure 7.2). The nodes are arguments in A
and there is an edge from a to b iﬀ (a,b) ∈→.
Example 7.2.1. We will demonstrate the concepts just introduced with the
attack-diagram in Figure 7.2. The following table lists the extensions belonging
to the extension types introduced in Deﬁnition 7.2.2.
admissible preferred semi-stable complete grounded
∅,{a1},{a2},
{a1, a4},{a2, a4}
{a1, a4},
{a2, a4}
{a1, a4},
{a2, a4}
∅,{a1, a4},
{a2, a4} ∅
Stable extensions are, unlike the other extension types, not guaranteed to
exist. Semi-stable extensions (see (Caminada 2006)) improve on that: they
are guaranteed to exist, and in case stable extensions exists the semi-stable
extensions are identical to them.5 Moreover, there is one unique grounded
extension.
7.3 A Logic for Abstract Argumentation
In this chapter we are going to present propositional logics for abstract ar-
gumentation. We will present for each extension type E (such as admissible,
5The following fact offers an alternative definition of semi-stable extensions in terms of
admissible sets S for which S ∪ S+ is maximal: Let A = ⟨A,→⟩ be an AF and S ⊆ A. S is a
semi-stable extension iff S is an admissible set of arguments for which there is no admissible
set of arguments T ⊆ A such that T ∪ T+ ⊃ S ∪ S+. The statement is proven in (Straßer and
Sˇesˇelja 2009).
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complete, preferred, etc.) a corresponding logic LE . The major idea is that LE
derives for a given argumentation framework A = ⟨A,→⟩ all skeptically (resp.
credulously) accepted arguments and that the models represent the extensions
of type E .
This section will make this idea more precise. It will introduce basic notions
and the modus operandi of our logical framework for abstract argumentation.
First, in Subsection 7.3.1, we will propose a formal language and the core set of
rules for our logics. Subsection 7.3.2 oﬀers a way to represent AFs as premise
sets. We give a precise account of the representational requirements for our
logics in Subsection 7.3.3. In the remainder of this section we will introduce
the reader into the main ideas of adaptive logics by focusing on example cases,
paradigmatically for preferred extensions. Section 7.4 will contain the deﬁni-
tions for all the other variants and the representational results.
7.3.1 Language and Rules
In order to represent a given AF A as a premise set we need a formal language
which allows us to express the basic notions of abstract argumentation. The
idea is, on the one hand, to represent arguments by propositional letters and,
on the other hand, to enrich the language of classical propositional logic by
a binary logical operator ↠ where α ↠ β means that α attacks β. Since we
represent arguments by propositional letters only, we restrict our language in
such a way that only propositional letters are arguments of ↠.6 Formally the
set of well-formed formulas Wn (where n is a natural number) is deﬁned in the
following way:
Vn ∶= p1 ∣ p2 ∣ p3 ∣ . . . ∣ pn
W↠n ∶= ⟨Vn⟩↠ ⟨Vn⟩ ∣ ↠ ⟨Vn⟩
Wn ∶=  ∣ ⟨Vn⟩ ∣ ⟨W↠n ⟩ ∣ ¬⟨Wn⟩ ∣ ⟨Wn⟩ ∧ ⟨Wn⟩ ∣ ⟨Wn⟩ ∨ ⟨Wn⟩ ∣ ⟨Wn⟩ ⊃ ⟨Wn⟩
Vn are the propositional letters of our language. We will in the remainder
abbreviate ¬(α↠ β) by α↠̸ β.
Let us introduce the rules characterizing our core logic for abstract argu-
mentation. First of all, it is obvious that if α is valid and it attacks β, α↠ β,
then β should not be a consequence of our logic:
α α↠ β
¬β (R↠)
This rule guarantees the conﬂict-freeness of our consequences since by (R↠)
we immediately get
⊢ (α↠ β) ⊃ (¬α ∨ ¬β)
So, whenever α ↠ β, either α or β is considered to be invalid. Moreover, in
our language it is easy to express that an argument has been defeated by one
6We also allow for  on the left hand side of ↠. We will comment on this in a moment.
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or more arguments. We deﬁne:
def β =df ⋁α∈Vn(α ∧ (α↠ β)) (Def)
It is easy to verify that the following properties are immediate consequences of
this deﬁnition and rule (R↠):
⊢ def α ⊃ ¬α
⊢ (α ∧ (α↠ β)) ⊃ def β
The ﬁrst property guarantees that, if an argument has been defeated, then it
is supposed not to be validated by the logic. The second property assures that,
if α and α↠ β have been derived then β is defeated.
Remember that the idea behind admissible extensions is that a selected set
of arguments S is required to defend itself. That is to say, in case an argument
a in S is attacked by another argument b, b → a, then there is an argument c
in S which attacks b or, in yet other words, b is defeated. For our logics we
can express this as follows:
α β↠ α
def β
(Rad)
If we have α and β↠ α, then β is supposed to be defeated. Note that it would
be insuﬃcient to replace the conclusion def β of rule (Rad) by ¬β. In case an
argument a is selected and b attacks a, b→ a, then it is not enough simply not to
select b. By the requirement of admissible extensions the selected arguments
have to defend themselves against all attackers. Thus, what is required in
terms of our language is def β. This ensures that there is an argument γ which
attacks and thus defeats β. This is guaranteed by def β due to its deﬁnition
⋁δ∈Vn(δ ∧ (δ ↠ β)). The existence of a defeating argument γ of β would not
be guaranteed were we to replace def β by ¬β in the conclusion of (Rad).
An attentive reader might have noticed that our language also allows for ↠ α. This is helpful in order to express that a given propositional letter
α corresponds to an argument in the given argumentation framework ⟨A,→⟩.
The cardinality of Vn might be higher than the cardinality of A and thus there
might be propositional letters which do not correspond to the given arguments
A. We express the fact that a propositional letter represents an argument
by  ↠ α. All propositional letters that do not represent an argument are
guaranteed not to be validated by the following rule:
↠̸ α¬α (R)
Let us have a look at one last rule that will help us to represent complete
extensions. The main idea behind this extension type is that any argument
that is defended by a given selected set of arguments S is supposed to be in
the selection S. That is to say, if S defends argument a, then a ∈ S. This can
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be expressed by the following rule:
↠ β ⋀α∈Vn((α↠ β) ⊃ def α)
β
(RCo)
That β is defended by the set of validated arguments is expressed by⋀α∈Vn((α↠
β) ⊃ def α): for every attacker α of β, α is supposed to be defeated. We also
add the condition that β is actually representing an argument,  ↠ β, since,
if it did not, then β would have no attackers and thus the other antecedent,
⋀α∈Vn(α ↠ β ⊃ def α), would be valid. But, as already pointed out, we want
to keep propositional letters which do not represent arguments out of the con-
sequence sets of our logics.
The presented rules enable us to deﬁne the following two logics which will
serve as LLLs for our adaptive systems.
Definition 7.3.1. LA is classical propositional logic enriched by the rules
(R↠), (Rad), and (R). LC is LA enriched by (RCo).
We deﬁne the semantics for logics L ∈ {LA,LC} via an assignment function
v ∶ Vn ∪W↠n → {0,1} and an L-valuation vLM ∶Wn → {0,1} determined by the
assignment. We use an extended assignment function v ∶ Vn∪W↠n → {0,1} that
assigns truth values to both, propositional letters and ‘attacks’, i.e., formulas
in W↠n . A model M is deﬁned by an assignment function v. The following
deﬁnitions are useful in order to deﬁne the LA-valuation based on v:
vRral =df 1 − max
α,β∈Vn
(min(v(α), v(α↠ β), v(β)))
vRbot =df 1 −max
α∈Vn
(min(v(α),1 − v(↠ α)))
vRad =df 1 − max
α,β∈Vn
(min(v(α), v(β↠ α),1 −max
γ∈Vn
(min(v(γ), v(γ ↠ β))))),
vLA
i
=df min(vRral, vRbot, vRad)
Note that vRral corresponds to our syntactical rule (R↠) in the sense that
vRral = 1 iﬀ the assignment satisﬁes the semantic counterpart to (R↠). That
is to say, vRral = 1 iﬀ v satisﬁes
If v(α) = v(α↠ β) = 1, then v(β) = 0. (S↠)
The situation is analogous for vRbot and vRad with respect to the following
properties:
If v(α) = 1, then v(↠ α) = 1. (S)
If v(α) = v(β↠ α) = 1, then there is a γ ∈ Vn for which v(γ) = v(γ ↠ β) = 1.
(Sad)
We call an assignment LA-intended iﬀ v
LA
i
= 1. In (Straßer and Sˇesˇelja 2009)
it is shown that an assignment v is LA-intended iﬀ v satisﬁes (S↠), (Sad) and
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(S).
We deﬁne the valuation function vLM ∶ Wn → {0,1} paradigmatically for
L = LA. The one for LC is deﬁned in a similar way and can be found in
(Straßer and Sˇesˇelja 2009). Where α,β ∈ Vn and ϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈Wn we deﬁne:
vLM() = 0 (s)
vLM(α↠ β) = v(α↠ β) (s↠)
vLM(↠ α) = v(↠ α) (s↠)
vLM(α) =min(vLAi , v(α)) (sPA)
vLM(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) =min(vLM(ϕ1), vLM(ϕ2)) (s∧)
vLM(ϕ1 ∨ϕ2) =max(vLM(ϕ1), vLM(ϕ2)) (s∨)
vLM(ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2) =max(1 − vLM(ϕ1), vLM(ϕ2)) (s⊃)
vLM(¬ϕ) = 1 − vLM(ϕ) (s¬)
Obviously, by (s↠) and (s↠) the valuation inherits the truth values for ‘at-
tacks’ in W↠n from the assignment function. Note that although (sPA) is of a
rather complex form, it is fully determined by the assignment v. In the case
vLA
i
= 1, i.e., in the case that the assignment is LA-intended, the valuation
takes over all truth values from the assignment for all formulas in Vn. How-
ever, if vLA
i
= 0, the valuation assigns to all propositional letters the truth
value 0. Note that for a given AF A the empty selection is always an admissi-
ble extension. Thus, the valuation on the basis of a non-intended assignment
corresponds to the empty extension. In (Straßer and Sˇesˇelja 2009) it is shown
that LA-valuations satisfy (S↠), (Sad) and (S).
Model validity and the semantic consequence relation are deﬁned in the
usual way. Where L ∈ {LA,LC}, we deﬁne M ⊧L ϕ iﬀ vLM(ϕ) = 1. We say a
model M is an L-model of Γ ⊂Wn iﬀ M ⊧L ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ. We write ML(Γ)
for the set of all L-models of Γ. The semantic consequence relations ⊩L are
deﬁned in the usual way: Γ ⊩L ϕ iﬀ for all L-models M of Γ, M ⊧L ϕ.
Completeness and soundness for both logics, LA and LC are proven in
(Straßer and Sˇesˇelja 2009).
7.3.2 Representing AFs as Premise Sets
Let us now see how to represent AFs in terms of premise sets. There is an easy
and intuitive way to do so:
 First, we need to map the arguments of a given AF A = ⟨A,→⟩, where
A ⊆ An, into the set of propositional letters Vn. Of course, we need at
least as many propositional letters as we have arguments. A canonical
way to do so is by λn ∶ An → Vn, ai ↦ pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We can say that
pi represents, or corresponds to an argument ai iﬀ ai ∈ A.
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 Second, we need to represent the attack relation. This can be simply
done by adding to the premise set pi ↠ pj iﬀ (ai, aj) ∈→.
 It is furthermore important to indicate which propositional letters belong
to the AF in question. We do this by adding ↠ pi to the premise set
iﬀ ai ∈ A.
For premise sets constructed in this way we write Γn
A
.
Example 7.3.1. For instance, the AF A from Example 7.2.1 is represented
by the premise set Γn
A
= {p1 ↠ p2, p2 ↠ p1, p1 ↠ p3, p2 ↠ p3, p3 ↠ p4} ∪ {↠
p1,↠ p2,↠ p3,↠ p4} where n ≥ 4.
For many applications it is interesting to choose a language that has more
propositional letters than an argumentation framework ⟨A,→⟩ that is initially
modeled. Some examples:
1. In order to model the argumentative reasoning of intelligent agents a
system has to deal with more and more information in form of new argu-
ments coming in. The initial setup is thus iteratively enriched as the ar-
gumentation proceeds. An argumentation can thus be seen as a sequence
of argumentation frameworks A1,A2, . . . ,Am where Ai+1 = ⟨Ai+1,→i+1⟩ is
an enhancement of Ai = ⟨Ai,→i⟩, i.e., (Ai+1∪→i+1) ⊃ (Ai∪→i).
2. Abstract argumentation is a promising framework for applications such as
machine learning (see (Mozˇina et al. 2007)), belief revision (see (Falappa
et al. 2009) for a survey), or decision theory (see (Amgoud and Vesic
2009)) since knowledge/belief bases may be represented by or with the
help of argumentation frameworks.
For such applications it is obviously important to have enough propositional
letters available in order to represent the successive stages A1,A2, . . . ,Am.
Furthermore, a logic has to be able to deal with new information arriving,
resulting in the transition from Ai to Ai+1. That is to say, it has to allow for
external dynamics. To simply apply a given algorithm producing the accepted
argument in question again from scratch to Ai+1 is cumbersome, especially
since it doesn’t model in any way the rationale of the rational agent going
through this very transition. We will thus oﬀer a dynamic proof procedure
which by dynamic markings is able to model the reasoning of the agent in
question throughout the sequence of updates she is exposed to. We will discuss
this feature more in Subsection 7.3.6.
7.3.3 Representational Requirements
Given an extension type E (such as admissible, complete, preferred, etc.) and
an AF A, what are our requirements for a logic for abstract argumentation LE?
What should its consequences look like, what should its models represent?
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Let us presuppose that for the AFs ⟨A,→⟩ under consideration, A ⊆ An,
and that LE is formulated in the language Wn. This simply makes sure that
we have enough propositional letters to logically represent the AFs in question.
We have two straightforward and intuitive representational requirements
for a complete and sound logic LE : a syntactical one and a semantical one. Let
A = ⟨A,→⟩ be an AF:
1. Syntactic adequacy for skeptical (resp. credulous) acceptance: We require
that Γn
A
⊢LE pi iﬀ ai ∈ A and ai is skeptically (resp. credulously) accepted
according to E . Informally this simply means that a propositional letter
is derivable iﬀ it represents a skeptically (resp. credulously) acceptable
argument (for E).
2. Semantic adequacy : LetMLE (ΓnA) be the set of all LE -models of ΓnA. We
require that,
a) For each E-extension E ⊆ A of A there is a model M ∈MLE (ΓnA) for
which M ⊧LE pi iﬀ ai ∈ E,
b) and vice versa, for each model M ∈MLE (ΓnA) there is an E-extension
E of A for which M ⊧LE pi iﬀ ai ∈ E.
Thus, the models of the logic correspond exactly to the E-extensions in
the sense that they validate exactly the propositional letters representing
the arguments in the extensions.
For instance, an adequate logic for preferred extensions for our Example
7.2.1 would have two types of models: one validating p1 and p4, representing
the preferred extension {a1, a4}, and another one validating p2 and p4, rep-
resenting the preferred extension {a2, a4}. For skeptical acceptance, the only
propositional letter derivable is supposed to be p4, since the only skeptically
acceptable argument is a4. Due to completeness, p1 ∨ p2 is obviously also a
consequence. This is also intuitive since in every preferred extension either a1
or a2 is valid.
Definition 7.3.2. Let E be an extension type. If a logic L fulﬁlls requirement
(1) for E and for all AFs A = ⟨A,→⟩ where A ⊆ An, then we say that L syn-
tactically represents extension type E with respect to skeptical (resp. credulous)
acceptance for argumentation frameworks with at most n arguments.
If a logic L fulﬁlls the requirements in (2) for E and for all AFs A = ⟨A,→⟩
where A ⊆ An, then we say that L semantically represents extension type E for
argumentation frameworks with at most n arguments.
7.3.4 ALs – Interpreting a Premise Set as Normally as
Possible
The logics we are going to present belong to the class of adaptive logics (ALs).
The essential feature of ALs is that they interpret a premise set “as normally
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as possible” given certain criteria for normality. Adaptive logics are deﬁned
on the basis of a so-called lower limit logic (LLL). The LLL is a a reﬂexive,
transitive, monotonic, and compact logic that has a characteristic semantics
and contains classical logic. Semantically speaking, ALs select from all LLL-
models the ones that “are normal enough” and hence satisfy a certain standard
of normality. We will give a technically precise explication of this in a moment.
Translated in the context of our application and given an AF A = ⟨A,→⟩ this
means, for instance,
 that, in the case of preferred extensions, in each selected LLL-model of
Γn
A
as many arguments as possible7 are validated while the criteria for
admissible extensions are satisﬁed,
 that, in the case of grounded extensions, in each selected LLL-model
of Γn
A
as few arguments as possible are validated while the criteria for
complete extensions are satisﬁed,
 that, in the case of semi-stable extensions, in each selected LLL-model of
Γn
A
as many arguments as possible are validated and at the same time as
many arguments as possible are defeated while the criteria for complete
extensions are satisﬁed.
An adaptive strategy deﬁnes what it means for a model to satisfy the
standard of normality. For all the ALs in this chapter it will mean that the
models should be as “normal as possible”, or in other words, “minimally ab-
normal”. So-called abnormalities deﬁne what is considered as abnormal for
these models. Abnormalities are a certain set of formulas deﬁned by a logical
form. For instance, in case of preferred extension
ΩP = {¬pi ∣ i ≤ n}
is a good choice for abnormalities. Assume for the moment that, given an
AF A, the LLL-models of Γn
A
correspond to the admissible extensions of A.8
The minimal abnormal models are the LLL-models in which as few negated
propositional letters ¬pi are validated as possible. Inversely that means that
as many propositional letters are validated as possible. Then these models
correspond exactly to the preferred extensions, since these are the maximal
admissible extensions.
More generally, where Ω is the set of abnormalities and L is a logic, we deﬁne
the abnormal part of an L-model M as follows, AbLΩ(M) = {ϕ ∈ Ω ∣ M ⊧L ϕ}.
We say that an L-modelM of Γ is an Ω-minimally abnormal L-model of Γ iﬀ for
all L-modelsM ′ of Γ, AbLΩ(M ′) ⊄ AbLΩ(M). The ALs presented in this chapter
7More precisely we would have to express this by “as many propositional letters as
possible that represent arguments of the given AF”.
8Actually, as we will see in Section 7.3.5, the LA-models of Γ
n
A
are a superset of the
models corresponding to the admissible extensions of A. Due to this we will perform a pre-
selection on the LA-models before selecting the ΩP -minimally abnormal models (see Section
7.3.6).
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select all the Ω-minimally abnormal LLL-models of a given premise set where
the exact nature of Ω depends on the extension type under consideration.
In terms of proofs, this idea is realized by allowing for certain lines to
be added to the proof conditionally while the LLL-rules are unconditionally
applicable. For instance in case of preferred extensions we are interested in
adding an argument α on the condition that the assumption that ¬α is not
the case is safe. The adaptive strategy informs the logic when such a condition
should be considered as unsafe. In that case the line with the unsafe condition
is marked as invalid.
But let us exemplify the notions just introduced by having a look at a
proof for the simple AF given by A1 = ⟨{a1, a2},→1⟩ where →1= {(a1, a2)}. As
discussed above, the premise set corresponding to A1 for language W3 is given
by Γ3
A1
= {p1 ↠ p2,↠ p1,↠ p2}. We use more than two propositional letters
(namely three) since we are later going to enhance A1. The only preferred
extension for A1 is {a1}. Thus, what is expected from the logic for preferred
extensions is to derive p1. A good choice for an LLL is our core system LA.
1 p1 ↠ p2 PREM ∅
2 p1 RC {¬p1}
3 ¬p2 1,2; R↠ {¬p1}
Note that the adaptive proof is enhanced by a forth column stating the
condition of a line. Clearly, we don’t need any conditions in order to introduce
premises, as it is done at line 1. We write PREM for the generic rule allowing
to introduce premises on the empty condition.
As discussed above, the idea for preferred extensions is to derive as many
arguments as possible. Technically, this is made possible by allowing for the
conditional introduction of arguments, i.e., propositional letters. For instance
at line 2, p1 is introduced on the condition {¬p1}. The elements of conditions
are abnormalities, in our case members of ΩP .
Now, once p1 is considered to be valid, we know that p2 cannot be valid
since p1 ↠ p2. Indeed, at line 3 we derive ¬p2 by rule (R↠). Note that
the condition of line 2 is carried forward to line 3 since the derivational step
performed at line 3 employs also line 2.
The following two generic rules for ALs characterize what has just been
demonstrated in our example:
RU If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢LLL ψ ∶
ϕ1 ∆1
⋮ ⋮
ϕn ∆n
ψ ∆1 ∪⋯∪∆n
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RC If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢LLL ψ ∨Dab(Θ) ∶
ϕ1 ∆1
⋮ ⋮
ϕn ∆n
ψ ∆1 ∪⋯∪∆n ∪Θ
In the case of RC, Θ is a ﬁnite and non-empty set of abnormalities. We
write Dab(Θ) to abbreviate ⋁ϕ∈Θ ϕ. RU states that if a formula ψ is derived
on a line l by an LLL-rule with antecedents that are derived on conditions
∆1, . . . ,∆n, then these conditions are carried forward to line l. In our example
we derive ¬p2 at line 3 by the LLL-rule (R↠) with antecedents in lines 1 and
2. The conditions of these lines, namely ∅ and {¬p1}, are carried forward to
line 3.
The essential strength of adaptive logics comes with rule RC. It enables us
to derive formulas conditionally. Since ⊢ p1 ∨¬p1 is a theorem of propositional
logic, we derive p1 by RC at line 2 on the condition {¬p1}. Also for applications
of RC conditions are carried forward, as it was the case for RU.
Note that adaptive proofs are not yet fully characterized by the generic
rules PREM, RU and RC. What is missing are means to invalidate lines which
are derived on conditions that have to be considered as unsafe. The marking
deﬁnition of our adaptive logics will give a precise account of when a condition
is considered as unsafe. We will come to that at the end of the next subsection.
7.3.5 The Problem of an Interpretative Surplus
It was indicated above that an intuitive semantic selection procedure is to select
all ΩP -minimally abnormal LA-models of Γ
3
A1
. This section will show that this
idea, although it is on the right path, gives rise to a problem. Namely, some of
the models selected by the proposed procedure validate attacks, pi ↠ pj , and
propositional letters, pk, that do not correspond to attacks or arguments in the
given AF A, i.e., (ai, aj) ∉ → and ak ∉ A. Thus, some models ‘interpret too
much into the given AF’. After explicating the problem in this subsection we
will propose a solution by reﬁning our semantic selection (Subsection 7.3.6).
Note that, in our example, neither is a1 a member of all admissible ex-
tensions of A nor is p1 derivable by LA. Argument a1 constitutes the unique
preferred extension {a1} and thus p1 should be derivable by a logic for pre-
ferred extensions and furthermore, it should be the only propositional letter
derivable. Also, since (p1 ↠ p2) ⊃ (¬p1 ∨ ¬p2), p1 and p2 are never both valid
in the same model. This is as desired since a1 attacks a2. Furthermore, it can
be easily shown that there is an ΩP -minimally abnormal LA-model of Γ
3
A
that
veriﬁes p1 and ¬p2. There are however two problems:
(1) As can easily be veriﬁed, all the ΩP -minimally abnormal LA-models of
Γ3
A1
also validate p3. Since a3 is not part of the AF in question, A
1, this is
undesired and is not in accordance with our adequacy requirements.
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(2) It is easy to see that there are other ΩP -minimally abnormal LA-models
which verify p2 and ¬p1. Some of these models verify p2 ↠ p1, which
enables p2 to defend itself against the attack from p1. However, a2 does
not attack a1 in our AF A
1.
Thus, the problem is that, in order to validate as many arguments as pos-
sible, the logic selecting ΩP -minimally abnormal LA-models, (a), validates
propositional letters that do not correspond to arguments of the given AF,
and, (b), in some models validates attacks which are not part of the given
premises. To interpret a premise set as normally as possible the logic should
thus always also take care, (a), that all the arguments that do not correspond
to arguments in the given AF are not validated, and, (b), that no additional
attacks are derived or validated in the models.
One way to do so would be to directly enhance the premise set for AF⟨A,→⟩ by pi ↠̸ pj iﬀ (ai, aj) ∉ → and by  ↠̸ pi iﬀ ai ∉ A. In our case the
enriched premise set is
Γ′
A1
= Γ3
A1
∪⋃
3
i=1{pi ↠̸ p1} ∪⋃3i=2{pi ↠̸ p2} ∪⋃3i=1{pi ↠̸ p3} ∪ { ↠̸ p3}.
However, to enhance the premise set in this way has disadvantages. Some
of them are rather obvious: our ﬁrst proposal for the representation of AFs in
terms of premise sets as exempliﬁed by Γ3
A1
is more intuitive, simple and elegant
compared to the enhanced presentation exempliﬁed by Γ′
A1
. Furthermore, such
enhanced premise sets can have a very high cardinality (namely, n!+n) already
for small AFs. Instead of manually adding all the additional formulas to the
premise set Γ3
A1
it would be better if the logic were able to derive them on its
own.
Additionally, for some applications the enhancement of the premise set pro-
posed above is counterproductive. Suppose we are to model the argumentative
reasoning of intelligent agents: argumentation is a dynamic process, new infor-
mation in form of new arguments and new attack relations might come in (see
also (Cayrol et al. 2008)). In terms of argumentation frameworks that means
that the initial state of an argumentation might be given by A1, while, at a
later stage a new argument might enter the scene. For instance an agent might,
in order to defend a2 argue that a new argument a3 attacks a1. Thus, A
1 is
extended to A2 = ⟨{a1, a2, a3},{(a1, a2), (a3, a1)}⟩. Now if we represent A1 by
the premise set Γ′
A1
, then there is no way anymore to introduce p3 ↠ p1 at a
later point of the proof, since this contradicts the premise p3 ↠̸ p1 ∈ Γ′A1 . Were
we to add p3 ↠ p1, this would lead to explosion. Similar applications requiring
from the logic the ability to deal with new information on-the-ﬂy would be in
the ﬁelds of belief revision or machine learning (see page 125). Fortunately,
ALs oﬀer a way to avoid these diﬃculties. The following subsection explores
how.
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7.3.6 A Better Solution: Going Adaptive and Enabling
External Dynamics
Instead of enriching the premise set in the way demonstrated above, it would
thus be preferable to have a logic that, (a), has the virtue of dealing with such
cases of external dynamics, that is to say a logic which is able to deal with
the addition of new arguments and new attacks at any point during the proof
without exhibiting explosive behaviour, and, (b), can deal with the intuitive
and simple representation Γn
A
of AFs A as premise sets as deﬁned in Section
7.3.2 without exhibiting the problems explicated in Subsection 7.3.5.
This is where the strengths of adaptive logics can again be of use. The
idea is now to interpret the relation between two arguments ai and aj as non-
attacking as long as the premise pi ↠ pj has not been introduced, and to treat
pi as not representing an argument as long as the premise ↠ pi has not been
introduced. For our example that means that as long as our agent doesn’t
introduce p3, the logic should, (a), treat the relation between p3 and pi for
all pi ∈ Vn as non-attacking and thus derive p3 ↠̸ pi, and, (b), derive  ↠̸ p3
and hence by (R) ¬p3. As a result, as long as p3 has not been introduced,
the only argument in the consequence set should be p1 since a1 constitutes the
unique preferred extension of A1. However, as soon as p3 and p3 ↠ p1 have
been introduced, we are interested in deriving p2 and p3 as only arguments.
The reason is that {a2, a3} constitutes the unique preferred extension of A2.
As the reader might have already guessed, the way to achieve this behaviour
via an adaptive logic is to deﬁne abnormalities by the logical form α↠ β. Let
thus
Ω↠ =df {α↠ β ∣ α ∈ Vn ∪ {}, β ∈ Vn}
The idea is to ensure in this way that pi ↠̸ pj and  ↠̸ pk are derivable
whenever pi ↠ pj and ↠ pk are not part of the premise set.
We have seen in Subsection 7.3.5 that the ΩP -minimally abnormal LA-
models of Γ3
A1
do not correspond to the preferred extensions since they validate
arguments and attacks which are not part of A1. In order to improve on that
we employ a so-called prioritized adaptive logic. In semantic terms the idea is
realized in two steps:
(1) First, we pre-select the set of LA-models M↠ of Γ
3
A1
which validate only
the attacks that are actually a part of the given AF and which invalidate
all propositional letters that do not represent arguments.
(2) Second, from our preselection M↠ we select the ΩP -minimally abnormal
LA-models.
Now we have all tools at hand, at least semantically, to introduce our logic for
preferred extensions:
ALP = ⟨LA, [Ω↠,ΩP ], [simple strategy,minimal abnormality strategy]⟩
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The ﬁrst element, LA, is the lower limit logic. The second element lists the
abnormalities for the ﬁrst and second selection. The third element lists the
strategies used for the semantic selections, or syntactically, for the markings
in the proof. We will comment on the simple strategy more in a moment;
what is now important is that semantically both strategies select minimally
abnormal models.9 ALP is semantically characterized by the two steps of the
selection procedure which have just been introduced. Only performing the ﬁrst
step characterizes another, ﬂat adaptive logic that can be shown to represent
admissible extensions:
ALA = ⟨LA,Ω↠, simple strategy⟩
It is easy to prove that, for a given AF A = ⟨A,→⟩, the models selected by the
ﬁrst selection, i.e., the ALA-models of Γ
n
A
,
(a) validate pi ↠ pj iﬀ (ai, aj) ∈→, and,
(b) for all ai ∉ A validate  ↠̸ pi and thus, by (s), ¬pi.
This obviously solves the problem of Subsection 7.3.5. Indeed, theALA-models
of Γ3
A1
correspond to the admissible extensions of A1.10 This is as expected,
since the models in our second selection, the ΩP -minimally abnormal models
from theseALA-models, are expected to correspond to the maximal admissible
sets. We will see in Section 7.4 that the same sequential selection procedure is
applied to other extension types, only the abnormalities for the second selection
have to be adjusted.
We have talked a lot about semantics. Let us now take a look at a contin-
uation of our proof from page 128 and see how the ideas presented above are
applied syntactically.
134 p2 RC {¬p2}
9The reader should not be confused by the fact that for both strategies, simple strategy
resp. minimal abnormality, we apply the same semantic selection, namely the selection of
minimally abnormal LA-models with respect to the abnormalities in Ω↠ resp. ΩP . The
reason for this is that the simple strategy is equivalent to the minimal abnormality strategy
for a lower limit logic LLL, abnormalities Ω and a class of premise sets Γ if the following
fact holds:
(F⋆): For all Γ ∈ Γ and all finite and non-empty ∆ ⊆ Ω, Γ ⊢LLL Dab(∆), then
there is a ϕ ∈∆ such that Γ ⊢LLL ϕ.
This is the case for our LA, Ω↠ and premise sets defined by Γ
n
A
(as shown in (Straßer and
Sˇesˇelja 2009)). Hence, in this case the simple strategy, as we will see, allows for a simplified
marking strategy (see Definition 7.3.3) compared to the one for minimal abnormality (which
is defined in Subsection 7.3.8, Definition 7.3.4). Of course, due to (F⋆) the semantic selection
for the simple strategy can also be characterized as follows: selected are all LA-models of Γ
n
A
that validate only those abnormalities in Ω↠ that are LA-derivable from Γ
n
A
(or equivalently,
that are validated by all other LA-models of Γ
n
A
). Note, that in the case that fact (F⋆) does
not hold, such models are not guaranteed to exist. See also the discussion in (Straßer 2010,
Section 2.4.3).
10The representational results are stated in Section 7.4 (see Theorem 7.4.1 and Corollary
7.4.1) and proven in (Straßer and Sˇesˇelja 2009).
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135 def p1 1,4; Rad {¬p2}
136 ¬p1 1,4; R↠ {¬p2}
137 ⋁3i=1(pi ∧ (pi ↠ p1)) 5; Def {¬p2}
138 [ (p2 ∧ (p2 ↠ p1))∨(p3 ∧ (p3 ↠ p1)) 6,7; RU {¬p2}
159 p3 RC {¬p3}
10 [ ¬p2 ∨ (p2 ∧ (p2 ↠ p1))
∨(p3 ∧ (p3 ↠ p1)) 8; RU ∅
11 p2 ↠̸ p1 RC {p2 ↠ p1}
12 p3 ↠̸ p1 RC {p3 ↠ p1}
13 ¬p2 10,11,12; RU {p2 ↠ p1, p3 ↠ p1}
14  ↠̸ p3 RC {↠ p3}
15 ¬p3 14; R {↠ p3}
What is happening in the proof segment above? At line 4 we conditionally
introduce p2. This gives rise to p1 being defeated under the same condition
at line 5. Furthermore, at line 8 we derive that either p2 or p3 has to be
the defeater of p1. Moreover, we introduce p3 conditionally at line 9. What
we expect from the proof is that lines 4–9 get invalidated, since it is not in
our interest to derive p2 and p3, as neither is a part of the unique preferred
extension {a1}.
At lines 11, 12 and 14 we realize the ideas from above, namely that two
propositional letters pi and pj should be considered to not attack each other as
long as no premise pi ↠ pj has been introduced, and that a propositional letter
pi should be considered as not valid unless one of the introduced premises states
that it is part of the AF under consideration, i.e.,  ↠ pi. Thus, we derive
p2 ↠̸ p1, p3 ↠̸ p1 and  ↠̸ p3 conditionally at line 11, 12 and 14. Since
p2 ↠ p1, p3 ↠ p1 and ↠ p3 are not part of the premise set Γ3A1 , these lines
are not going to be marked in our proof for A1. Using these lines we are able
to derive ¬p2 at line 13 on the condition {p2 ↠ p1, p3 ↠ p1} as well as ¬p3 at
line 15 on condition {↠ p3}. Now something very important happens. Note
that lines 4–8 have been derived on the very condition that ¬p2 is not valid.
However, now we have derived ¬p2 and thus all lines which were derived on
this condition should be considered as invalid derivations and thus have to be
marked. Similarly, by introducing  ↠̸ p3 at line 14 we derive ¬p3 at line 15
which causes the marking of line 9. The idea behind the marking is thus to
invalidate lines on conditions that have to be considered as unsafe. What is
considered as unsafe depends on the adaptive strategy used. Recall that we
have deﬁned two types of abnormalities: ΩP and Ω↠. Each of these come with
their own marking deﬁnition. The marking deﬁnition for abnormalities in Ω↠
is very simple, after all it is based on the adaptive strategy called the simple
strategy.
Definition 7.3.3 (Marking for the simple strategy). A line with condition
∆ is marked at stage s if a α ↠ β ∈ ∆ ∩ Ω↠ has been derived on the empty
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condition.
Suppose for a moment that new information comes in: one agent, in order
to defend a2, voices a3 which attacks a1. In this case we would introduce
p3 ↠ p1 and  ↠ p3 by PREM. Note that lines 12–15 would get marked.
These lines would not anymore be considered to be derived since they rely on
the condition that p3 ↠ p1 and resp. ↠ p3 are not derivable. This behavior
is obviously intuitive.
The marking conditions for ΩP are technically a bit more complicated. We
will introduce them later in Subsection 7.3.8 in order not to complicate things
more than necessary at this point. However, let us make another important
remark.
So far we have discussed the prioritized aspect of adaptive logics only in
terms of the semantic selection. Of course, this has a syntactic equivalent to
it. This is illustrated in the proof, for instance, at line 13: here we derive
an abnormality ¬p2 ∈ ΩP at an unmarked line on a condition {p2 ↠ p1, p3 ↠
p1} ⊂ Ω↠. This causes the marking of all lines that have ¬p2 as a part of the
condition. Similarly, at line 15 we derive ¬p3 on the condition {↠ p3} which
causes the marking of line 9. Hence, lines are considered as (un)safe due to
conditions in ΩP on the basis of abnormalities in ΩP (and their disjunctions,
as we will see in Subsection 7.3.8) derived on unmarked lines on the empty
condition or on conditions which are subsets of Ω↠. In contrast, the marking
condition for Ω↠ requires that, in order to mark a line with condition ∆, a
α ↠ β ∈ ∆ has to be derived on the empty(!) condition. It is not enough to
derive α↠ β on a condition ∆′ ⊆ ΩP . This evidently mirrors syntactically the
prioritized aspect of the two semantic selections.
7.3.7 External Dynamics — Letting New Information In
Let us now proceed from A1 to A2. The new information in Γ3
A2
∖ Γ3
A1
is
introduced at lines 16 and 17. We restate lines 2, 4, 9, 13–15. Let Θ = {p1 ↠
p3, p2 ↠ p3, p3 ↠ p3}.
222 p1 RC {¬p1}⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
4 p2 RC {¬p2}⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
9 p3 RC {¬p3}⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
1613 ¬p2 10,11,12; RU {p2 ↠ p1, p3 ↠ p1}
1714 ↠̸ p3 RC {↠ p3}
1715 ¬p3 14; R {↠ p3}
16 p3 ↠ p1 PREM ∅
17 ↠ p3 PREM ∅
18 def p3 2,16; Rad {¬p1}
19 ⋁3i=1(pi ∧ (pi ↠ p3)) 18; Def {¬p1}
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20 ¬p1 ∨⋁3i=1(pi ∧ (pi ↠ p3)) 19; RA ∅
21 ⋀3i=1(pi ↠̸ p3) RC Θ
22 ¬p1 20,21; RU Θ
Due to the new information in A2, p3 now corresponds to an argument,
namely a3. Furthermore a3 attacks a1. Thus we introduce at lines 16 and 17
the new premises p3 ↠ p1 and ↠ p3. This immediately leads to the marking
of line 13 since this line was derived on the condition that p3 does not attack
p1, and to the marking of lines 14 and 15 since these lines were derived on
the condition { ↠ p3}, i.e., that a3 does not belong to the AF in question.
Furthermore, the new information enables us to derive ¬p1 at line 22 on the
condition Θ ⊂ Ω↠, which leads to the marking of line 2. Moreover, line 4 is
now unmarked, since the line which caused it to be marked before, namely 13,
is now itself marked. Analogously for line 9: line 15 which caused it to be
marked is now marked itself and hence, 9 is unmarked.
7.3.8 The Minimal Abnormality Strategy and Final
Derivability
We postponed the exact marking deﬁnition for the minimal abnormality strat-
egy so far. Recall that this strategy is used for the abnormalities in ΩP . The
marking deﬁnition can be better motivated if we take a look at another simple
example. Let A = ⟨{a1, a2},{(a1, a2), (a2, a1)}⟩. The two preferred extensions
are {a1} and {a2}. Thus, there should be two types of ΩP -minimally abnormal
ALA-models: on the one hand a model verifying p1 and ¬p2 and on the other
hand a model verifying p2 and ¬p1. That means that we expect from our logic
to derive p1∨p2 since either p1 or p2 is valid in each minimally abnormal model.
Let us take a look at a proof for Γ4
A
= {p1 ↠ p2, p2 ↠ p1,↠ p1,↠ p2} and
the language W4.
1 p1 ↠ p2 PREM ∅
2 p2 ↠ p1 PREM ∅
3 ↠ p1 PREM ∅
4 ↠ p2 PREM ∅
5 p1 RC {¬p1}
6 p2 RC {¬p2}
7 p1 ∨ p2 5; RU {¬p1}
8 p1 ∨ p2 6; RU {¬p2}
With the analyses given above, what we expect from our logic is that lines
5 and 6 are marked, while line 7 and 8 are not marked and hence p1 ∨ p2 is
considered as being derived. Note that with line 1 we can derive the following
disjunction of abnormalities:
9 ¬p1 ∨ ¬p2 1; R↠ ∅
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It is important to notice that neither ¬p1 nor ¬p2 can be derived on a
condition ∆ ⊆ Ω↠ (including the empty condition ∅).
In order to deﬁne our marking conditions we need to introduce some ter-
minology. Let us do this in a more general setting for a logic
AL = ⟨LX, [Ω↠,Ω], [simple strategy,minimal abnormality strategy]⟩,
where X ∈ {A,C}. Obviously our ALP is such a logic for Ω = ΩP . Where
∆ ⊆ Ω and ∆ is ﬁnite and non-empty, we say that Dab(∆) is a Ω-minimal
Dab-formula at a stage s of the proof iﬀ it is the formula of an unmarked line
with a condition ∆↠ ⊆ Ω↠ and no Dab(∆′), where ∆′ ⊂∆, is the formula of an
unmarked line with a condition ∆′↠ ⊆ Ω↠. A choice set of Σ = {∆1,∆2, . . .}
is a set that contains an element out of each member of Σ. A minimal choice
set of Σ is a choice set of Σ of which no proper subset is a choice set of Σ.11
Where Dab(∆1), . . . ,Dab(∆n) are the Ω-minimal Dab-formulas at stage s for
a premise set Γ, Φs(Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of {∆1, . . . ,∆n}.
With this terminology we can deﬁne marking conditions for the abnormal-
ities Ω and the minimal abnormality strategy. Let Γ be a premise set.
Definition 7.3.4 (Marking for the minimal abnormality strategy (with respect
to Ω)). Line i is marked at stage s if, where ϕ is derived on the condition ∆
at line i,
(i) there is no ∆′ ∈ Φs(Γ) such that ∆′ ∩∆ = ∅, or
(ii) for some ∆′ ∈ Φs(Γ), there is no line at which ϕ is derived on a condition
Θ for which ∆′ ∩Θ = ∅.
Let us return to our example. Note that at this stage of the proof ¬p1∨¬p2
at line 9 is a ΩP -minimal Dab-formula. Thus, the minimal choice sets at this
stage of the proof are {¬p1} and {¬p2}. By (ii) lines 5 and 6 are marked.
This is as desired, since after all, neither is a1 nor is a2 a skeptically accepted
argument. However, the situation is diﬀerent for lines 7 and 8. Note that
neither (i) nor (ii) apply, due to the fact that we are able to derive p1 ∨ p2 on
condition {¬p1} and(!) on condition {¬p2}.
Since, as we have seen with our examples, markings come and go in adaptive
proofs, we need a stable criterion for derivability in order to deﬁne a conse-
quence relation.
Definition 7.3.5. ϕ is finally derived from Γ on line i of a proof at stage s iﬀ
(i) ϕ is the second element of line i,
(ii) line i is not marked at stage s and
(iii) for every extension of the proof in which line i is marked there is a further
extension in which line i is unmarked.
11Let for instance Σ = {{1,2},{1,3}}. Choice sets are {1},{1,2},{1,3}, {2,3} and
{1,2,3}. Minimal are {1} and {2,3}.
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The deﬁnition states that a formula derived at an unmarked line is ﬁnally
derived in the case that there is no way anymore to mark it by extending the
proof. For instance in our proof above it is easy to see that p1 ∨ p2 is ﬁnally
derived since there is no way of extending the proof in such a way that lines 7
and 8 get marked. This is due to the fact that neither ¬p1 nor ¬p2 are derivable
on a condition ∆ ⊆ Ω↠.
Let us close this section by introducing p1 ↠ p3, p2 ↠ p3, p3 ↠ p4, ↠
p3,↠ p4 to our last example so that we arrive at the AF from Example 7.2.1.
Hence our new premise set is {p1 ↠ p2, p2 ↠ p1, p1 ↠ p3, p2 ↠ p3, p3 ↠ p4,↠
p1,↠ p2,↠ p3,↠ p4}. In the following proof we use the abbreviations:
Θ1 = {p1 ↠ p1, p3 ↠ p1, p4 ↠ p1}
Θ2 = {p2 ↠ p2, p3 ↠ p2, p4 ↠ p2}
The proof is as follows:
10 p1 ↠ p3 PREM ∅
11 p2 ↠ p3 PREM ∅
12 p3 ↠ p4 PREM ∅
13 p1 ↠̸ p1 ∧ p3 ↠̸ p1 ∧ p4 ↠̸ p1 RC Θ1
14 def p1 ⊃ p2 13; RU Θ1
15 p2 ↠̸ p2 ∧ p3 ↠̸ p2 ∧ p4 ↠̸ p2 RC Θ2
16 def p2 ⊃ p1 15; RU Θ2
17 p3 ⊃ def p1 10; Rad ∅
18 p3 ⊃ def p2 11; Rad ∅
19 p3 ⊃ (def p1 ∧ def p2) 17,18; RU ∅
20 p3 ⊃ (p1 ∧ p2) 14,16,19; RU Θ1 ∪Θ2
21 ¬p3 9,20; RU Θ1 ∪Θ2
22 p4 RC {¬p4}
It is easy to see that there is no way to mark line 22. Thus, as desired,
p1∨p2 and p4 are ﬁnally derivable. Recall that a4 is the only accepted argument
with respect to preferred extensions and that in each preferred extension there
is either a1 or a2 (but obviously never both simultaneously). Thus, p1 and p2
are not derivable, but p1 ∨ p2 and ¬p1 ∨ ¬p2 are.
After having introduced a logic for preferred extensions it is time to intro-
duce the other logics for abstract argumentation in the next section.
7.4 The AL framework for Skeptical Acceptance
In this section we will introduce adaptive logics for all the standard extension
types for abstract argumentation. After our discussion in the previous section
this can be done very smoothly. Let us ﬁrst recapitulate the three characteristic
elements of ALs that were introduced in the previous section:
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The lower limit logic (LLL) While all the rules of LLL are valid in AL,
the latter additionally allows for certain rules to be applied conditionally. This
strengthens LLL as it allows to derive at least as much as LLL and in most
cases even more. Thus, the consequence set of AL is a superset of the conse-
quence set of LLL: CnAL(Γ) ⊇ CnLLL(Γ) for all premise sets Γ. In semantic
terms ALs select a subset of “suﬃciently normal” LLL-models. In the case of
our logics, models are “minimally abnormal” in the sense that they validate as
few abnormalities as possible. This brings us to the next point:
The abnormalities The set of abnormalities is deﬁned by a logical form F.12
In the last section we, for instance, used abnormalities of the form ¬α where α
is a propositional letter. Thus, one set of abnormalities was characterized by
the set ΩP = {¬pi ∣ i ≤ n} for the language Wn.
The strategy Together with the abnormalities the strategy gives an exact
account of what it means to interpret a premise set “as normally as possible”.
In the previous section we, for instance, employed the minimal abnormality
strategy. In semantic terms this strategy selects all LLL-models M of a given
premise set Γ for which there are no LLL-models that validate less abnormali-
ties (w.r.t. ⊂). In syntactic terms strategies are realized by a marking deﬁnition.
In the last section we have demonstrated that adaptive proofs are dynamic:
the markings invalidate lines, however if new information is introduced and/or
while we reason along, markings may come and go. In this respect adaptive
proofs resemble human reasoning.
We have introduced the following notation to deﬁne adaptive logics (where
X ∈ {A,C}):
AL1 = ⟨LX,Ω↠, simple strategy⟩
AL2 = ⟨LX, [Ω↠,Ω], [simple strategy,minimal abnormality]⟩
We have already seen examples for both cases: the logic ALA is a ﬂat AL
for admissible extensions. On the other hand, the logic ALP for preferred
extensions is a prioritized AL.
The idea of the prioritization can be easily put in semantic terms: ﬁrst the
set of minimally abnormal LX-modelsM↠ with respect to Ω↠ is selected, and
then, from these selected models in M↠ the minimally abnormal models with
respect to Ω are selected. This is mirrored in the proof dynamics: the marking
deﬁnition for the minimal abnormality strategy (w.r.t. Ω) is such that not only
Ω-minimal Dab-formulas (i.e., minimal disjunctions of abnormalities) derived
on the empty condition are considered for the marking procedure, but also such
derived at unmarked lines with conditions ∆ ⊆ Ω↠ (see Deﬁnition 7.3.4).
We presuppose the languageWn throughout this and the next section for an
arbitrary natural number n. Let us give a general account of the consequence
12
F is considered to be LLL-contingent, i.e., neither ⊢LLL F nor ⊢LLL ¬F.
7.4. The AL framework for Skeptical Acceptance 139
relations for the ﬂat and prioritized logics that we are going to introduce in
this chapter:
Definition 7.4.1. We deﬁne Γ ⊩AL1 ϕ iﬀ for all Ω↠-minimally abnormal LX-
models M of Γ, M ⊧LX ϕ. Furthermore, Γ ⊢AL1 ϕ iﬀ ϕ is ﬁnally derivable in
terms of the marking conditions for the simple strategy deﬁned in Deﬁnition
7.3.3.
We deﬁne Γ ⊩AL2 ϕ iﬀ for all Ω-minimally abnormal AL1-models M of
Γ, M ⊧LX ϕ. Furthermore, Γ ⊢AL2 ϕ iﬀ ϕ is ﬁnally derivable in terms of
the marking conditions for the simple strategy in Deﬁnition 7.3.3 and for the
minimal abnormality strategy in Deﬁnition 7.3.4.
The consequence set of the prioritized logic AL2 in Deﬁnition 7.4.1 is char-
acterized by CnAL2(Γ) = CnAL′2(CnAL1(Γ)) where13
AL′2 = ⟨LLL,Ω,minimal abnormality strategy⟩
We are now able to deﬁne our adaptive logic framework for abstract argu-
mentation. The idea is that we ﬁrst deﬁne ﬂat, non-prioritized adaptive logics
for admissible and complete extensions. While ALA is the logic for admissible
extensions, the logic for complete extensions is the strengthening of ALA by
the rule (RCo):
ALC = ⟨LC,Ω↠, simple strategy⟩
In the second step we deﬁne the adaptive logics for all the other extension types
(preferred, grounded and semi-stable) by simply adding an “adaptive layer” to
the ﬂat adaptive logics ALA, resp. ALC. We have seen this already in Section
7.3.6 for preferred extensions: we added a second level to the adaptive logic for
admissible extensions resulting in logic ALP.
For grounded extensions the idea is similar. There are three diﬀerences
compared to preferred extensions:
 While preferred extensions are a certain selection of admissible exten-
sions, the grounded extension is a certain complete extension. Thus,
instead of using LA as LLL, we now use LC.
 While preferred extensions weremaximal admissible extensions, the grounded
extension is the minimal complete extension. Thus, instead of verifying
as many propositional letters as possible we now verify as few as possible.
Hence, instead of deﬁning the abnormalities as ΩP = {¬pi ∣ i ≤ n} we now
deﬁne them as
ΩG = {pi ∣ i ≤ n}
13We have not characterized the marking conditions for minimal abnormality for logics
that employ the minimal abnormality strategy for the flat case such as AL′
2
. They are a
straightforward specification of our Definition 7.3.4.
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 While there may be many preferred extensions, the grounded extension
is always unique. This allows for a simpliﬁcation, namely to use instead
of the minimal abnormality strategy the simple strategy.14
Thus, we deﬁne the adaptive logic for grounded extensions as follows:15
ALG = ⟨LC, [Ω↠,ΩG], [simple strategy, simple strategy]⟩
The adaptive logic for semi-stable extensions shouldn’t come as a surprise any-
more: instead of maximizing the number of arguments validated, we now max-
imize not only the number of arguments validated but also the number of
defeated arguments. Thus, our abnormalities are deﬁned by
ΩS = {¬pi ∧ ¬def pi ∣ i ≤ n}
For as many propositional letters as possible the logic is supposed to derive¬(¬pi ∧ ¬def pi). This is equivalent to pi ∨ def pi: either pi is valid or it is
defeated. We deﬁne our adaptive logic for semi-stable extensions as follows:16
ALS = ⟨LC, [Ω↠,ΩS], [simple strategy,minimal abnormality strategy]⟩
Completeness and soundness of all the logics presented in this paper are
proved in (Straßer and Sˇesˇelja 2009). The following results show that the
logics deﬁned above satisfy our representational requirements from Subsection
7.3.3.
Theorem 7.4.1.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(i) ALA
(ii) ALC
(iii) ALP
(iv) ALG
(v) ALS
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
semantically represents
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
admissible
complete
preferred
grounded
semi-stable
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
ex-
tensions for argumentation frameworks with at most n arguments.
Corollary 7.4.1.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(i) ALA
(ii) ALC
(iii) ALP
(iv) ALG
(v) ALS
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
syntactically represents
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
admissible
complete
preferred
grounded
semi-stable
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
extensions with respect to skeptical acceptance for argumentation frameworks
14As is well-known in the adaptive logic research, in case all minimally abnormal models
validate the same set of abnormalities, the minimal abnormality strategy and the simple
strategy are equivalent (cf. Footnote 9). See Section 2.4.3 in (Straßer 2010).
15In view of our discussion it is straightforward to define the marking conditions for the
simple strategy for ΩG in ALG: A line with condition ∆ is marked at stage s if a pi ∈∆∩ΩG
has been derived at an unmarked line on a condition ∆′ ⊆ Ω↠.
16In accordance with Footnote 5, ALS can easily be shown to be equivalent to
⟨LA, [Ω↠,ΩS], [simple strategy, minimal abnormality strategy]⟩.
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with at most n arguments.
7.5 Adaptive Logics for Credulous Acceptance
So far we have presented logics modeling skeptical acceptance. The current
section will deal with credulous acceptance. In the skeptical case we were
interested in arguments located in the intersection of all extensions of a given
type. Now we are focusing on their union. The so-called normal selections
strategy will prove to be very useful for this purpose.17 We will see that, given
the systems for skeptical acceptance, everything which has to be done in order
to model credulous acceptance is to use the normal selections strategy instead,
resp. on top of the minimal abnormality strategy.
The reason for this can be easily understood when we take a look at the
normal selections strategy from a semantic point: like the minimal abnormal-
ity strategy, the normal selections strategy selects minimally abnormal LLL-
models. However, semantic consequences are not deﬁned in terms of the in-
tersection of the models but in terms of their union. This obviously mirrors
the diﬀerence between skeptical and credulous acceptance, where the former
is deﬁned with respect to the intersection of all models of a certain extension
type while the latter is deﬁned in terms of the union of these extensions.
We use in this section the language Wn for an arbitrary natural number
n. The semantic consequence relation for our prioritized logics for credulous
acceptance is deﬁned as follows:
Definition 7.5.1. Where X ∈ {A,C} let
ALn = ⟨LX, [Ω↠,Ω], [simple strategy,normal selections]⟩.
WhereMALn(Γ) is the set of all Ω-minimally abnormal ALX-models of Γ, we
deﬁne the semantic consequence relation as follows: Γ ⊩ALn ϕ iﬀ there is a
M ∈MALn(Γ) for which M ⊧LX ϕ.18
Thus, we are going to deﬁne, for instance, a logic for preferred extensions
17The normal selections strategy was first introduced in (Batens 2000). See also (Batens
et al. To appear) and Section 2.9 in (Straßer 2010) for a more elaborated representation.
18Usually the semantic consequence relation has to be defined in terms of equivalence
classes of Ω-minimally abnormal ALX-models. For two ALX-models M ∼ N iff Ab
LX
Ω
(M) =
Ab
LX
Ω
(N). The semantic consequence relation is then defined by Γ ⊩ALn ϕ iff there is an
Ω-minimally abnormal ALX-model M of Γ such that for all Ω-minimally abnormal ALX-
models N of Γ for which N ∼ M , N ⊧LX ϕ (see (Straßer 2010, Section 2.9)). However, the
nature of our abnormalities and of our premise sets allows for the simplification in Definition
7.5.1 since it can easily be shown that for all AFs A and for all Ω-minimally abnormal
ALX-models of Γ
n
A
, M and N ,
(M ∼ N) iff (for all ϕ ∈ Wn,M ⊧LX ϕ iff N ⊧LX ϕ)
The simplification is explicated in a more detailed way in (Straßer and Sˇesˇelja 2009).
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with respect to credulous acceptance by
ALCP = ⟨LA, [Ω↠,ΩP ], [simple strategy,normal selections]⟩.
Note that each of the selected models from Deﬁnition 7.5.1 exactly corresponds
to a preferred extension.
We are still lacking a syntactic characterization of the normal selections
strategy. The marking conditions are technically straightforward. The follow-
ing deﬁnition covers the generic case for ALn from Deﬁnition 7.5.1:
Definition 7.5.2 (Marking for normal selections (w.r.t. Ω)). Line i is marked
at stage s if, where ∆ is the condition of line i, Dab(∆ ∩Ω) has been derived
at an unmarked line on a condition ∆′ for which ∆′ ∩Ω = ∅.
Definition 7.5.3. Γ ⊢ALn ϕ iﬀ ϕ is ﬁnally derivable with respect to the mark-
ing conditions for simple selections (w.r.t. Ω↠) and for normal selections (w.r.t.
Ω).
Let us again take a look at the AF A from our Example 7.2.1 for the logic
ALCP and with the language W4. Recall that the premise set is Γ
4
A
= {p1 ↠
p2, p2 ↠ p1, p1 ↠ p3, p2 ↠ p3, p3 ↠ p4,↠ p1,↠ p2,↠ p3,↠ p4}. In the
proof we use the following abbreviation: Θ = {p1 ↠ p1, p3 ↠ p1, p4 ↠ p1, p2 ↠
p2, p3 ↠ p2, p4 ↠ p2}.
1 p1 ↠ p2 PREM ∅
2 p2 ↠ p1 PREM ∅
3 p1 ↠ p3 PREM ∅
4 p2 ↠ p3 PREM ∅
5 p3 ↠ p4 PREM ∅
6 p1 RC {¬p1}
7 ¬p2 ∧ def p2 1,6; R↠,Def {¬p1}
8 p2 RC {¬p2}
9 ¬p1 ∧ def p1 2,8; R↠,Def {¬p2}
1310 p1 ∧ ¬p1 6,9; RU {¬p1,¬p2}
1311 p2 ∧ ¬p2 7,8; RU {¬p1,¬p2}
1312 p1 ∧ p2 6,8; RU {¬p1,¬p2}
13 ¬p1 ∨ ¬p2 1; R↠ ∅
14 ⋀i∈{1,3,4} pi ↠̸ p1 RC {p1 ↠ p1, p3 ↠ p1, p4 ↠ p1}
15 def p1 ⊃ p2 14; Def {p1 ↠ p1, p3 ↠ p1, p4 ↠ p1}
16 ⋀i∈{2,3,4} pi ↠̸ p2 RC {p2 ↠ p2, p3 ↠ p2, p4 ↠ p2}
17 def p2 ⊃ p1 16; Def {p2 ↠ p2, p3 ↠ p2, p4 ↠ p2}
18 p3 ⊃ def p1 3; Rad ∅
19 p3 ⊃ def p2 4; Rad ∅
20 p3 ⊃ (def p1 ∧ def p2) 18,19; RU ∅
21 p3 ⊃ (p1 ∧ p2) 15,17,20; RU Θ
22 ¬p3 13,21; RU Θ
23 p4 RC {¬p4}
7.5. Adaptive Logics for Credulous Acceptance 143
24 ↠ p4 PREM ∅
Although the proof is very similar to the one presented in Section 7.3.8,
there are important diﬀerences. Let us take a closer look. At lines 1–5 we
introduce some premises. At line 6 we conditionally derive p1. Next, due to p1
being conditionally derived, p2 gets defeated at line 7 on the condition {¬p1}.
This branch of the proof corresponds to the preferred extension {a1, a4} in the
sense that the proof proceeds under the condition that p1 is valid. The only
ΩP -minimally abnormal ALA-model validating p1 is the one also validating
p4 and ¬p2,¬p3. Analogously lines 8–9 correspond to the preferred extension{p2, p4}. At line 13 the ΩP -minimal Dab-formula ¬p1 ∨ ¬p2 is derived. At line
22 another ΩP -minimal Dab-formula is derived, namely ¬p3.
Note that, unlike the marking procedure for logic ALP (see Deﬁnition
7.3.4), at line 13 we do not mark lines 6–9. The reason for this is that, con-
cerning the marking conditions for normal selections, we would have to derive¬p1 (resp. ¬p2) at an unmarked line on a condition ∆ ⊆ Ω↠ in order to mark
lines derived on the condition {¬p1} (resp. {¬p2}).
In our example we have two minimal choice sets at line 24, namely {¬p1,¬p3}
and {¬p2,¬p3}. Therefore we have two ΩP -minimally abnormal ALA-models:
Ma and Mb where Ab
LA
ΩP
(Ma) = {¬p2,¬p3} and AbLAΩP (Mb) = {¬p1,¬p3}. It
is easy to see that Ma ⊧LA p1, p4,¬p2,¬p3 and Mb ⊧LA p2, p4,¬p1,¬p3. Ma
(resp. Mb) therefore corresponds to the preferred extension {a1, a4} (resp. cor-
responds to the other preferred extension {a2, a4}).
What is important to notice in this example is that we have
Γ4A ⊢ALCP p1
Γ4A ⊢ALCP p2
Γ4A ⊢ALCP ¬p1
Γ4A ⊢ALCP ¬p2
However, we also have for instance
Γ4A ⊬ALCP p1 ∧ p2 (7.1)
Γ4A ⊬ALCP p1 ∧ ¬p1 (7.2)
Note that lines 10–12 are marked. While p1 and p2 are credulously accept-
able in their own respect, as both corresponding arguments —a1 and a2— are
members of preferred extensions, their conjunction is not. Indeed, there is no
preferred extension in which both appear simultaneously. This justiﬁes (7.1).
As for (7.2), note that this prevents an explosion. Also, as a1 is a member
of one preferred extension, it is credulously acceptable. Still, a1 is defeated
in another preferred extension and therefore the corresponding p1 is false in
the corresponding model Mb. Of course, we do not want this to lead to the
credulous acceptance of ‘p1 ∧ ¬p1’.
Let us take a look at the other extension types. Admissible, complete, and
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preferred extensions share the same credulously accepted arguments since an
argument is credulously accepted with respect to preferred extensions iﬀ it is
in a maximal admissible (resp. complete) extension iﬀ it is in an admissible
(resp. complete) extension iﬀ it is credulously accepted with respect to admis-
sible (resp. complete) extensions. Thus, logic ALCP also models credulous
acceptance for admissible (resp. complete) extensions.
Also for grounded extensions we know that an argument is credulously
accepted iﬀ it is a member of the unique grounded extension iﬀ it is skeptically
accepted. Thus, logic ALG also models credulous acceptance.
For semi-stable extensions we proceed in a similar way as for preferred
extensions:
ALCS = ⟨LC, [Ω↠,ΩS ,ΩP ],
[simple strategy,minimal abnormality strategy,normal selections]⟩
The semantic consequence relation for ALCS is deﬁned similar to Deﬁnition
7.5.1 (details can be found in (Straßer and Sˇesˇelja 2009)).
Theorem 7.5.1.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(i) ALCP
(ii) ALCP
(iii) ALCS
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
semantically represents
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max. complete
preferred
semi-stable
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
extensions for argumentation frameworks with at most n arguments.
Theorem 7.5.2.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(i) ALCP
(ii) ALCP
(iii) ALCP
(iv) ALG
(v) ALCS
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
syntactically represents
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
admissible
complete
preferred
grounded
semi-stable
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
extensions with respect to credulous acceptance for argumentation frameworks
with at most n arguments.
7.6 Discussion
In this discussion section we will localize our results within the context of logical
representations of abstract argumentation and highlight some of its advantages.
There are basically two types of logical approaches to argumentation: a
meta-level and an object-level approach (see (Caminada and Gabbay 2009)).
The meta-level approaches are often framed in terms of modal logics (see
(Grossi 2009, Caminada and Gabbay 2009)). Where L is such a modal logic,
argumentation frameworks are models of L and arguments are possible worlds.
This way extension types and other key properties of argumentation theory
can be expressed in terms of the validity of certain formulas in the models.19
19A different meta-level approach is (Boella et al. 2005). Here, arguments are presented
by propositions and extensions are presented by primitives. The authors in (Caminada and
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Object-level approaches “model argumentation from within” ((Caminada
and Gabbay 2009), p. 134). An AF is represented in terms of premises and
arguments as atoms. The logic is supposed to derive acceptable arguments
with respect to a given extension type. Obviously, this is the way we motivated
our logical framework. Caminada and Gabbay (Caminada and Gabbay 2009)
present such a (modal) system for grounded extensions. Our system is clearly
more unifying in the sense that it is able to represent all standard extensions
of Dung’s framework. It is to our knowledge the most unifying object-level
logical modeling of argumentation in this sense. This is due to the fact that the
adaptive logic framework oﬀers easily adjustable and thus powerful mechanisms
that make it possible to obtain a generic proof-theoretic framework for all the
diﬀerent extensions, i.e., with the same representation of AFs as premise sets
and only slight variations in the abnormalities and strategies.
It is important to point out that our logical (object-level) approach to ab-
stract argumentation has a variety of advantages that go beyond the capabilities
of a simple algorithmic framework that produces skeptically resp. credulously
accepted arguments. Some were already mentioned before. For instance, the
defeasible character of our modeling allows for the addition of new elements
to an AF A1 on-the-ﬂy, resulting in A2 (see especially Section 7.3.7 for the
technical details). Traditional algorithms have to be applied ﬁrst to A1 and
then again, from scratch, to A2. However, our proof theory adjusts to new
situations by updating the markings while the argumentation goes on, provid-
ing provisional consequences for each step. In this way the dynamics and the
rationale of an ongoing argumentation are modeled.
Furthermore, the consequence set of our logics applied to an AF contains
more useful information beside the acceptable arguments. Take our Example
7.2.1. As expected, our logic for preferred extensions does derive the only
skeptically acceptable p4. Moreover, the following formulas are derivable: ϕ1 =
p1 ∨ p2, ϕ2 = def p1 ∨ def p2, ϕ3 = def p3.20 The ﬁrst formula, ϕ1, expresses that
either a1 or a2 is valid in every preferred extension, ϕ2 expresses that either
a1 or a2 is defeated in every preferred extension, and ϕ3 expresses that a3 is
defeated in every preferred extension.
Moreover, in some cases the user may take some arguments, X, in A for
granted and is thus only interested in, say, preferred extensions that cohere
with X, i.e., all preferred extensions E of A such that E ⊇ X. In this case
the premise set Γn
A
may be enriched by {pi ∣ ai ∈ X}. Our logic for preferred
extensions for instance derives inter alia all skeptically acceptable arguments
with respect to this subset of all preferred extensions. E.g., for X = {a1} we
get the following consequences: p4,def p2,¬p2,def p3,¬p3. This expresses that
a4 is skeptically acceptable in the discussed sense, that a2 and a3 are defeated
and thus not part of any of the preferred extensions of interest.
Furthermore, we are able to introduce proof theoretic techniques developed
Gabbay 2009) offer, besides the modal systems, also a classical logic meta-level approach
(using circumscription).
20Note that neither of the following is derivable: p1, p2,def p1,def p2.
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for adaptive logics which are interesting for abstract argumentation. For in-
stance, the interpretation of adaptive proofs in terms of argumentation games21
can be used to model a debate between two parties. Thus, we gain a view on all
the standard extension types for abstract argumentation in terms of dialogical
games for free on the basis of the presented proof dynamics.
Another advantage of our framework is that it is easily extendable. We
give two examples. Often it is not a single argument but rather a bundle
of arguments that together attack another argument (see also (Nielsen and
Parsons 2006)). Such joint attacks can easily be introduced in our framework
by, for instance, allowing for formulas such as (⋀I pi) ↠ pj expressing that
arguments {ai ∣ i ∈ I} attack argument aj . Our rules (R↠), (Rad), (R),
(RCo) and the deﬁnition (Def) can be adjusted in a straightforward way.22
On the other hand, it is interesting to allow for arguments attacking attacks
rather than arguments (see e.g., (Modgil 2009)). One such reason is to express
a preference for one argument, for instance a1 attacks a2 → a3 since a3 is
preferred compared to a2. For our modeling this means that we allow for
nested occurrences of the attack operator: p1 ↠ (p2 ↠ p3).23 It is important
to notice that enhancements to abstract argumentation and their combinations
can be modeled by minor natural adjustments to our framework and that the
modeling is very intuitive.
We have at the end of Section 7.3.2 already pointed out that the external
dynamics enabled by the AL representation of abstract argumentation not only
opens the possibility to model open, on-going argumentations, but may also be
useful for applications in machine learning, belief revision and decision theory.
Moreover, the interpretation of abstract argumentation in terms of adaptive
logics oﬀers the possibility to combine the strengths of both frameworks in the
modeling of various reasoning forms. Scholars have pointed out the strength
of both systems to model for instance defeasible reasoning (see e.g., (Batens
et al. 2009, Bondarenko et al. 1997)) or abduction (see e.g., (Neophytos and
Antonis 2003, Meheus and Batens 2006)). It remains open for future research
to explore these options.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented an adaptive logic characterization of abstract
argumentation. Our framework is unifying in the sense that adaptive logic
enhancements of one core logic are able to represent all standard extension
types for skeptical and credulous acceptance. Skeptically as well as credulously
accepted arguments with respect to a given extension type are represented
syntactically via the consequence set and semantically in the sense that the
21See (Batens 2009) for different variants of argumentation games proposed for adaptive
logics, and for instance (Vreeswijk and Prakken 2000) for the interpretation of abstract
argumentation in form of games.
22This has been realized in (Straßer 2010, Section 8).
23We will present the technical details in a future paper.
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models correspond to the extensions. The logics diﬀer only insofar as diﬀerent
strategies and diﬀerent sets of abnormalities are employed.
Moreover, the presented family of logics is apt for the modeling of open-
ended argumentations. The logics are able to derive provisional conclusions
at diﬀerent stages of an ongoing discussion. Thus, they explicate the rationale
underlying the acceptance of arguments. This is mirrored also by their dynamic
proof theory.
It is interesting to notice that the proof dynamics of these logics can be
interpreted in terms of argumentation games (see (Batens 2009)). Finally,
it should be mentioned that the logics can easily be extended by preferences
(Amgoud and Cayrol 1998), values (Bench-Capon 2002), audiences (Bench-
Capon et al. 2007) as well as joint attacks (Nielsen and Parsons 2006). We will
demonstrate this in a future paper.

Chapter
8
Epilogue
This thesis presented research on certain aspects of theory evaluation, the
context of pursuit, and the argumentative approach to methodology and its
formal modeling. I would like now to point out some of the questions that can
be raised in view of the preceding chapters and that remain open for future
research.
First of all, the epistemic goal of robustness, mentioned in Chapter 1 has so
far, up to my knowledge, not been used to characterize the scientiﬁc knowledge
as a whole. Several authors (the most prominent in this respect being William
Wimsat (Wimsatt 2007)) have discussed robustness of particular theoretical
entities. While the former notion concerns the ability of scientiﬁc knowledge
to preserve its virtues of explaining and helping us to understand the world
by avoiding and in spite of possible scientiﬁc crisis and theoretical shifts, the
latter notion(s) concern the ability of theories (or smaller theoretical entities)
to remain constant throughout scientiﬁc development. While the robustness of
theories and theoretic entities is supportive of the more general aim of robust-
ness of scientiﬁc knowledge, we have argued the latter is not reducible to the
former since –in principle– the possibility of crisis cannot be excluded. Hence,
the more general notion of robustness plays an important role in the context
of theory pursuit. This idea remains to be further developed: on the one hand,
by showing how it relates to the other notions of robustness, and on the other
hand, by examining a role that diﬀerent notions of robustness play in diﬀerent
contexts of epistemic justiﬁcation.
Second, we have presented in Chapter 3 the account of potential coherence
by modifying Bonjour’s concept of coherence. As we have indicated at the end
of this chapter, a similar modiﬁcation could also be done on the basis of other
accounts of epistemic justiﬁcation. In which way the evaluation in the context
of pursuit is eﬀected by changing the basis account, and which of them might
be the most suitable ones for this purpose remains to be investigated in future
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research.
Next, the distinction between the epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness
is closely related to the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values.
Recent discussions in epistemology and philosophy of science have questioned
the viability of this distinction (see, for instance, (Rooney 1992), (Longino
1996), (Douglas 2009)). It remains a task for future research to investigate
in which ways these approaches challenge the idea of epistemic justiﬁcation as
such, both in the context of acceptance and in the context of pursuit.
Another issue that has been brought up early in this thesis is the pursuit
worthiness of scientiﬁcally relevant phenomena, entities, technological develop-
ments, etc. Even though we have discussed them as a single set, diﬀerent from
the pursuit and pursuit worthiness of scientiﬁc theories, a careful examination
of this set should reveal the diﬀerences between, for instance, the pursuit of
certain phenomena and the pursuit of technological developments. Further-
more, clarifying the diﬀerence between the notion of pursuit and the notion of
discovery, remains a task for the future research of the context of pursuit.
With respect to our explanatory argumentation framework, its concrete
applications to the case studies are yet to be realized. Chapter 6 oﬀered the
basic framework that can serve for this task. Moreover, a number of possible
enhancements has been indicated. A concrete evaluation of argumentative
structures representing rivaling scientiﬁc views on the basis of EAFs is another
open inquiry. In addition, the question of representing the criteria constituting
our account of potential coherence in terms of (possibly enhanced) EAFs is to
be tackled as well. Of special interest for this task is the notion of a nested
attack (see Section 6.7.3) which allows for attacks to themselves be attacked
(without attacking the arguments participating in the attack). For example,
the criterion of the programmatic character could be represented in terms of
nested attacks: if shortcomings (a) of a given scientiﬁc view are represented
as an attack on the arguments (b1–bn) constituting this view (i.e. a → bi for
all i ≤ n), then such an attack could itself be dismissed if a theory has a
programmatic character (c) that addresses this shortcoming (c → (a → bi)).
Such an attack neither attacks a nor bi. Instead, it dismisses the criticism
a of bi in view of c. For example, in the case of the theory of continental
drift, a could be an argument showing that Drift could not prove a mechanism
of drifting, while c could be an argument indicating Holmes’ hypothesis of
convection currents (see Chapters 4 and 6). While c does not attack the fact
that there is no suﬃcient evidence to establish the idea of the mechanism of
drift, it attacks its ability to lower the defensive strength of Drift.
Finally, our adaptive logic framework oﬀers a proof-theoretic environment
for all the standard extensions of Dung’s abstract argumentation. Logics for
diﬀerent selections of arguments belonging to EAFs could be formulated in a
similar way, though their concrete realization remains a task for future work.
Taking into account the explanatory relations in EAFs these logics may be
interesting for the research done on abduction, especially since the abductive
reasoning would be approached not from a propositional level, which is usual
for the logical systems, but from an argumentative level.
Appendix
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Appendix
A
Kuhn and Coherentist
Epistemology
. This following paper has been published under the same title in Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science (Sˇesˇelja and Straßer 2009). It is a joint
work with Christian Straßer. We are indebted to Erik Weber for comments
on an earlier draft of this paper.
Summary The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen
to show that since Thomas Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint can be incorpo-
rated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: (Thesis
1) an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory compar-
ison, nor to (Thesis 2) an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside
the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanen’s
ﬁrst thesis is not suﬃciently explicated, while the second one entirely fails.
With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhn’s view on inter-paradigm theory
comparison allows only for (what we shall dub as) ‘the weak notion of rational-
ity’, and that Kuukkanen’s argument is thus acceptable only in view of such
a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn
as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible
with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not ‘ultimately
empirical’, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.
A.1 Introduction
In his recent paper, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen argues that Thomas Kuhn’s philo-
sophical standpoint does not necessarily lead to:
(a) an abandonment of rationality and rational inter-paradigm theory compar-
ison, nor to
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(b) an abandonment of scientiﬁc realism and the convergence thesis (Kuukka-
nen 2007, p. 555).
The reason why these two conclusions can be avoided lies, according to
Kuukkanen, in the fact that Kuhn’s ideas can be interpreted in terms of a
coherentist epistemology. More precisely, he argues that a coherentist approach
to theory evaluation provides the criteria for a rational inter-paradigm theory
comparison (Thesis 1) and is compatible with convergent realism (Thesis 2).
The aim of this paper is to discuss Kuukkanen’s arguments used for rejecting a)
and b). We do not wish to criticize his interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist,
but to show that his theses, built on the basis of this interpretation, are either
insuﬃciently explicated (Thesis 1), or should be entirely rejected (Thesis 2).
With respect to the ﬁrst point, we will argue that Kuukkanen’s notion of
rationality, which he uses to characterize Kuhnian inter-paradigm theory com-
parison, needs to be further elaborated. We will show that Kuhn’s ideas on
theory choice allow only for (what we shall dub as) “the weak notion of ratio-
nality”, which is, in fact, compatible with coherentist epistemology, but which
might not be acceptable for some philosophers of science. We will conclude
that, if Kuukkanen’s aim is to interpret Kuhn in terms of some stronger notion
of rationality, he is on the wrong track. If, on the other hand, his notion of
rationality is the weaker one, introducing coherentist epistemology does not
bring any novel insights into Kuhnian inter-paradigm theory comparison, since
such a notion of rationality was already explicated by Kuhn himself.
With respect to the second point, we will show that convergent realism
cannot be seen as compatible with Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint even if we
agree that it can be compatible with coherentist epistemology. We will argue
that Kuhn’s argument against convergent realism is not “ultimately empirical”,
as Kuukkanen takes it to be, and thus, cannot be refuted on empirical grounds.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section A.2 we present a brief sum-
mary of Kuukkanen’s arguments. In Section A.3 we discuss the issue of inter-
paradigm theory comparison, while Section A.4 elaborates the problem of con-
vergent realism. Section A.5 brings some concluding remarks.
A.2 Kuukkanen on Kuhn
Kuukkanen characterizes Kuhn’s work as compatible with coherentist episte-
mology on the basis of what he calls “Kuhn’s epistemological conservatism”
and the idea that science is fundamentally problem-solving.1 Let us have a
brief look at each of these points.
First, Kuukkanen argues that the historical perspective underlying Kuhn’s
approach represents an epistemological framework according to which knowl-
edge is evaluated against a background of accepted beliefs characteristic of a
1Since Kuukkanen uses “puzzle solving” and “problem solving” interchangeably, we do
the same. For Kuhn’s remark on the difference between the two (i.e. between Popperian
“problem solving” and his own “puzzle solving”) see (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 4–5, 559).
A.3. Inter-Paradigm Theory Comparison and Theory Choice 155
speciﬁc scientiﬁc paradigm. Further, what needs to be evaluated is not beliefs
as such, but the desirability of a particular change of belief. Maintaining that
Kuhn adopted a piecemeal approach to theory change in which “it is ratio-
nal to attempt to improve the justiﬁcation of the old system, rather than to
reject the whole system and try to construct an alternative one”, Kuukkanen
characterizes Kuhn’s position as “epistemological conservatism” (ibid. p. 558).
The second relevant feature of Kuhn’s views is that scientiﬁc practice is
essentially puzzle-solving, and that “the choice between two theories turns,
therefore, to the question of whether the suggested alternative manages to
solve the puzzle that the older theory could not, or whether it can solve more
puzzles than the old one” (ibid., p. 558-559).
In view of these two theses Kuukkanen argues that Kuhn’s standpoint can
be incorporated into coherentist epistemology. He primarily calls upon L. Bon-
jour’s theory of coherence, summarizing Bonjour’s approach in the following
three criteria: consistency of the system, the degree of inferential connections
it contains, and the number of unexplained anomalous instances it exhibits
(ibid., p. 560). According to Kuukkanen, the ﬁrst point of his interpretation of
Kuhn – epistemological conservatism – ﬁts the coherentist idea that the sys-
tem should not be changed if that results in a decrease of its coherence, and
the other way around: if coherence can be increased, the system ought to be
changed. The second point – puzzle (or problem) solving – is characterized
as a natural component of coherentist epistemology: “Problems, that is, phe-
nomena unexplained by the machinery of the set, decrease the number and
strength of inferential relations between the components of the set, making the
system less coherent.” (ibid., p. 561). In other words, problem solving can be
described as coherence-increasing activity.
Although Kuukkanen remarks that Kuhn himself might not have agreed
with the description of himself as a coherentist, he points out that there are
indications in Kuhn’s work that actually go in the direction of coherentism. In
this paper we are not going to discuss whether such an interpretation is valid.
Kuukkanen himself mentions a number of obstacles for incorporating Kuhn
into coherentist epistemology. What we are interested in is the following ques-
tion: provided we agree with the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, are
Kuukkanen’s points regarding Kuhn’s view on the rationality of inter-paradigm
theory comparison and convergent realism acceptable? The following two sec-
tions are devoted to these issues.
A.3 Inter-Paradigm Theory Comparison and Theory
Choice
The ﬁrst thesis that Kuukkanen argues for is that Kuhn’s philosophy does not
necessarily lead to an abandonment of rational inter-paradigm theory compar-
ison, since it can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology. However, he
makes no remarks on the notion of rationality that is employed here. In this
section we present three possible concepts of rationality with respect to the
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determination of theory choice. Next, we discuss which of the three can be
taken to describe Kuhn’s own approach to theory choice. Finally, we explicate
the notion of rationality Kuukkanen needs to accept when arguing that Kuhn’s
standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology.
Let us begin by distinguishing two concepts of rationality governing theory
choice, with respect to the relation between the criteria of theory choice and
the determination of choice. In order to speak at all of a theory choice being
rational, we presuppose that the criteria used in this process are, generally
speaking, shared by the scientiﬁc community, that is, scientists in general agree
that arguing according to these standards is rational.
1. Strong notion of rationality : the choice of a theory is strictly determined
by the criteria shared by the scientiﬁc community. That is, an application
of the criteria leads to a unique theory choice.
2. Weak notion of rationality : the choice of a theory is not strictly deter-
mined by the shared criteria. That is, the criteria do not provide a linear
preference order on the set of theories in question. With respect to the
way the criteria are applied, we can make a further distinction between:
(a) Moderately weak notion of rationality : although the preference order
one the criteria, as well as the rules of their application, is ﬁxed, a
linear order on theories is not guaranteed: the given criteria together
with the rules of their application might be insuﬃcient for deciding
between two theories.
(b) Very weak notion of rationality : even though the criteria are shared,
the rules of their application as well as the preference order on them
are not a priori ﬁxed, but are dependent on the particular context
and/or the background knowledge, beliefs, values, etc. of an individ-
ual scientist.
Let us now move to Kuhn’s views on inter-paradigm theory comparison and
theory choice. First of all, Kuhn insisted that the theory comparison is done in
view of a set of shared criteria (see, for example, (Kuhn 1977, p. 322), (Kuhn
2000, p. 96)). However,
There is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic deci-
sion procedure which, properly applied, must lead each individual
in the group to the same decision. (Kuhn 2000, p. 200)
Hence, our strong notion of rationality does not ﬁt Kuhn’s views. More-
over:
Individually the criteria are imprecise: individuals may legitimately
diﬀer about their application to concrete cases. In addition, when
deployed together, they repeatedly prove to conﬂict with one an-
other: accuracy may, for example, dictate the choice of one theory,
scope the choice of its competitor. (Kuhn 1977, p. 322)
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... for purposes of evaluation, one must embed it [a newly proposed
law or theory] in a relevant body of currently accepted beliefs — for
example, those governing the instruments with which the relevant
observations have been made — and then apply to the whole a set
of secondary criteria. Accuracy is one of these, consistency with
other accepted beliefs is another, breadth of applicability a third,
simplicity a fourth, and there are others besides. All these criteria
are equivocal, and they are rarely all satisﬁed at once. Accuracy
is ordinarily approximate, and often unavailable. Consistency is at
best local ... Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder. And so on.
(Kuhn 2000, p. 114)
Even with respect to puzzle-solving (which Kuukkanen, as we have seen,
takes to be Kuhn’s key criterion of theory choice) Kuhn writes: “Like any
other value, puzzle-solving ability proves equivocal in application.” (Kuhn 1996,
p. 205). It follows that our moderately weak notion of rationality does not
capture Kuhn’s standpoint either. We are thus left with the very weak notion
of rationality .
So, for Kuhn there are indeed shared standards governing theory choice,
but they alone are not suﬃcient for explaining it:
One can explain, as the historian characteristically does, why par-
ticular men made particular choices at particular times. But for
that purpose one must go beyond the list of shared criteria to char-
acteristics of the individuals who make the choice. (Kuhn 1977,
p. 324)
These other criteria can be seen as reasons why the shared standards are ap-
plied in diﬀerent ways. Their diﬀerent application can be explained by diﬀerent
preference orders on the shared criteria, diﬀerent ways of evaluating the same
(shared) criterion, or diﬀerent parts of a theoretical framework to which the
same (shared) criterion is applied (see ibid., p. 334). Thus, instead of an algo-
rithmic path, discussions among scientists often take the path of persuasion:
. . . the superiority of one theory to another is something that cannot
be proved in the debate. Instead, I have insisted, each party must
try, by persuasion, to convert the other . . . Debates over theory-
choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or math-
ematical proof. (Kuhn 1996, pp. 198–199)
Kuhn explains that this does not mean that there are no good reasons for being
persuaded, or that these reasons are not ultimately decisive for the group of
scientists involved in the discussion, or that they are diﬀerent from the standard
criteria of theory choice, such as accuracy, simplicity, etc. (see also (Kuhn
1970a, p. 238, 241, 260–262)). His point is that the reasons used for persuasion
“function as values” (Kuhn 1996, p. 199): just as values can be diﬀerently
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applied and used to argue in favour of diﬀerent positions, so can otherwise
shared criteria be used to argue in favour of diﬀerent theories.
Now, if we take into account these arguments, then the only way to incor-
porate Kuhn’s standpoint into coherentist epistemology is by accepting that:
1. the criteria of coherence evaluation do not represent an algorithm that,
if properly applied, leads each evaluator to the same result;
2. the way in which the coherentist criteria are applied (for example, their
preference order, the scope of their application, etc.) can vary, and is in
this way context dependent.
Interestingly enough, such a weak notion of rationality is not incompatible
with coherentist accounts themselves. Neither Bonjour nor Thagard oﬀers a
preference order on the criteria of coherence evaluation or a strict way in which
these criteria are to be applied. On the contrary, both conceptions imply
a contextual approach to coherence evaluation. In the case of Bonjour, his
Doxastic Presumption, as well as his Observation Requirement, directly implies
context dependency of coherence evaluation (see (Bonjour 1985), especially
p. 119 and p. 283). In the case of Thagard’s account, its contextual character
is equally obvious: with regards to the comparative coherence evaluation of
phlogiston and oxygen theories, Thagard explicitly points out that his model
is biased towards the oxygen theory, since it was based on the anal-
ysis of Lavoisier’s argument. [. . . It] is not intended to represent
the point of view of a phlogiston theorist, a neutral observer, or the
entire scientiﬁc community. (Thagard 1992, p. 85, 88)
Let us now return to Kuukkanen’s interpretation of Kuhn. With regards
to Kuhn’s point that the criteria of theory choice might be diﬀerently applied,
he writes:
Yet, this does not make theory choice arbitrary or irrational. The
shared values, however diﬀerently shaped, seem to lead to the same
theory choice by community members, as ‘most members of the
group will ultimately ﬁnd one set of arguments than another deci-
sive’ (Kuhn 1996, p. 200).
(Kuukkanen 2007, p. 559); [the reference to Kuhn adapted to our
list of references]
This remark does not help in clarifying what Kuukkanen understands by “ra-
tional”. On the one hand, he is aware of Kuhn’s point that the criteria of
theory evaluation might be diﬀerently applied. On the other hand, he omits
to mention that the reason why community members tend to make the same
choices is not explained by the shared criteria alone. The explanation of their
unique choice, according to Kuhn, lies in the process of persuasion that enables
the majority to accept speciﬁc application of the standards governing theory
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evaluation.2 Which notion of rationality Kuukkanen uses here depends on the
way in which the link between the criteria and the theory choice is understood.
If his point that shared values “lead to the same theory choice” is supposed
to mean that the shared criteria always determine the same result in spite of
their diﬀerent application, Kuhn is being interpreted in the sense of our strong
notion of rationality. Moreover, Kuukkanen writes:
I show that problem-solving can be unproblematically connected
to a coherentist epistemology. What is more, there are indications
in Kuhn’s writings that he might have accepted this conclusion.
Surprisingly , this means that Kuhn implicitly agreed that there
could be a rational inter-paradigm theory comparison. (ibid., p.
556; italics added).
Again, this passage could be understood as suggesting that the idea of rational
inter-paradigm theory comparison is not at all obviously or explicitly present in
Kuhn’s writings. Since, as we have shown, the “very weak notion of rationality”
is indeed elaborated by Kuhn,3 it could be assumed that Kuukkanen’s aim is
to interpret Kuhn’s standpoint in terms of some stronger notion of rationality.
In case this really is Kuukkanen’s intention, his interpretation is on the wrong
track.
If, on the other hand, Kuukkanen uses the term rational in the sense of our
notion of very weak rationality, his analysis faces a diﬀerent sort of criticism.
First of all, such an idea of rationality might not seem all that rational to some
philosophers of science, in particular to those for whom Kuhn’s conception of
rationality is too weak, that is, to those who, contrary to Kuukkanen, think
that Kuhn should not be seen as a rationalist because of his weak notion of ra-
tionality (ibid., p. 562). Second, and more importantly, it could be asked, why
the recourse to coherentism is needed at all if Kuhnian inter-paradigm theory
comparison can already be shown to be rational (in the sense of our very weak
notion) on the basis of Kuhn’s own writings. If Kuhn already explicated his
view on theory choice, what is the beneﬁt of incorporating him into coherentist
epistemology, with respect to this question? Such a beneﬁt cannot be found
in interpreting Kuhn in terms of some stronger notion of rationality, for such
an approach would be inconsistent with Kuhn’s own standpoint, as it has been
shown in this section. But if we are left with the very weak notion, then co-
herentism does not oﬀer anything new with respect to the issue discussed, and
is thus unexplanatory. Moreover, linking coherentist epistemology with Kuhn
2This is clear already from the context in which the part of the sentence quoted by
Kuukkanen appears. Let us have a look at the entire sentence: “What one must understand,
however, is the manner in which a particular set of shared values interacts with the particular
experiences shared by the community of specialists to ensure that most members of the
group will ultimately find one set of arguments rather than another decisive. That process
is persuasion [...]” (Kuhn 1996, p. 200).
3We do not wish to argue that Kuhn gave an elaborated theory of rationality governing
theory choice, but only that his repeated explication of this problem accords with the very
weak notion of rationality defined in this paper.
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is not at all straight forward, since, for example, Kuhn maintained that the
development of science(s) leads to an increased incoherence among scientiﬁc
disciplines, as Kuukkanen himself remarks (cp. (Kuhn 2000, pp. 98–99) and
(Kuukkanen 2007, p. 564)).
It is important to notice that, speaking in principle, there would be a third
option left for Kuukkanen: namely, to show that even though Kuhn’s concep-
tion of rationality is a weak one, it is not necessarily implied from “the core”
of his views. In this case, Kuukkanen’s aim would be to link some stronger
notion of rationality with a part of Kuhn’s views. Nevertheless, he explicitly
states that he takes Kuhn’s philosophy as a whole to be at least consistent
with coherentist epistemology:
I will show below in detail that Kuhn’s philosophy indeed ﬁts with a
coherentist epistemology. (Kuukkanen 2007, p. 558; italics added);
... I believe this extension of his philosophy does not distort his
thinking. (ibid., p. 559)
Now we come to the crucial part. We have to assess how epistemo-
logical coherentism meshes with Kuhn’s characterization of science
as a whole, and speciﬁcally, how it agrees with the criteria that he
suggests are used in theory choice. (ibid., p. 560; italics added)
... all criteria are linked either directly or indirectly via problem-
solving to coherence, which makes Kuhn’s philosophy consistently
coherentist. (ibid., p. 561; italics added)
These passages clearly show that the notion of rationality used by Kuukka-
nen is not supposed to oppose of Kuhn’s views taken as a whole, and therefore
should not oppose Kuhn’s views on the rationality underlying theory choice
either.
Thus, we can conclude that Kuukkanen’s argument from coherentism to
the rationality of Kuhnian inter-paradigm theory comparison is either invalid
or unexplanatory.
A.4 Convergent Realism and Correspondence Theory of
Truth
Having argued that Kuhn’s position can be interpreted in terms of a coherentist
epistemology, Kuukkanen goes on to argue that, since convergent realism is
compatible with coherentism, it is therefore compatible with Kuhn’s views as
well.4 Kuukkanen agrees that the link from coherentism to realism isn’t straight
forward, but if we can show continuity, increasing coherence and stability over
4Even though Kuukkanen does not offer an explicit definition of convergent realism, it is
clear that he refers to a view according to which scientific theories can be seen as converging
towards the truth in the sense of the correspondence theory of truth (cp. “[...] the realist
typically understands truth as correspondence with reality” (ibid., p. 562) and the rest of
Section 4 in (Kuukkanen 2007)).
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the long run in the history of science, “an argument for the (approximate) truth
of theories has some intuitive appeal” (Kuukkanen 2007, p. 564). According to
him, Kuhn’s rejection of convergent realism is empirically motivated:
Although Kuhn had some reservations with the regard to the no-
tion of truth-likeness, he assigned to empirical historical research a
central role in deciding the issue of convergence.
And a bit further on:
Although Kuhn argued that the history of science does not yield
support for convergent realism (and for an overall increase of co-
herence in science), convergent realism is not incompatible with
his philosophy because Kuhn’s argument is ultimately empirical.
(ibid., p. 565)
Let us begin by noting that, in view of the above mentioned quote from Kuukka-
nen, what he actually claims is the following: had Kuhn found suﬃcient em-
pirically based support for convergent realism, he would have agreed with it
(or at least, such an agreement would be consistent with his own philosophi-
cal position). Consequently, if further research reveals some good empirically
based arguments for realism, that will be suﬃcient to refute Kuhn’s sceptical
view on it.
In addition, in order to claim the compatibility between Kuhn’s views and
convergent realism, Kuukkanen ﬁrst had to reassure us that Kuhn’s position
is compatible with one of the most crucial constituents of convergent realism:
the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, at the beginning of his article he ar-
gues that Kuhn did not successfully reject the correspondence theory of truth.
According to Kuukkanen, Kuhn only showed that there is no direct and un-
problematic access to truth, but that did not refute the correspondence theory
itself:
Even if we could not assess a match between a theory and reality,
it [Kuhn’s attack] does not make the idea that truth consists in a
relationship of correspondence between an independent world and
our beliefs, theories, and so on, meaningless. In other words, the
correspondence theory is a theory that oﬀers an interpretation of
what truth is without any epistemic concern as to whether we can
know the truth. (ibid., p. 556; italics added)
By making this point, Kuukkanen is able to argue in the following way: Kuhn
never refuted the correspondence theory itself, so his theory is compatible with
it, as well as with convergent realism; if historical arguments show stability,
continuity and increasing coherence of scientiﬁc theories, it is plausible to ac-
cept a convergent realist standpoint, which is thus not necessarily incompatible
with Kuhn’s approach.
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The main problem with this line of reasoning is that, according to Kuhn’s
central ideas, a valid empirically based argument for convergent realism is,
principally speaking, not possible. In what follows we will ﬁrst show that
Kuhn himself thought of his argument to be an a priori one. Second, we will
present this argument as Kuhn’s rejection of the very condition of possibility
of the convergent realist view – the correspondence theory of truth.
Let us begin with the ﬁrst point. Although Kuhn referred to a historical
meta-induction, he pointed out that his argument does not rely on it:
... my generation of philosophers/historians saw ourselves as build-
ing a philosophy on observations of actual scientiﬁc behavior. Look-
ing back now, I think that the image of what we were up to is
misleading. Given what I shall call the historical perspective, one
can reach many of the central conclusions we drew with scarcely
a glance at the historical record itself. ... And it is taking longer
still to realize that, with that perspective achieved, many of the
most central conclusions we drew from the historical record can be
derived instead from first principles. Approaching them in that way
reduces their apparent contingency ... . (Kuhn 2000, pp. 111–112;
italics added)
Taking the context into account, it is clear that by ﬁrst principles Kuhn means
the principles that constitute scientiﬁc practice as such. A rejection of con-
vergent realism could thus rely on what we can conclude from the nature of
science, i.e. on its key constituents, without which it would be diﬃcult to con-
ceive science in the sense of the term as we know it. But was such an approach
undertaken by Kuhn? By presenting his “tripartite conviction” Kuhn answered
this question:
First, the Archimedean platform outside of history, outside of time
and space, is gone beyond recall. Second, in its absence, compara-
tive evaluation is all there is. ... And third, if the notion of truth
has a role to play in scientiﬁc development, which I shall elsewhere
argue that it does, then truth cannot be anything like correspon-
dence to reality. ... I’ve reached that position from principles that
must govern all developmental processes, without, that is, needing
to call upon actual examples of scientiﬁc behavior. (ibid., p. 115)5
Furthermore, the objections on his reference to history and sociology of sci-
ence were not unknown to Kuhn and he opposed them by emphasizing that
5A bit further in the same article, Kuhn compares his arguments against an absolute
Archimedean platform and the correspondence theory of truth with the ones he is about to
present: “This one, unlike the last, is not necessary or an a priori characteristic, but must
be suggested by observations.” (Kuhn 2000, p. 116). The comparison thus explicitly shows
that Kuhn thought of these arguments as a priori and not based on empirical observations.
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“the generalizations which constitute received theories in sociology and psy-
chology (and history?) are weak reeds from which to weave a philosophy of
science”(Kuhn 1970a, p. 235) .
The crucial part of Kuhn’s a priori reasoning against convergent realism is
his argument against the correspondence theory of truth. Let us recall that,
according to Kuukkanen, the correspondence theory can be seen as compatible
with Kuhn’s account since Kuhn never succeeded at rejecting the theory itself.
We argue that Kuukkanen does not take into account that Kuhn’s attack on
the correspondence theory of truth is an attack on one of its main constitutive
ideas – the notion of the mind-independent world. We shall present a number of
places from Kuhn’s work that substantiate our point. We begin with his explicit
rejection of the possibility of truth as the correspondence to “the one big mind-
independent world”, and move towards arguments given in the framework of
his so-called “Post-Darwinian Kantianism”.
... truth cannot be anything like correspondence to reality. I am not
suggesting, let me emphasize, that there is a reality which science
fails to get at. My point is rather that no sense can be made of
the notion of reality as it has ordinarily functioned in philosophy of
science. (Kuhn 2000, p. 115)
Kuhn, thus, argues not only that the match between the mind and from it
independent reality is not assessable, but that this match is nonsensical .
But the natural sciences, dealing objectively with the real world
(as they do), are generally held to be immune. Their truths (and
falsities) are thought to transcend the ravages of temporal, cultural,
and linguistic change. I am suggesting, of course, that they cannot
do so. Neither the descriptive nor the theoretical language of natu-
ral science provides the bedrock such transcendence would require.
(ibid., p. 75)
The reasons for these claims need to be explicated in view of Kuhn’s discussion
of the notion of world. First of all, Kuhn emphasizes the world-constitutive role
of intentionality and mental representations (ibid., p. 103), of a lexicon that is
always already in place (ibid., p. 86):
. . . diﬀerent languages impose diﬀerent structures on the world. ...
where the structure is diﬀerent, the world is diﬀerent. (ibid., p. 52)
The world itself must be somehow lexicon-dependent. (ibid., p. 77)
What is thus at stake is the notion of a mind-independent, or in Putnam’s
terms, “ready-made” world. And for the reasons given above, this term is
for Kuhn nonsensical. Nevertheless, he warns his readers that this does not
imply that the world is somehow mind-dependent: “the metaphor of a mind-
dependent world — like its cousin, the constructed or invented world — proves
to be deeply misleading” (ibid., p. 103).
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How should the notion of world be treated then? Instead of the strict
dichotomy between the mind-independent world and our representations of
it, Kuhn proposes “a sort of post-Darwinian Kantianism. Like the Kantian
categories, the lexicon supplies preconditions of possible experience” (ibid.,
p. 104). And as the lexical categories change (ibid.), both in a diachronous and
a synchronous manner, “the world ... alters with time and from one community
to the next” (ibid., p. 102). Kuhn compares a permanent, ﬁxed, and stable
foundation “underlying all these processes of diﬀerentiation and change” to
“Kant’s Ding an sich”, which “is ineﬀable, undescribable, undiscussable” (ibid.,
p. 104). And what replaces the dichotomy of mind/language/thinking and the
one big mind-independent world (ibid., p. 120) is the concept of “niche”: “the
world is our representation of our niche” (ibid., p. 103).
Those niches, which both create and are created by the conceptual
and instrumental tools with which their inhabitants practice upon
them, are as solid, real, resistant to arbitrary change as the external
world was once said to be. (ibid., p. 120)
Now, what has become of the notion of truth in Kuhn’s post-Darwinian Kan-
tianism?6 Truth can at best be seen as having “only intra-theoretic applica-
tions” (Kuhn 1970a, p. 266):
Evaluation of a statement’s truth values is, in short, an activity
that can be conducted only with a lexicon already in place. (Kuhn
2000, p. 77)
By contrast, “[t]he ways of being-in-the-world which a lexicon provides are
not candidates for true/false” (ibid., pp. 103–104). None of these “form[s] of
life”, “practice[s]-in-the-world” give “privileged access to a real, as against an
invented, world” (ibid., p. 104). Therefore the speech of theories becoming
truer “has a vaguely ungrammatical ring: it is hard to know quite what those
who use it have in mind.” (ibid., p. 115).7
Furthermore, if with Kuhn the sciences form a “complex but unsystematic
structure of distinct specialties or species” and therefore have to be “viewed as
plural” (ibid., p. 119), and if the niches “do not sum to a single coherent whole
6Kuukkanen is not the only one who skips over Kuhn’s arguments given in the tradition
of Kantian philosophy. Brendan Larvor (cp. (Larvor 2003)), for example, argues that “Kuhn
worked into his model of science the historicism found in Koyre and Butterfield” (ibid., p.
386), so that his (Kuhn’s) claims “that there is no ahistorical standard of rationality by which
past episodes may be judged and that science cannot be shown to be heading towards the
Truth – [...] now appear as methodological commitments rather than historico-philosophical
theses. Kuhn made waves by dropping an historicist stone into a scientific pond.” (ibid.,
p. 389). However, as our discussion shows, Kuhn’s views on these issues cannot be reduced
to a mere application of the methodological standards, characteristic for the tradition of
historicism in which he stood, to philosophy of science.
7Kuhn obviously emphasized his proximity to more “continentally minded” traditions in
philosophy not just by his explicit “Kantianism”, but also by calling upon key notions such
as Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” or late Wittgenstein’s “forms of life”.
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of which we and the practitioners of all the individual scientiﬁc specialties are
inhabitants” (ibid., p. 120), then “there is no basis for talk of science’s gradual
elimination of all worlds excepting the single real one.” (ibid., p. 86).
What these quotes show is that the problem with the correspondence theory
is not only in the correspondence itself (as Kuukkanen takes it to be), but also
in the notion of world that is supposed to participate in this correspondence.
But what would it mean to oﬀer a valid argument against the correspondence
theory of truth if not to show that one of its constitutive terms, together with
the correspondence itself, is meaningless. Thus, when Kuukkanen claims that
Kuhn’s argument against the correspondence theory is epistemological, this
interpretation is acceptable only if epistemology is taken in view of Kuhn’s
transcendental perspective. Bearing this in mind, we have to reject Kuukka-
nen’s claim that Kuhn “failed to understand the nature of the correspondence
theory as a non-epistemic theory”, for, as we have seen, such a non-epistemic
character of the correspondence theory is for Kuhn plainly nonsensical. Once
again:
There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases
like ’really there’; the notion of a match between the ontology of
a theory and its ‘real’ counterpart in nature now seems to me illu-
sive in principle. Besides, as a historian, I am impressed with the
implausibility of the view. (Kuhn 1996, p. 206).
We have thus shown that Kuukkanen’s arguments against Kuhn’s rejection of
the correspondence theory of truth, and for the compatibility of the Kuhnian
standpoint with convergent realism – both fail. Showing that Kuhn’s position
can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology cannot help in bringing him
closer to convergent realism since a coherentist approach should either be com-
patible with Kuhn’s a priori argument, or if it is incompatible with it, then so
much worse for Kuukkanen’s idea of incorporating Kuhn into coherentism.
A.5 Conclusion
J. M. Kuukkanen tried to show that by incorporating Kuhn into coherentist
epistemology we can reject the claim that Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint
abandons a rational inter-paradigm theory comparison, as well as the claim
that it is incompatible with convergent realism. In this paper we have argued
that there are certain problems with Kuukkanen’s arguments. On the one hand,
we have shown that Kuhn’s views on theory comparison and theory choice
allow only for, what we have called, “the very weak notion of rationality”, and
that Kuhn can be interpreted as a coherentist only in view of this notion. On
the other hand, we have shown that Kuhn had an argument against convergent
realism, which Kuukkanen did not take into account when claiming that Kuhn’s
standpoint is compatible with it. In both cases Kuukkanen’s point faces the
following problem: either coherentist epistemology claims the opposite of Kuhn,
and is thus incompatible with Kuhn’s ideas, or it is compatible with Kuhn’s
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ideas, in which case this link oﬀers no new and/or surprising insights into
Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint, with respect to the issues discussed.8 We
would like to conclude with two remarks regarding our arguments.
With respect to the rationality of Kuhnian inter-paradigm theory compar-
ison, it is important to notice that our distinction between three notions of
rationality, though not very reﬁned, is suﬃcient for our point. That is to say,
the distinction is not meant to serve discussions on the issue of rationality in
general, since it can indeed be further reﬁned. However, the fact that it is
exhaustive is suﬃcient for our claim that Kuhn’s position cannot belong to
either of the ﬁrst two categories.
With regard to Kuhn’s a priori argument against the correspondence theory
of truth and convergent realism, we would like to remark that in order to
challenge Kuukkanen’s claim that Kuhn’s argument against convergent realism
was ultimately empirical, it was suﬃcient to show that Kuhn, in fact, had an a
priori argument. The question as to whether Kuhn’s argument is a good one,
or whether it is a novel one (or only based on arguments that were already
given in the continental philosophical tradition) is irrelevant for our point.
8This, however, does not mean that showing the possibility of incorporating Kuhn into
coherentist epistemology is of no significance at all, for that is an interesting and valuable
insight in itself.
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